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GENERAL EDITOR: RICHARD SORABJI

AENEAS OF GAZA: Theophrastus *with* ZACHARIAS OF MYTILENE: Ammonius

Translated by
Sebastian Gertz, John Dillon & Donald Russell

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Preface: Waiting for Philoponus

Richard Sorabji

I. Three Gazan Christians waiting for Philoponus

The fifth-century AD pagan Neoplatonist Proclus wrote eighteen arguments for the eternity of the cosmos which were to be recorded and attacked one by one in the following century by the Christian Philoponus in his *Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World*.[1] By 'the world' (*kosmos* in Greek) was meant the entire universe envisaged as an orderly system, and they agreed with each other that the universe was an orderly system, even when they used an expression, 'the universe' (*to pan* in Greek), that did not actually include that in its meaning. Their disagreement was on whether it had a beginning and end, as the Christians said. Proclus died in 485 AD, and Philoponus wrote his reply, the first of a series against the pagan philosophers, in 529. In the period of almost fifty years between 485 and 529, three Christians from Gaza had already attempted to attack the dominant pagan philosophy of Platonism. They had some limited successes, but I shall argue that it was only Philoponus who had the ability to carry the attack home into the pagan camp.[2]

Three Christian attacks on Neoplatonism

Aeneas of Gaza was the first of the three Gazans. His dialogue *Theophrastus*, written between 485 and 490,[3] was named after his fictitious Platonist interlocutor who represented the case for Platonism and who supposedly lost to the fictitious Christian Euxitheus. The main subject of the *Theophrastus* was the human soul and its fate before birth and after death, including the resurrection. But it overlapped in one part with the subject of the other two Christian texts, the Christians' creation of the world from a beginning, as opposed to the Neoplatonists' eternal creation of the world. Moreover, the overlap turns out to be greater, because the second Christian also finishes his text by discussing the resurrection.

The second Christian, Zacharias, born in the port of Gaza, Maiuma, had gone to study rhetoric and philosophy in Alexandria in the 480s. After moving on to study law in Berytus around 487, he wrote

in the 490s a dialogue caricaturing the great Neoplatonist philosopher of Alexandria, Ammonius, and named it after him, *Ammonius* (or *On the Creation of the World*). This dialogue represented Ammonius as being refuted and silenced by the arguments about creation of a Christian student identified in the preface as Zacharias himself, even though he warns that when he is in dialogue with the two pagan professors, he will switch his designation from 'A' to 'CH.' (short for 'Christian'), as he does several times.[4] It cited Aeneas a couple of times, and re-used some of his arguments, although it added many more, often naïve, but occasionally better than those of Aeneas. Zacharias was to feature as the hero in another of his own treatises, *The Life of Severus*, this time as the most important figure in a riot of about 486 that ransacked the pagan temple of Isis outside Alexandria, and led to the flight from the city of three pagan teachers, the torture of another, and the death in hiding of a fifth. The *Ammonius* inserted the supposed refutation by Zacharias of Gessius, a younger medical colleague of Ammonius, and it has been suggested that this 'refutation' was added after 525 AD, when Ammonius was no longer alive himself to provide the straw man.[5] The dialogue is amusingly unreal in its boasts, but also sociologically interesting, as it reveals much about the practices in the Alexandrian school, which has recently been excavated,[6] and about the feelings of a zealous and dangerously disruptive sub-group of Christian students. Zacharias finished up as the Bishop of Mytilene.

As regards a third Christian, Procopius of Gaza (died *c.* 538), it has been drawn to my attention[7] that there are two pages in Procopius' *Commentary on Genesis*[8] that argue against the eternity of the world, and this battery of summarised arguments includes a few that are more skilful than those that we find in Zacharias. Procopius himself had a brother called Zacharias, but it is not known whether that Zacharias was ours.

The anti-Platonist arguments of the last two Gazans very occasionally anticipate those found in Philoponus. But we shall see that they cannot be compared. One important factor is that Philoponus does repeatedly what the Gazans do only occasionally. He takes on his Platonist opponents on their own terms, using their premises to arrive at his conclusion. Not even Proclus had done that in writing against the Christians, and Philoponus often complains in his *Against Proclus* that Proclus is relying on Platonist dogma which he, Philoponus, finds unpersuasive and sometimes absurd.

This is only one of the reasons why I have described the Christian opponents of Neoplatonism as 'waiting for Philoponus'. But the situation has been illuminatingly nuanced by Edward Watts. It is not that the three Gazans were trying to do the same thing as Philoponus and failing. On the contrary, Watts has argued, in discussing the first two of the three Gazans, that they had more parochial aims.[9] On this

account, it turns out to be only natural that they did not feel it necessary to refute the Platonists on their own terms. Aeneas was a rhetorician, and Watts argues that the readers he wanted to impress were in the literary salons especially of Alexandria and regarded themselves as being on equal, and not unfriendly, terms with the Neoplatonists. Zacharias, by contrast, was writing to impress certain Christian students in Alexandria and to undercut the personal authority of their pagan teachers in religious matters. Neither questioned the value of Neoplatonist cultural knowledge, and Aeneas was interested in displaying his rhetorical acquaintance with it. Both might presumably have achieved their objectives, without showing the Neoplatonists themselves that their philosophical position was untenable, which is what Philoponus set out to do.

Watts offers a hypothesis about Philoponus' motivation, which must inevitably remain conjectural.[10] But it would, if true, explain the fact that Philoponus opposed the Neoplatonists on their own terms. Up to about 525 AD Philoponus had edited by far the largest number of commentaries on Aristotle based on Ammonius' lectures, with innovative contributions of his own.[11] From 529 onwards, while writing at least one more commentary on Aristotle, he embarked on a series of attacks on the pagan world-view of Aristotle and Proclus. Watts' suggestion is that, on finding he was passed over for the chair of philosophy upon the death of Ammonius' immediate successor around 525 in favour of the very much less experienced Olympiodorus, he decided that he could attract Christian students away from Olympiodorus to his own better exposition of pagan thought, accompanied by a critique of it.

I shall now look more closely at the successes and limitations of the three earlier efforts to combat pagan Neoplatonism.

Aeneas on the food chain objection to resurrection

I shall start with an example from Aeneas' defence of Christian views on the soul and the resurrection of the body. This makes the overlap with Zacharias complete, because Zacharias tacks on this same problem about the resurrection to his treatise on the creation of the world. Like Philoponus, Aeneas is aware of an objection to the resurrection of the body, that our bodies will be eaten after death and will have passed through a food chain, but he is unaware of the sharpest formulation of the problem given by Origen (died 253/4 AD), which motivates the solution offered by Origen and was apparently followed by Philoponus.[12] The crucial point in the sharpest formulation is that the food chain includes other individual humans.

The food chain problem was known at least as early as Athenagoras in the second century AD. Christians wanted us to be given back the very same bodies at the resurrection and the usual

view was that this would require us to be given back some of the same particles as we had before. But if the food chain through which our dead bodies had passed included other *human* bodies, the question arose how those particles would belong to one human individual rather than to another. Origen solved the problem, but at a price that most Christians other than Philoponus did not like to pay. He took an unusual passage of Aristotle which uses the notion of form (*eidos*) in the sense of the structure of an individual organism, and compared it with an elastic tube, preserving the organism's structure and identity however much its *matter* may change and grow.[13] Origen accordingly suggested that it would count as the very same individual body, if the unique structure (*eidos*) of our former body was restored in the resurrection. There would be a positive advantage if the matter was *not* the same, because the Christian promise is of an indestructible new heaven and a new earth – this point Philoponus certainly accepted. Flesh is inevitably destructible. What we need is a body made of a spirit (*pneuma*), whether of air or fire or a mixture, which cannot be sliced, cut or otherwise damaged, but one having the very same unique *structure* as we had at some point in our lives. We might think of the structure displayed in a photograph taken in our most characteristic prime.

The way Aeneas puts the food chain problem is different. He considers only a *single* link, and not a chain. He puts it not as a question about recovering the *individual* body, but as an apparently easier question about recovering a body of the right – human – *type* after a *single* devouring.[14] It is not obvious why he thinks this a problem. If the idea is merely that our particles get mixed up with particles from an animal of another *type*, why should God not retrieve them for the resurrection? But perhaps he thinks they get *converted* into particles of the other animals' type, so that the particles of *our* type would be lost. That would justify his speaking of *types*.

However, Aeneas occasionally half-recognises, but only briefly, that even a *single* devouring calls also for a discussion of *individual* bodies, *not* types. He does so when he says, 'God dispatches each soul to its own and separates and distributes them, just as, in our world, good shepherds easily marshal even one of their myriad sheep in the right place, and there is no risk of any confusion.'[15] He returns a little later to the example of the bronze statue of an *individual*, Achilles, being melted down and turned into gold. Aeneas is following the discussion in Gregory of Nyssa's *On the Soul and Resurrection*, which talks merely of our bodily elements being scattered, not of their being *devoured*. Nonetheless Gregory's talk of elements (*stoikheia*) seems to be referring, even if a little ambiguously, to *individual* elementary particles, rather than to *types* of element, when he says that each human soul has to remember for the sake of bodily resurrection the

original elements and the order in which they were originally placed. When he adds that the soul remains diffused among these elements and remains with them, this is what suggests *individual* elementary particles. The soul recognises the original particles by means of the signs (*sêmeia*), peculiar characteristics (*idiotêtes*), and distinguishing structure (*idiazousa sustasis*) proper to them (*oikeion*, *idion*). Some of the analogies offered by Gregory concern individuals, but Gregory may be referring to types, when he gives the analogy of colour hues, and imagines a painter who can recover the original separate hues out of a mixture.[16] Gregory has occasion to focus again on *types*, when he goes on to discuss certain distinct questions. Criticising the view of some (not all) Platonists that individual humans can be reincarnated as animals of different *types*, he says that this obliterates the peculiar characteristics (*idiotêtes*) of their nature.[17] Again, he takes up St Paul's resurrection analogy that the death of a seed of a given *type* is needed for the life of a plant of a given type.[18] Aeneas repeats this sort of example, without any warning that it concerns types, in his answer to the food chain problem.[19]

The food chain problem is raised again in Zacharias' *Ammonius* as a final supplementary question on the resurrection, but again with only a *single* devouring considered. He shows no appreciation of the dangers involved in further stages of the food chain.[20]

Platonists for and Christians against an eternal world

I shall now come to the debate between Platonists and Christians on whether the world is eternal.

(i) Platonists Porphyry, Sallustius, Proclus: the Creator's eternal good will implies an eternal world created

The pagan arguments for the world's eternity, like the difficulties raised against the resurrection, go back well before Proclus. Proclus in the fifth century is said to have been drawing on Porphyry in the late third century, and was also anticipated by the later fourth-century Platonist Sallustius, when he argued that the Creator's eternal good will implied an eternal world created.[21]

(ii) Proclus: otherwise he would sometimes be a potential, so imperfect, creator

Proclus offers a further argument, that if the world that God created was not eternal, he would sometimes be a merely potential, and so imperfect, creator.[22] God then must be an *actual* creator, and in that case the world he creates must be *actual*.[23]

(iii) Christians: Zacharias, Procopius, Philoponus: being a creator depends on internal powers, not external products

I shall start with the Gazans' best replies. Aeneas did not contribute significantly to the first topic. But Zacharias offered some good arguments directed not against Proclus, but against Proclus' pupil Ammonius, under whom Zacharias studied in Alexandria. The pagan view makes God dependent for his being on what he creates.[24] But in fact God is a creator not because of what he creates, but because of what he has within him: creative principles (*dêmiourgikoi logoi*),[25] so that he creates by will and freely (*thelein*, *eleutheros*), not by any necessity.[26] In appealing to creative principles, Zacharias may deliberately have been using a favourite concept of his opponent Ammonius. At any rate, one of Ammonius' more philosophical pupils, Asclepius, wrote a commentary based on Ammonius' seminars on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and the commentary uses the term 'creative principles' of the Platonic Forms in God's mind no less than ten times.[27] The idea of creative principles goes back earlier to Proclus, who quotes it from Porphyry, who based it in turn on a discussion in different wording by his own teacher, Plotinus.[28] But Zacharias might also – probably not instead – have found the idea of creative principles in the *Christian* tradition. At any rate, without the *word* 'creative', Origen, perhaps inspired by the still earlier Jewish thinker Philo of Alexandria, sees principles (*logoi*, Latin: *rationes*) in the mind of God as being used as a model for Creation. More exactly, he thinks these principles are within God the Son in his role as God's Wisdom.[29]

Zacharias continues by saying that human professionals are analogous to God as creator. A doctor does not depend for being a doctor on patients being treated continuously, but on the medical principles (*iatrikoi logoi*) within him, and the same goes for a craftsman or rhetorician.[30] He adds a telling objection, that the pagan argument about God being eternally good would prove too much. For God is surely the creator of individuals like Socrates and Plato, but they do not exist always. Does that detract, however, from the goodness of God?[31]

The other Christians agree. Procopius says that if God's creatures were necessary for his being *by nature* a creator, they would also be needed for completing the divine essence (*ousia*).[32] But a building or ship is not co-terminous (*sunhuparkhei*) with a builder or shipwright. For the creating is *within* the creator, whereas the thing created comes *after* him.[33]

Philoponus repeats some of the same arguments as Zacharias before going beyond him. God creates by means of creative principles, analogously to a shipwright or builder, so what he creates need not exist at the moment he thinks of it.[34] He repeats also that an

individual human is not for ever being created by God.[35] But he takes the argument about potentiality further, and treats it in a more systematic way. It was Aristotle who had first introduced the distinction between potentiality and actuality, but he had recognised an intermediate level between two extremes. A human embryo may be potentially a builder. A fully trained wakeful human may *actually* be building. But the trained human, when sleeping or otherwise occupied, is in an intermediate state, which can equally be called a level of second potentiality, or of *first actuality*. It is to be contrasted with the level of *second* actuality occupied by someone who is building at the moment.[36] Philoponus' point is that, although the second actuality of building may call for (some of) a building to exist, the first actuality does not require there to be any building in existence. The same goes for God, who is an *actual* creator, so long as he possesses the *first* actuality of creating. The point is a very general one that takes in Zacharias' examples of doctor, craftsman and rhetorician, and brings these and many other examples under a very general principle supplied by that very systematic philosopher, Aristotle.

(iv) Christians Zacharias, Philoponus: God's will for a beginning is not a change of his beginningless will

Zacharias has another good argument that uses his opponents' premises. He responds to the objection, ascribed to his opponent Ammonius, that, if God gave the world a beginning, he will at that time have changed his will (*boulêsis*). Zacharias makes Ammonius' Christian student reply that God had a *beginningless* will for this creation.[37] Zacharias could once again be taking or adapting an idea from his opponent Ammonius, in order to turn it against him. At any rate, Ammonius' pupil Philoponus later repeatedly uses the argument that God could have a beginningless and changeless will for a creative change to occur,[38] and he goes on to compare God's changeless will for change with his unitary knowledge of the diverse and timeless knowledge of the temporal.[39] Possibly the point about will, and certainly the point about knowledge, had been used by Ammonius. The point about knowledge had first been made by Iamblichus and was then repeated by Proclus and by Ammonius himself in application to timeless knowledge of the temporal and definite knowledge of an indefinite future.[40]

(v) Christians Maximus, Procopius, Philoponus: even Aristotle allows instances of white to come into being out of nothing

The other good argument that deserves to be mentioned is made by Procopius, but this one had already been anticipated by an earlier Christian. It is that the creation of the world out of nothing in which

Christians believe was also accepted by Aristotle for the special case of individual forms. This argument, applied to qualities (*poiotêtes*) rather than forms, is already ascribed by Eusebius in the fourth century to a still earlier Christian called Maximus. When Philoponus applies the argument to individual forms, he gives Aristotle's example of a *particular* instance of whiteness as a form that comes into being out of nothing.[41] This explains why Maximus could have called it a quality. It is, of course, a *particular* form or quality, and most *particular* forms would be of finite duration. Aristotle says that white and certain other forms start existing without undergoing a process of coming into existence.[42]

(vi) Some Platonists: must not an endless world be beginningless? Reply: only if by nature endless

From the Platonist side, Augustine reports the case made by many Platonists for treating the world as beginningless.[43] Augustine, like Aristotle before him, and like the Platonists Plutarch and Atticus, understood Plato differently as assigning a beginning to the orderly cosmos, while having the Creator spare it from coming to an end. This is just what Augustine believed to be true of the human soul, that it had a beginning, but was spared destruction. But many Platonists insisted that what has no end can have no beginning. This reason for making the world eternal had neither Plato's support, in Augustine's view, nor his own.

Proclus used the same Platonist view that Augustine had criticised. He claimed Plato's authority for the view that the world was imperishable and that therefore it must be beginningless, and hence eternal.[44] But Lindsay Judson has shown that Philoponus outmanoeuvred him and took the subject further. Not only was Philoponus more careful in specifying the relations between imperishable and ungenerable, and between unperishing and ungenerated, but he also stressed that Plato's *Timaeus* made the world imperishable only through God's overriding its perishable nature. It is only if it is *by nature* imperishable, which Plato denies, that we can infer that it is ungenerable.[45]

(vii) Christians Basil, Zacharias, Procopius: would not an eternal world be co-eternal with God, and so have the same honorific status as its Creator? Replies: why same in all respects? And is God eternal in the same sense?

Zacharias and Procopius, like Basil of Caesarea before them, raise the further complaint that a world co-eternal with its Creator would share God's honorific status.[46] Zacharias has a better version in which he argues, more modestly, that if the world were co-eternal

with God, there would be *one* respect (eternity) in which God was not superior.[47] But why should the world have the same status in *all* respects?

There is an even more glaring oversight. The Neoplatonists drew on Plato's denial in the *Timaeus* that 'was' or 'will be' apply to Platonic Forms or that the Forms grow older, and in the *Parmenides* that the One postulated by Parmenides is in time or has a share of time. Although Plato's own description of Forms wobbled and his description of the One ended in paradox, Plotinus and subsequent Neoplatonists were emphatic in describing not only Forms, but also Plato's Creator God – normally equated with the divine Intellect – as outside of time, and the supreme God, the One, as indescribable. Neither God, then, is in time. Time already in Plato's *Timaeus* was only an image of eternity, and to eternity the Neoplatonists deny duration. This means that the physical world, even if eternal in the sense of having everlasting temporal duration, does not have the kind of eternity which sets the Neoplatonic deities outside time altogether.[48]

Nonetheless, the Christians' mistake did not consist in putting their point in terms of co-eternity, because the Platonists themselves often speak that way. In arguments (i) and (ii) above, they speak of the Creator's good will, of his status as Creator and of the created world all in the same terms as being eternal (*aïdion*), existing always (*aei*), or in the Arabic of Proclus' first argument as being everlasting (*abadî*).[49] Only at the very end of the Arabic discussion is it explained that God is everlasting in a different sense of being eternal and timeless. The Platonists do not mind the talk of co-eternity, because what interests them is what the timeless and the everlasting have in common: they are beginningless and endless. But the Christian conclusion that they have the same status requires more: that they are eternal in the same sense, and this the Platonists do not grant.

(viii) Christians Procopius, Philoponus: is not effect chronologically later than cause? Reply: or only causally posterior?

On the Christian side, we have noticed Procopius insisting that a ship or building comes *after* (*meta*) the shipwright or builder. But Philoponus makes the claim quite general. Whenever anything is generated, the cause precedes and the effect comes later.[50]

The Platonists, however, had made use of a distinction of Aristotle's between types of posteriority, in order to say that some things are posterior only in the order of causation, and not chronologically. Augustine reports that some Platonists had used this distinction in the present context to say that Plato intended to give the world a causal origin, but not a temporal origin.[51] But Aeneas and Zacharias seem not to distinguish the two types of posteriority, temporal and

causal. Thus Aeneas mistakenly cites Plotinus as on his own side in insisting that the Creator is older (*presbuteron*) than the matter he creates, and cannot be *hama*, at the same level, or on the same footing. He does not consider whether the priority and sameness of level and footing in Plotinus is chronological or causal.[52] Zacharias repeats the mistake over whether *hama* means chronologically or causally at the same level. In a passage to which I shall return, he thinks Ammonius will be forced to agree that, since co-eternal things are *chronologically* at the same level, *hama*, one cannot be the cause of the other. But this will follow only if the meaning of *hama* is switched to being *causally* at the same level, so that one is not *causally* prior to the other.[53] It is interesting that Zacharias is really hoping here to argue from the opponent's premises, because he introduces his point by having the Christian student say that he will furnish *also* proofs that are derived from premises familiar and dear to Ammonius.[54] But the word '*also*' acknowledges the point that he has not thought it necessary to confine himself to premises accepted by Ammonius, but sometimes plays only to the Christian gallery.

(ix) Platonist examples of effect with the same duration, but not status, as its cause: a shadow, light, a footprint

To the Christian objections that an effect must be chronologically later than its cause the Platonists had a set of analogies to offer by way of further reply: a shadow, light from a light-source and a footprint. Thus Taurus in the second century AD explained the sense in which the world is 'generated' in terms of the analogy that there never was a time when the light of the moon was not being generated by the sun.[55] Plotinus in the third century spoke of Aristotle's prime matter, the ultimate subject of properties that has to be endowed with form if it is to constitute bodies, as 'a shadow upon a shadow'. It was not even a being at all.[56] We shall later have to consider whether that would prevent it being an effect. It is the last item in the chain of things that proceed co-eternally from the supreme deity, the One. If it is a shadow upon a shadow, this may imply that the penultimate items in the chain, bodies, are themselves regarded as a shadow. The first thing that proceeds from the One, the thing that is above all a being, is the divine Intellect. For its proceeding forth Plotinus uses the analogy of light. It proceeds from the One not by the One's willing, but as a shining round about the One (*perilampsis*) like the brightness (*to lampron*) that is always being generated (*gennômenon*) round the sun.[57] The fourth-century Platonist, Sallustius, argues that the world is as ever-existent as its Creator, in the way that light co-exists with fire or the sun, and a shadow with a body.[58] Proclus says that the world is always being brought into being (*ginetai*), and brought forth (*paragetai*), and always simultaneously

is being generated (*gignomenos*) and has been generated (*gegenêmenos*), just as solar light emanates from its source.[59]

Christians began to notice these Platonist analogies, which they disliked, at least as early as Basil of Caesarea (329-79), who ascribes to his Platonist opponents a shadow and radiance that are spontaneous (*automaton*) and not generated by choice (*prohairesis*),[60] while Augustine's mentor, Ambrose (339-97), ascribes to them a co-eternal world existing like a shadow spontaneously (*sua sponte*), and not through God's will (*ex voluntate*), although both Christians recognise that the Platonists allow God to be the *cause*.[61] Augustine himself in the early fifth century ascribes to certain Platonists the analogy of an eternal footprint.[62] Aeneas objects to the shadow analogy,[63] and Zacharias allows his Platonist straw man, Gessius, to defend Ammonius with the analogy of a shadow that is simultaneous with the body that casts it, but does not have the same status.[64]

Augustine's example of a Platonist co-eternal cause and effect was of a foot implanted without beginning or end in the dust causing an eternal footprint. In discussing this and other examples elsewhere,[65] I suggested substituting a springy cushion for the dust, in order to justify treating the foot as a cause. To call it a cause would be to imply that, for example, if the foot *were* to be removed – which it need not be – the indentation *would* spring up.

Shadow and light would not be accepted by modern physics as examples of effects exactly simultaneous with their causes, since light takes time to travel. But although time for travel has been used as a criterion of causation in certain special scientific experiments,[66] the case for excluding a time lapse from the *ordinary* concept of causation is that for ordinary purposes it is useful to be able to take shadow or light as genuine effects, without having first to discover whether there was such a time lapse. Augustine's Platonist example of the footprint in any case involves a different physical mechanism.

(x) Christian objections to the analogy of shadow and light: Basil, Ambrose, Aeneas, Zacharias

It might seem that Christians would be in a poor position to object to the Platonist appeal to light from a source as an example of an effect with the same duration as its cause. For the Christians themselves, ever since the Letter to the Hebrews 1:3, ascribed to St Paul, repeatedly used the example of a light-source and its radiance (*apaugasma*) to illustrate the begetting (*gennêsis*) for all eternity of God the Son by God the Father.[67] But the Christian Nicene Creed of 325 AD insisted that the Son was *begotten*, *not created*, being of *one substance* with the Father. This may have made the relationship too close to count as one of cause and effect. We shall see Zacharias and Philoponus drawing the same conclu-

sion for the analogy of sunlight from the sun as applied to the different case of the creation of the world.

The Christian objections to the analogies of a shadow and of light do raise some questions of interest, but they virtually all make the mistake of supposing that the casting of a shadow or light would need to be analogous to the creation of the world in *all* respects, instead of just the *one* respect of producing an effect exactly simultaneous with its cause. Even Philoponus did not entirely escape this defect. Sometimes too Christians were simply addressing their co-religionists and deploring the analogies as not fitting their own beliefs, which, of course, they were not meant to do. This would be true of Basil and Ambrose, who were complaining in the texts already cited that a shadow and light are generated spontaneously, not by will, as Christians require. Ambrose in addition casts around for disanalogies and points out that God has no body and his splendour is not corporeal, something that had not been disputed.

Aeneas repeated Basil's displeasure at the idea that a shadow is spontaneously generated (*automaton*), for we must recognise what a shadow is. It occurs when a body in front of the sun does not allow light to fall behind it, and this is why the shadow is drawn with the same shape as the body. Zacharias was to ascribe this account of shadow by Aeneas to 'one of the sages (*sophoi*) of our time'.[68] Aeneas immediately added a series of disanalogies. There is nothing bodily about God.[69] In any case, who would wish to create or destroy his own shadow?[70]

Zacharias similarly repeated much of what was displeasing to Christians. A shadow is unchosen, unwilled and spontaneous (*aprohaireton*, *aboulêton*, *ek t'automatou*). He, like the others, looked for disanalogies: To cast a shadow, a light, unlike God, needs a third thing, a body in between. A shadow would follow God, even if he did not wish it (*thelein*).[71]

Procopius did not add to the case, but only repeated that a coeternal world is due not to will (*boulêsis*), but to the necessity of nature (*anangkê phuseôs*).[72] Even Philoponus makes this point about an unwilled necessity of nature (*aboulêtos anangkê phuseôs*) in a related discussion.[73] But he does not rely on it to refute the Platonists. For that, he rather refers back to his earlier argument, acceptable to Platonists, that God is a creator through having within him creative principles at the level of *first* actuality, and in his reminder he has in mind only that being a creator does not require a first actuality to be converted by necessity of nature into a *second* actuality. At most he can be faulted for looking for disanalogies in the shadow analogy. The sun, he says, does not always cast a shadow from a body it is illuminating – not if it is directly overhead. Of course, the Platonists would require only one case for their analogy, say the case of Greece, where the sun is never directly overhead.[74]

(xi) Philoponus, amplifying Aeneas: a shadow is not an effect

Aeneas did hint at an interesting question, missing from Basil and Ambrose, when he alleged that a shadow is not *made* (*poiein*), but merely *accompanies* (*sunakolouthein*) its source.[75] Zacharias had a similar complaint that a shadow is an *accompaniment alongside* its source (*parakolouthêma*), as if the world existed independently *alongside* God (*parhupostan*).[76]

The two Gazans do not explain why a shadow is an accompaniment, and therefore, as Aeneas says, not made. For this we have to wait until Philoponus, who does explain. A shadow, says Philoponus, is a non-entity (*mê on*), the mere privation or absence of light. This might well seem to be supported by Plotinus who treated Aristotle's prime matter as a shadow upon a shadow which was not even a being (*on*).[77] Aeneas too had stressed that a shadow is merely the interruption of light by a body.[78] But Philoponus draws the further conclusion that, as a non-being, a shadow is not an effect at all.[79] Could this be taken to mean that it is the point at which the effects of illumination have already stopped? However, Philoponus unintentionally suggests an answer when he points out that blindness is also a privation or absence. Yet surely it would be strange to say that blindness could not be caused, so the point cannot be applied to *all* privations, even if it can be applied to shadow.

(xii) Zacharias, Philoponus: sunlight is definitionally too close to the sun to be an effect

There is another potentially interesting argument in Zacharias, that uses some of the same language of mere accompaniment alongside (*par-*, *para-*). But it is presented in too compressed a way, and is clarified only when Philoponus expounds it later.[80] I would translate Zacharias' passage as follows.

> Christian student: Then consider what has been concluded as a whole. If the cosmos is co-eternal with God, and co-eternal things are included among things that are on the same footing, and of things that are on the same footing neither can be the productive cause of the other, then the cosmos cannot have its productive cause from God. If (a) what comes into being is not to be some shadow, nor (b) is the effect to be taken into the definition of the cause and as something that completes (*sumplêrôtikon*) its substance (as with the sun and its radiance), or as having the same substance as the cause (as with God the Father and God the Son), but if rather (c) the cause is something that is productive and rational and exercises will, and produces a being that is displaced from itself (*parêllagmenês*), where in

> that case, my good sir, will there be room to affirm that God is the productive and substantive cause of the cosmos thanks to its substance being something *distinct* (*hetera*) from God alongside him (*par' auton*), whereas according to *you* people the cosmos is co-eternal with him? Or [where is there room] to say that god and the cosmos are on the same footing from eternity, if we are right in saying that co-eternal things are included among things on the same footing, and of things on the same footing one cannot be the cause of the other?

This is the passage that Zacharias introduces by saying that he wishes to use *also* premises dear and familiar to Ammonius. There are many premises, so it is not clear whether he thinks all of them acceptable to Ammonius. Many of the points made here will now be familiar, but the new point is briefly expressed in (b). Christians and Platonists had each taken a case in which they wanted to argue that the relation of creator and created was too distant to describe a certain crucial relationship. I have already mentioned the Christian case: God the Father does not *create* God the Son, because the relationship of continuous begetting is too close to be a relationship of creating, since it makes Father and Son to be of the same substance. The Platonists agreed with the underlying principle, when, discussing embryology, they insisted that the engendered has a lower status than the engenderer and cannot be of the same substance (*homoousia*).[81] They also described in slightly different language the relation between the sun and the sunlight that fills the transparent sphere on which the sun was thought to be carried round us. The relation was too close for the sun to *create* the sunlight, because, Zacharias says, the sunlight is taken into the *definition* of the sun and *completes its substance*. This gets explained by Philoponus. He refers to the light within the sphere of the sun, evidently the transparent sphere on which the sun was thought to be carried round us. The light within that sphere gives the sun its form and completes its nature (*eidopoion*, *sumplêrôtikon tês phuseôs*), and the essence and substance (*ti ên einai*, *ousia*) of the sun accords with that form. The sun is given form and has its being (*to einai*) in accordance with that light. But now the sun and the light (like God the Father and Christ) seem too close to be related as creator and created. Nothing is its *own* creative cause (*dêmiourgikon aition*). Hence the sun is not the creator (*dêmiourgos*) of its own light.[82] This is a bold challenge. It is true that nothing creates itself. But it is less clear that nothing can cause what is definitionally related to itself: murder causes the death which defines it, and it does so without being a cause of itself.

(xiii) Do the Neoplatonists omit the role of the One's will from their account of Creation?

The Christian objections to the shadow and light analogies before Philoponus regularly accuse the Platonists of omitting God's goodness and will from the account of Creation. But the actual situation is rather different. The Neoplatonists are committed to giving a major role in Creation to the *will* of the Creator or Demiurge, whether that is their second divinity, the Intellect, or their third, the World Soul. For Plato made the Creator's *will* central in his account of Creation in the *Timaeus*. The Creator willed nothing bad, but willed that the world should be spared its natural disintegration.[83] What is surprising is that Plotinus, in a passage already quoted, says that the first entity in the chain of created things, the divine Intellect, proceeds forth from the One, like brightness, and not by the One's willing.[84] If that were the whole story, the Christians would have been more accurate if they had complained that will appears belatedly in the Neoplatonist account of Creation at the stage of the second divinity, unmotivated by anything in the supreme deity.

But that is not the whole story at all, as I have explained elsewhere, citing Plotinus *Ennead* 6, tractate 8, which is called 'On willingness (*to hekousion*) and the will (*thelêma*, here a synonym for *boulêma*) of the One'.[85] The point made is that any description of the One has to use terms that are strictly inapplicable, and which must be hedged with a 'so to speak'. But we have to say that the One is what it wills (*thelein*), or rather casts among beings what it wills. In other words, the One is indescribable, but the best we can say is that, as the Good, it eternally wills other things into being, and they gain their being by willing to partake in the Good.

Proclus also seeks to give a role to *will* in his account of things proceeding from the One.[86] Although the One is indescribable, we need to say that there exists within it goodness, will (*boulêsis*) and providence.[87] These three are analogous to three other things in the One, essence, power (*dunamis*) and activity. Will furnishes the wholes with goods, and power stirs all things to procession.[88] Will depends on goodness, and providence on will, and the universe is generated through the providence, will and goodness of the Father.[89] Proclus here gives a role to what is inexactly called *will* in the One by declaring an analogy between it and what is inexactly called a power in the One that stirs all things to procession. There is no attempt to explain to the unconverted why '*will*' is the closest term we can use for describing the indescribable One. This may be a real gap in Neoplatonism, and the Christians might have had a real chance of pressing such a complaint. But the Christians surveyed here tended instead to accuse the Platonists of omitting reference to

the will altogether in their account of Creation, even though they discussed in other statements Platonist references to the will of the Demiurge.

What is so different about Philoponus?

Philoponus goes beyond the Gazans in many ways, as the arguments sketched here may already indicate. It is important that he almost always attacks his opponents on their own terms, quoting Christian Scripture only as an addition to the argument, and not as a main consideration, whereas the Gazans often play only to the Christian gallery.

Philoponus is also extraordinarily systematic, opposing Proclus' eighteen arguments for beginningless creation over the 646 pages of the modern edition of *Against Proclus*, with cross-references to his arguments earlier in the book, and with attentive use of the systematic logic of his other main opponent Aristotle. I have not even mentioned, because it is not mentioned by the Gazans, his use of Aristotle's concept of infinity, accepted by the Neoplatonists, to show that their account of creation allows something impossible in their own terms: that the universe should have finished passing through a more than finite number of past years.[90] But we can see that this is merely the most famous and stunning case of his using his opponents' views in order to refute them out of their own mouths. I think we can also see at least one reason for the contrast with the three Gazans, and to that I shall now turn.

II. Significance of the commentary traditio in Ammonius' school

Philoponus' skill in answering the Neoplatonist Proclus was partly the fruit of his listening earlier in his career to Proclus' ablest pupil Ammonius. In the hands of Neoplatonists, commentaries on Aristotle became a source for Neoplatonist views as well as for Aristotle's text. This makes it unsurprising that Philoponus was able to move from editing Ammonius' Neoplatonist lectures on Aristotle to extremely well informed and dangerous attacks first on Proclus in 529 and later on Aristotle himself. Both attacks related to the eternity of the world. Philoponus' Neoplatonist opponent Simplicius, though outraged, felt obliged to take the attack on Aristotle seriously, though at the time of his reply he claimed not to have brought himself to read the attack on Proclus.[91] Philoponus based his attacks upon years of writing up commentaries on no less than seven of Aristotle's works. At least four commentaries were derived from the lectures of Ammonius, pupil of the even more famous Neoplatonist Proclus, and Philoponus is named as the sole author of another three. Philoponus' switch in 529

to attacking his teacher's teacher, Proclus, must have required some very strong motivation, and we have seen one suggested by Edward Watts.[92]

By contrast, Zacharias' 'refutation' of Ammonius, despite a few good arguments, reads more like a cabaret act designed to impress his Christian fellow-students. As such, it would have been rather good – he and Aeneas are talented literati – but not as a refutation of Platonist thought. The contrast must be in part due to another contrast, the difference in Zacharias' own training. Where was he trained? He may indeed have attended Ammonius' elementary classes on Aristotle, but Ammonius will have kept the exposition of Aristotle separate from his own views on the eternity of the world, so Zacharias' fictional confrontation on that subject could not have taken place in that context. For beginners, in any case, Ammonius may well have gone little further than Aristotle's logic. Zacharias' listening is also likely to have been distorted. In his *Life* of an eventual convert to Christianity, Severus, Zacharias tells us that he stayed on in Alexandria a year longer than Severus, to listen to the philosophers and rhetoricians, who were excessively proud of their studies, for a rather idiosyncratic reason – in order to be able to dispute with them.[93] Zacharias may have learnt his actual arguments against Ammonius at the monastery of Enaton, which he also attended outside Alexandria. The monastery could have had more than one motive for resisting Ammonius. Edward Watts has described it as motivated by the condemnation at the Council of Chalcedon of its Christological view that Christ had only one nature, not two, human and divine. This led it to predict the imminent end of the world and hence to be particularly opposed to Ammonius' teaching about the world's eternity.[94] Whatever the motive, the monastery was clearly interested in opposing Ammonius. Zacharias tells us, again in his *Life of Severus*, that several days of discussion in the monastery at Enaton was enough to complete the conversion of a pagan student of grammar in Alexandria, Paralius, and arm him with arguments to forward not only to his professor of grammar, but to the professors of philosophy, including Ammonius himself.[95] If Zacharias also learnt his arguments against Ammonius at the monastery of Enaton, he too could have learnt them in a brief course. It is also not clear what level of knowledge was possessed by the monastery's teachers, much though Zacharias reveres them. A further possibility, though it must remain a conjecture, is that their knowledge, or at any rate their students' knowledge, was based on a catalogue of summarised Christian arguments against Platonist philosophy. Either the brevity of the crash course, or the brevity of catalogues would help to explain why Zacharias provides a mixture of arguments, a few well worked out, but many naïve and sometimes in a form so compressed that it is an effort to disentangle them. A

catalogue of arguments on the subject is exactly what the later Gazan Procopius supplies in his objections to the eternity of the world.

Catalogues of summaries could take any of three forms. There were *florilegia* of doctrines of the Church Fathers from at least as early as the Council of Ephesus in 431 AD on the subject of Church Council debates.[96] There may have been catalogued summaries of doctrines ascribed to pagans, and, perhaps combined with them, summaries of arguments in reply to pagan doctrines. It has been pointed out to me that in 447 after the Council of 431, the Christian Theodoret (died *c*. 466) had provided both *florilegia* of Christian quotations, and also an appendix of summarised arguments which he calls a *sullogismos* – argumentation.[97]

David Runia has discussed Christian knowledge of Aristotle and argued that many Christians – far from all, I should stress – relied for their knowledge of pagan thought on collections of summarised pagan doctrines – doxographies – compiled originally by pagans, and subsequently copied from one writer to another. He argues that the Christians Eusebius (died 339) and Cyril of Alexandria (died 444) drew on a doxography by pseudo-Plutarch, and Theodoret (died 466) drew on pseudo-Plutarch's source, Aëtius. Many Christians especially in the earlier second and third centuries he considers wholly dependent on doxographical sources for their knowledge of Aristotle, and he marks twenty-nine such passages, even though other Christians have been exonerated by himself and by other writing.[98]

I have to say that some Christians possessed a wonderful knowledge of pagan philosophy, and access to Aristotle came from extremely varied directions. To take a superlative example, the Christian Origen (died 253/4) could not only draw on the knowledge of pagan thought of Philo of Alexandria, the Jewish thinker of the first century AD, and his own Christian predecessor in Alexandria, Clement of Alexandria of the second century, but he also studied there under Ammonius Sakkas, the teacher of Plotinus. His knowledge of Greek thought included Aristotle. I have mentioned above his using a passage in Aristotle's *On Generation and Corruption* 1.5, which has been little discussed even today, in which the perceptible form of an individual organism is compared by Aristotle with an elastic tube. Origen made a characteristically philosophical use of it, in order to explain how people might recover their original bodies in the resurrection. He avoided the food chain problem discussed above by treating Aristotle's tube-like form as calling not for the same *matter* in the resurrection, but only for something like a photographic likeness. Origen has also been hailed as the inventor of Biblical commentary in the form that commentary on Aristotle eventually took in the Alexandrian commentaries of Ammonius' school.[99]

Nonetheless, other Christians had only summaries available, and this may have been true of Zacharias, whether or not of his monastic

teachers who may have supplied him with his crash course in answering the Neoplatonists. The contrast with Philoponus' detailed understanding of pagan thought provided by prolonged study in Ammonius' school brings out some of the significance of the commentary tradition in that school. I will finish by mentioning another significance. The school was attended by Christian students bilingual in Greek and Syriac. One of them, Sergius of Reshaina (died 536), it has been argued, acquired his knowledge from personally taking lecture notes in the school, and went on to write a commentary with selective similarities of preface and format and Christianised religious aims, on Aristotle's *Categories*, as well as a Syriac adaptation of an earlier commentator's work, that of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the *Principles of the Universe*. This was a very important source – not the only source – for the transmission of the commentary tradition to Arabic writers, since the Syriac was later translated into Arabic. Eventually a Christian educated in a Syriac monastery, Abu Bishr Mattâ (died 940), worked in Baghdad, translating into Arabic some of Aristotle along with Greek commentaries on Aristotle and writing commentaries himself for an increasingly Muslim readership in Baghdad.[100]

Notes

1. H. Rabe (ed.), Ioannes Philoponus *De Aeternitate Contra Proclum*, Leipzig 1899, translated in three volumes by Michael Share, 2004, 2005, and 2010, and one by James Wilberding, 2006, in this series.

2. This preface is a revised version of a paper in Ch. Burnett, R. Hansberger and M. Afifi al-Akiti (eds), *Medieval Arabic Thought: Essays in Honour of Fritz Zimmermann*. Warburg Studies and Texts 4, London 2012. Both versions form a sequel to the extensively updated second edition of my (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*, published as Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, vol. 103, London 2010. I should rectify a couple of oversights in that updating. I was aware at the time of only one of the writings, discussed below, of Edward Watts on the Alexandrian school. I further regret that in describing the research of Clemens Scholten, I ascribed one part of it to his reviewer, Christian Wildberg, who had intended only to endorse what Scholten had himself said on pp. 129-43 of his *Antike Naturphilosophie*, Berlin 1996, in response to Verrycken's hypothesis on the chronology of Philoponus.

3. Aeneas, *Theophrastus*, ed. Maria Minniti-Colonna, *Teofrasto*, Naples 1958. For the date see N. Aujoulat, 'Le Théophraste d' Énée de Gaza: problèmes de chronologie', *Koinonia* 10 (1986): 67-80; A. Segonds, 'Ainéas de Gaza', in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, vol. I, Paris 1989. A date earlier than 485 when Proclus was still working would render incomprehensible the claim at *Theophr*. 3,4-8 that no proper study of philosophy was going on in Athens any longer.

4. Preface lines 8-13. The truth is that Ammonius made a concession, but not the one Zacharias wanted. He extended Aristotle's argument that God's infinite power is needed to produce eternal *motion* by saying that Aristotle

actually *recognised* the point (already made by Proclus) that it was also needed to produce eternal *existence*. (See my *Matter, Space and Motion*, London 1988, pp. 253-4.) But the effect remained, contrary to Zacharias, *eternal*.

5. Edward Watts has illuminated the situation in a series of four writings to date: 'The Enduring Legacy of the Iatrosophist Gessius', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 49 (2009): 113-32; 'An Alexandrian Christian Response to Fifth-century Neoplatonic Influence', in *The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity*, ed. Andrew Smith, Swansea 2005, pp. 215-39; *City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria*, Berkeley 2006, pp. 204-61; *Riot in Alexandria*, Berkeley, 2010.

6. By the Polish Centre of Archaeology, Cairo, under Grzegorz Majcherek. I have drawn conclusions from the excavation in the second edition of *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*, Introduction, Part 1, as above.

7. I am indebted to Michael Champion for drawing this to my attention in his PhD dissertation 'Cultures and Creation in Late Antique Gaza: Christian and Neoplatonic Interactions', King's College, London, 2010. I had the benefit of reading the dissertation along with his draft translations of Aeneas and Zacharias, which were not included in the dissertation.

8. PG 87.1, ed. J.P. Migne, cols 29B-33A.

9. Watts, 'Response', pp. 218, 222, 225.

10. Watts, *City and School*, ch. 9

11. Watts does not commit himself on Koenraad Verrycken's hypothesis that the anti-Aristotelian arguments were added later, but that hypothesis has not on the whole found favour.

12. I am drawing on my discussion in *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death*, Oxford/Chicago 2006, pp. 70-7. The evidence on Philoponus is in fr. 32 in Syriac with French translation in A. van Roey, 'Un traité cononite contre Jean Philopon sur la résurrection', in *Hommage à Maurits Geerard*, Wetteren 1984, pp. 135-8

13. Aristotle *On Generation and Corruption* 1.5, 322a28-33. I have analysed this reference to form as applied to the Christian resurrection by Origen in my *Self, Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death,* pp. 59-60 and 76-7.

14. Aeneas *Theophrastus* 54,20.

15. Ibid. 59,3-6.

16. Gregory of Nyssa *On the Soul and Resurrection*, PG vol. 46, ed. J.P. Migne, cols 73A-85A. Similarly *On the Creation of Man*, PG vol. 44, ch. 27, cols 225A-229A.

17. Gregory of Nyssa *On the Soul and Resurrection*, col. 109, lines 5-26.

18. Ibid. cols 153, lines 33-40; 156, 1-6, citing I Corinthians 15:35-44.

19. Aeneas *Theophrastus* 56,9-17.

20. Zacharias *Ammonius* ll. 1421-86.

21. Proclus, recorded by Philoponus *Against Proclus*, ed. Rabe. Proclus' first argument is missing in Greek, but preserved in the Arabic of Ishâq ibn Hunayn, in A. Badawi (ed.), *Neoplatonici apud Arabes*, *al-Aflâṭûniyya al-muḥdatha ʿinda l-ʿarab*, Cairo 1955, p. 34, lines 3-6, and translated into English by Peter Adamson in Michael Share's *Philoponus: Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World 1-5*, London 2004. See further Sallustius *On the Gods and the World*, ed. and tr. A.D. Nock, Cambridge 1926, ch. 7, and Proclus' sixth argument, translated by Michael Share from Philoponus *Against Proclus* 224,18-225,6 in Rabe's Greek edition.

22. Proclus recorded by Philoponus *Against Proclus* 56,10-12 and 18-20; 82,17-25; 93,8-10.

23. Proclus recorded by Philoponus *Against Proclus* 42,1-43,23.

24. Zacharias *Ammonius* ll. 740-3.

25. Ibid. ll. 762-7.

26. Ibid. ll. 389-94.

27. In *Matter, Space and Motion*, London 1988, p. 279 n. 123, I recorded Asclepius, from the voice of Ammonius, 44,32-7; 68,17-27; 75,27-8; 167,14-34; 183,14-16; 233,38-40; 363,1-5; 393,34-394,2; 441,27-31; 442,1-2.

28. Proclus *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, vol. 1, p. 396, line 22, ed. Diehl, Leipzig 1903, in a passage said at 391,4-5, to be drawn from Porphyry; cf. Plotinus *Enneads* 3.2.2, lines 18ff. Henry-Schwyzer.

29. Origen (partly in the Latin translation of Rufinus) *On First Principles* 1.2.2; Commentary on John 1.19.(22), 111-15; *Against Celsus* 5.39, discussed in my *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, London 1983, reprinted by Chicago University Press 2006, pp. 250-2.

30. Zacharias *Ammonius* ll. 372-4.

31. Ibid. ll. 180-207.

32. Procopius *Commentary on Genesis*, PG 87.1, col. 29D.

33. Ibid. cols 32D-33A

34. Philoponus *Against Proclus* 36,18ff.; 79,5-6; 84,14-15.

35. Ibid. 92,1-93,14.

36. Aristotle *On the Soul* 2.5. Philoponus *Against Proclus* 47,18-48,7.

37. Zacharias *Ammonius* l. 1087.

38. Philoponus *Against Proclus* 563,12; 568,6-21.

39. Ibid. 658,21ff.

40. Ammonius *Commentary on Aristotle On Interpretation*, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. 4, part 5, ed. A Busse, 136,15-25.

41. Maximus is cited by Michael Champion, 'Cultures and Creation in Late Antique Gaza: Christian and Neoplatonic Interactions', PhD dissertation, King's College, London, 2010. See, for Maximus, Eusebius *Praeparatio Evangelica* 7.22, sec. 12ff; for Procopius, *Commentary on Genesis*, PG vol. 87.1, cols 29B-C; for Philoponus, *Against Proclus* 340; 347; 365,3.

42. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1039b26; 1043b14; 1044b21. For other things besides forms of which this is true, see my *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, London 1983, reprinted by Chicago University Press 2006, p. 11 n. 5.

43. Augustine *City of God* 10.31.

44. Proclus ap. Philoponus *Against Proclus* 120,5-14.

45. Philoponus *Against Proclus* 225,21-226,19; Lindsay Judson, 'God or Nature? Philoponus on Generability and Perishability', in *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*, ch. 10. Judson points out that while Philoponus rightly records Plato as making God override the world's perishable nature, he has no sound argument for his further assumption that even God could not override its natural ungenerability.

46. Basil of Caesarea *Homilies on Hexaemeron* 2.2.10, PG 29, cited by Champion, 'Cultures and Creation'; Zacharias, *Ammonius*, ll. 516-17; 856, Colonna; Procopius, *Commentary on Genesis* (n. 8 above), col. 29B. Philoponus' Platonist enemy Simplicius had heard analogous complaints raised against the idea of matter as a principle on a par with God, Simplicius *On Aristotle's Physics* 256,14-15.

47. Zacharias *Ammonius* (n. 19 above), ll. 833-5.

48. I have assembled the textual evidence in *Time, Creation and the*

Continuum, London 1983, reprinted by Chicago University Press 2006, ch. 8. I thank Sebastian Gertz for stressing its relevance here.

49. *Aei*: Sallustius *On the Gods and the World* ch. 7; Proclus in Philoponus *Against Proclus* 87,17-25; 225,3-10. *Aïdion*: 56,18-20. *Abadî*: first argument of Proclus preserved in Arabic, 34,3-35,8, translated by Peter Adamson in Michael Share's *Philoponus: Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 1-5*, London 2004.

50. Philoponus *Against Proclus* 14,18-20; cf. 17,22-5; 41,14-16.

51. Augustine *City of God* 10.31.

52. Aeneas *Theophrastus* 46,11-16, referring to Plotinus *Enneads* 2.4.7, ll. 2-10 Henry-Schwyzer.

53. Zacharias *Ammonius* ll. 1027-40.

54. Zacharias *Ammonius* l. 1025.

55. Taurus ap. Philoponus *Against Proclus* 147,7-9.

56. Plotinus *Enneads* 6.3.8, ll. 34-7 Henry-Schwyzer.

57. Ibid. 5.1.6, 25-39.

58. Sallustius *On the Gods and the World* ch. 7

59. Proclus *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, vol. 1. pp. 290,29-291,2 Diehl.

60. Basil of Caesarea *Homilies on Hexaemeron* 1.7, PG 29, cols 19-28.

61. Ambrose *Hexaemeron*, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum vol. 32, day 1, ch. 5, paragraph 18.

62. Augustine *City of God* 10.31.

63. Aeneas *Theophrastus* 46,1-9.

64. Zacharias *Ammonius* ll. 522-6.

65. Richard Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, London 1983, reprinted by Chicago University Press, 2006, p. 310 and n. 16.

66. The simultaneous production of two opposite electric charges at a distance too great for light to traverse has been confirmed in the so-called non-locality phenomenon, and has been taken to rule out one charge affecting the other, but at the same time it has created a serious challenge to current physical theories.

67. In *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, p. 310 n. 16, I cited, besides Letter to the Hebrews 1:3: Origen *On First Principles* bk 1, ch. 2, sec. 4; a fragment cited ad loc. in Paul Koetschau's edition, *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller*, Origen vol. 5, p. 297, tr. G.W. Butterworth, Gloucester MA 1973 (namely, fr. 1 of *Homily on the Letter to the Hebrews*, in C.H.E. Lommatzsch's edition, Berlin 1831-1848); Dionysius of Alexandria ap. Athanasius *De sententia Dionysii,* PG vol. 25, cols 501C-504B; 508A-B; 512C; 516C; Theognostus ap. Athanasius *De decretis Nicaenae Synodi,* PG vol. 25, col. 460C; Alexander of Alexandria *Epistolae de Ariana haeresi*, PG vol.18, cols 557C; 565C; 576A-B; Athanasius *Contra Arianos*, oratio 1, ch. 8, 1.12; 2.34-6; 4.2, in PG vol. 26, cols 25C-28C; 37A; 220A-225A; 469C; 480C-D; Basil of Caesarea *Homilies on Hexaemeron* 1.7 (n. 48 above), col. 17B-C; cf. *De Spiritu Sancto,* PG vol. 32, col. 186B-C; Gregory of Nyssa *De fide*, PG vol. 45, col. 140A-B; *Oratio de deitate Filii et Spiritus Sancti*, PG vol. 46, col. 560C-D; Ambrose *Hexaemeron* 1.5 (n. 49 above).

68. Zacharias *Ammonius* l. 543, as pointed out by Sebastian Gertz.

69. Aeneas *Theophrastus* 46,1-6.

70. Ibid. 46,8.

71. Zacharias *Ammonius* ll. 526-40; 758-61.

72. Procopius *Commentary on Genesis*, PG 87.1, col. 29D.

73. Philoponus *Against Proclus* 78,10-15.

74. Ibid. 16,1-23.

75. Aeneas *Theophrastus* 45,21-3.

76. Zacharias *Ammonius* ll. 529-34; 760-1.

77. Plotinus *Enneads* 6.3.8 (34-7).

78. Aeneas *Theophrastus* 46,2-5.

79. Philoponus *Against Proclus* 15,1-16,2.

80. Zacharias *Ammonius* ll. 1038-50. I thank Sebastian Gertz for identifying Zacharias' earlier version, which the compression had led me to overlook.

81. Porphyry *To Gaurus On How Embyros are Ensouled* 6.2, 42,20ff.

82. Philoponus *Against Proclus* 16,24-17,14.

83. Plato *Timaeus* 30A; 41A-B.

84. Plotinus *Enneads* 5.1.6, 25-39.

85. Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, pp. 317-18, citing Plotinus *Enneads* 6.8.9, 44-8; 6.8.13; 6.8.15, 1-10; 6.8.18, 35-53; 6.8.21, 8-19.

86. I am grateful to Dirk Baltzly, who showed me the passages I cite here, and to Carlos Steel and Jan Opsomer, who drew my attention to other passages.

87. Proclus *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus,* vol. 1, 371,9ff. Diehl.

88. Ibid. 414,27-415,3.

89. Ibid. 412,2-7.

90. I have described the infinity arguments in my *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, London, 1983, ch. 14, reprinted Chicago University Press, 2006. I have added references to better understandings of infinity that may have been achieved by Archimedes (*c.* 287-212/11 BC), Thabit ibn Qurra (died 901 AD) possibly al-Haytham (died *c.* 1040) and Robert Grosseteste (*c.* 1175-1253) in my *The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD,* vol. 2: *Physics*, London and Ithaca NY 2005, pp. 175-6.

91. Simplicius *On Aristotle On the Heavens*, 135,30-136,1. In my introduction to *Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.1-5* in this series, I express some doubt whether he had read it even at a later date.

92. The desire to take over from the less experienced pagan philosopher Olympiodorus the imparting to Christians of pagan Greek philosophy.

93. Zacharias *The Life of Severus*, p. 46 Kugener, in the surviving Syriac-English translation by L. Ambjörn, New Jersey 2008.

94. Edward Watts, *Riot in Alexandria* (n. 4 above), pp. 93, 123-4, 131, 136, 143, 256.

95. Zacharias *The Life of Severus*, p. 16 Kugener.

96. See M. Richard, 'Dyophysite Florilegia of the Fifth and Sixth Centuries CE', in A. Cameron and R. Hoyland (eds), *Doctrine and Debate in the East Christian World, 300-1500*, Aldershot 2011, no. 12, translated from 'Florilèges diphysites du Ve et VIe siècles', in A. Grillmeier and H. Bacht (eds), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, Würzburg 1951, pp. 721-48.

97. I thank Averil Cameron for this information.

98. D. Runia, 'Festugière Revisited: Aristotle in the Greek Patres', in *Vigiliae Christianae* 43 (1989): 1-34, which, however, exonerates Clement of Alexandria from the earlier strictures of A.-J. Festugière, *L'ideal réligieux des Grecs et l'Évangile*, Paris 1932. Hippolytus (died 235) has been exonerated as regards his knowledge of Aristotle's *Categories* and the Presocratics by Catherine Osborne, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy*, London 1987.

99. Ilsetraut Hadot, 'Les introductions aux commentaires exégètiques chez les auteurs néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens', in M Tardieu (ed.), *Les Règles de l'interpretation*, Paris 1987; Alfons Fürst, 'Origen: Exegesis and

Philosophy in Early Christian Alexandria', in J. Lössl and J. Watt (eds), *Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity*, Aldershot 2011, ch. 1.

100. The Syriac tradition is discussed in several of the chapters of J. Lössl and J. Watt (eds), *Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity*, with a useful overview by John Watt in ch. 15. That Sergius wrote his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* on the basis of lecture notes taken directly from Ammonius' lectures is also argued by Daniel King in ch. 14, p. 230.

Note on the Composition of the Present Volume

Aeneas of Gaza's *Theophrastus* was translated up to 35,9 Colonna by John Dillon, on the basis of a first draft by Sarah Klitenic and Joseph A. Almeida. This part was annotated by Sebastian Gertz, with help from Katharine O'Reilly, and incorporating some of Sarah Klitenic's notes (marked [SK]). Most of the brief introduction to Aeneas was written by John Dillon. The remaining half of the *Theophrastus* was translated by Donald Russell, with annotation and emendations by him and further notes by Sebastian Gertz and the General Editor.

Zacharias' *Ammonius* was translated and annotated by Sebastian Gertz, who also wrote the introduction to it. The textual emendations on this part were nearly all suggested by Donald Russell. We thank Michael Champion for showing his own draft translation of the *Ammonius*, and the General Editor thanks Donald Russell and John Dillon for comments on the present translation of it.

Katharine O'Reilly compiled the English-Greek Glossaries for both the *Theophrastus* and the *Ammonius*. The volume was indexed and prepared for press by Sebastian Gertz.

Conventions

[…] Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to the translation for purposes of clarity.

<…> Angle brackets enclose conjectures relating to the Greek text, i.e. additions to the transmitted text deriving from parallel sources and editorial conjecture, and transposition of words or phrases. Accompanying notes provide further details.

(…) Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses, contain transliterated Greek words.

Note on Citations

All references to Aeneas of Gaza's *Theophrastus* are to page and line number (e.g. 23,17) of the edition by M. Colonna, *Enea di Gaza: Teofrasto*, Naples 1958.

All references to Zacharias of Mytilene's *Ammonius* are to the line numbers (e.g. ll. 432-3) of the edition by M. Minniti Colonna, *Zacaria Scolastico*: *Ammonio,* Naples 1973.

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Aeneas of Gaza
Theophrastus

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Introduction

1. Aeneas' life and times

About the life of Aeneas himself we are sadly ill-informed, despite knowing quite a lot about the environment in which he moved. Gaza in his day, a busy and prosperous entrepôt port, having been forcibly Christianised earlier in the century through the vigorous efforts of the redoubtable Bishop Porphyrius, had become the location of a lively Christian rhetorical and philosophical school, of which Aeneas came to be a leading light. We may reasonably assume that he was of fairly prosperous background. It has been suggested,[1] with some plausibility, but no degree of proof, on the basis of a reference in one of his letters (*Ep.* XIX), that he may have been the son of a doctor called Elpidius, and such a background would be entirely suitable. From his own writings,[2] we can deduce that he studied philosophy in Alexandria at the school of the distinguished Neoplatonist Hierocles, who taught between about 430 and 470 AD. This would indicate a birthdate of around 450 at the latest, since he would have been sent to study with Hierocles in his mid to late teens. From a series of references in the *Letters,* including a number of correspondents in common, we can deduce that Aeneas was a slightly older contemporary of his fellow-citizen, the sophist and rhetorician Procopius of Gaza (*c.* 465-528). He himself can be assumed to have survived at least into well into the second decade of the sixth century.

As to the date of composition of the *Theophrastus,* there are no certain indications, but some time in the first decade of the sixth century would be a reasonable conjecture, after Aeneas had established himself as a teacher and rhetorician back in Gaza. The dramatic date seems fixed by a reference to the persecution of Christians in North Africa by the Vandal king Huneric in 484, which Euxitheus, at p. 66,10-11 Colonna, refers to as a very recent happening (*khthes kai prôên*). In the dialogue, Euxitheus (who is very much a stand-in for Aeneas himself) is portrayed as arriving – inadvertently; he is headed for Athens – in Alexandria from 'the Syrians' (which may be taken to include Gaza), so that we may conclude that even by the 480s Aeneas is securely established at home in Gaza.

2. Aeneas' Hellenic *paideia*

As an accomplished *rhetor,* Aeneas has at his command a wide range of literary and mythological materials which he can employ to embellish his arguments. A good selection of these are on display in the *Theophrastus.* Homer's *Iliad* is quoted to particularly good effect at 10,4, where his epic description of battle (the context is Zeus' withdrawal of Hector from the field) serves to emphasise the disagreement among philosophers on the subject of reincarnation. In his polemic against Platonic theories of reincarnation (see section 5 below), Aeneas refers to the *Odyssey* when he compares Odysseus with an ant on the grounds that both are household-managers, and amusingly quotes the Homeric epithet 'with a gleaming helmet' to compare Hector, a key figure in the *Iliad*, to a wasp.

Other important literary sources are Xenophon and Herodotus. When the discussion turns to the benefit of poverty for the virtuous and Socrates is said to have 'thought highly of poverty' (20,6), it is Xenophon's *Symposium* that stands in the background, just as it does in the case of Euxitheus' comparison of pain to the mandrake root (Socrates' *comparandum* in Xenophon, however, is wine, not pain) at 30,8. Herodotus provides many of the historical and mythical stories that liven up the arguments in the dialogue. For example, his *Histories* lie behind references to the Thracian Getai (34,11), the worship of Proteus and Helen (34,16-17), and, together with the poet Pindar, the resurrection story of Aristeas at 63,20-7.

On mythological subjects, Aeneas can draw on a number of different writers, from Pindar to Apollodorus. Euxitheus' speech beginning at 62,2, for example, includes a dense collection of resurrection stories from a variety of sources, including Apollodorus' *Library*, an unknown book by Eudoxus of Cnidus, an erudite fourth-century BC author, and the historian Theopompus.

Aeneas' virtuosity in playing off different ancient authorities against one another comes to the fore at 17,27-18,2, where he refutes Philostratus' account of the Brahmans in the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* by pointing out that other ancient authors, namely Ctesias and Arrian, do not mention any Indian wise men with knowledge about their previous lives.

Knowledge of the obscure and the marvellous are equally important to the display of *paideia*, and in this respect too, Aeneas shows himself as a writer addressing an educated audience that will appreciate references to shadowy figures such as Pythagoras of Rhodes (54,4) or to bizarre practices such as producing bees from decaying animal carcasses (15,24-16,12 and 56,20-23).

Yet if Aeneas' facility in handling classical Greek culture is readily apparent, it is all the more remarkable that Christian sources do not feature prominently in the dialogue. No Christian writer is men-

tioned by name, and only one clearly recognisable echo of Scripture can be found (at 23,1-2, without explicit attribution). Aeneas refers to the Trinity only once, in a theological excursus from 44,1-45,4, and even then attempts to show, at 45,5-7, how the tenets of Christian faith are in agreement with the teaching of the Chaldaean Oracles, a collection of esoteric pronouncements with considerable authority for Platonist philosophers in his time. As Edward Watts has argued, this sets Aeneas apart from Zacharias of Mytilene, who is more ready to quote Christian Scripture and authorities, and may suggest that each writer was targeting a different audience.[3]

3. Aeneas' use of Plato

Aeneas is not only well acquainted with the Platonic dialogues; he exhibits considerable sophistication in utilising them for literary purposes, in such a way as to indicate that he is writing for an audience of sufficient sophistication themselves to appreciate what he is doing. We find him echoing terminology and phrases from a number of the best known dialogues, such as *Phaedo, Gorgias, Phaedrus, Symposium, Republic, Timaeus* and *Laws,* as well as from a number of lesser known ones, such as *Lysis, Menexenus, Hippias Major* or *Clitophon.* It is not always clear that his Platonic echoes are intended to set up any special resonance, but in many cases this is unmistakably his purpose, and it may be helpful to look at a selection of these.

To begin at the beginning, Aeneas launches his dialogue with the significant phrase, borrowed from the beginning of the *Phaedrus,* 'Where are you going, [Euxitheus], and where do you come from?' (*poi dê kai pothen, Euxithee?* cf. *Phdr*. 227A: *O phile Phaidre, poi dê kai pothen?*). This simple little enquiry came to take on a considerable significance in later Platonism, attested to in Hermeias' Commentary, since it could be taken as a challenge to Phaedrus from Socrates as to the nature of his first principles, his *archê* and his *telos* (which of course, at the outset of the dialogue, are sadly deficient!). Similarly, the *Theophrastus* is to comprise a Socratic-style undermining of Theophrastus' beliefs on reincarnation by Euxitheus. Further, to confirm the position of the *Phaedrus* as a model, the dialogue ends with an imitation of Socrates' prayer 'to Pan and the other gods of the place' (Euxitheus' prayer is directed instead, very suitably, to the Trinity), culminating in the same exhortation, 'Let us go' (*iômen*).

Reminiscences of the *Phaedrus,* therefore, frame the dialogue, but that is only the beginning. There may be another significant echo just after the introductory phrase, at the beginning of the opening speech of Aegyptus, where he expresses himself 'deeply thankful to that wind' (*ê pollen kharin oida tôi pneumati*) for bringing Euxitheus to Alexandria. We may recall that Socrates opens the *Statesman* with a

very similar phrase (*ê pollen kharin opheilô*), expressing his deep thanks to Theodorus for introducing him to Theaetetus – though this echo is somewhat less striking than the previous two.

If we move along to 4,16-17, where Theophrastus is being set up for the elenchus that Euxitheus is about to inflict on him, he utters two phrases in succession that seem significant. First he says 'Go ahead, ask, if indeed you wish to do me a kindness' (*eiper moi boulei kharizesthai*). This phrase seems borrowed from *Rep.* 4.430D, where, in the process of seeking for definitions of the four virtues, Glaucon is badgering Socrates to define self-control (*sôphrosunê*) for him before going on to justice, and employs the phrase 'but if you wish to do me a kindness' – to which Socrates readily assents. The second phrase, however, 'For no one these many years has asked me anything new', is much more significant, since it is in just these terms that the great sophist Gorgias responds, with pompous self-confidence, to Chaerephon near the beginning of the dialogue bearing his name (*Gorg.* 448A), and Theophrastus is being set up as something analogous to one of the great fifth-century BC sophists whom Socrates confuted. We would suggest that this is the sort of evocative reference that Aeneas expects his educated readers to pick up on.

Another use of the *Gorgias* by Aeneas is equally subversive. At 44,1, Euxitheus undertakes to answer the worry how a creator could be a creator even though he does not create all the time by telling 'a beautiful story'. The language here closely echoes Socrates' introduction to the afterlife myth of the *Gorgias* (*Gorg.* 523A). Aeneas, however, puts it to a very different use: his 'beautiful story' is nothing less than a lengthy account of the Trinity.

Again, when at 5,11ff. Theophrastus responds to Euxitheus' question whether the descent of the soul is voluntary or involuntary, he launches into an exposition borrowed extensively from Plotinus *Enn.* 4.8.1. The key Platonic passages to which Aeneas, and his source Plotinus, can refer here are *Phd.* 62B, where Socrates refers to a secret doctrine according to which men on earth are as 'in a sort of guard-house' (*en tini phroura*); Socrates' analogy between the soul and a charioteer and pair of horses in the *Phaedrus*, especially *Phdr.* 247B, which describes the fall of the soul as being dragged by a wicked horse; and the altogether more positive account of the soul's embodiment in the *Timaeus* (*Tim.* 30B-C).

4. Aeneas' use of Plotinus and knowledge of the later Platonist tradition

Aeneas' use of Plotinus is of a different order to his use of Plato, being of a much more 'businesslike' nature. Despite his radically different philosophical position, he is happy to borrow extensively from a number of treatises of Plotinus to support his points.

His first source of borrowing in *Enn.* 4.8, a treatise in which Plotinus is raising the question as to why the soul descends into human bodies. Aeneas has no sympathy with the concept of the descent of a pre-existent soul, but he finds Plotinus' survey of pre-Platonic and Platonic attitudes on the nature of the world useful for his purposes. At 5,12-7,16 he takes his information as to the views of Heraclitus, Empedocles, Pythagoras, and Plato himself, as to how far the descent is voluntary or involuntary, and whether the world is a good or a bad place, from chapter 1 of that treatise.

As the argument develops, however, the treatise that he finds most useful for his purposes is 3.2-3, 'On Providence' (divided by Porphyry into two tractates). When Euxitheus defends the universal applicability of the law of Providence, echoes of Plotinus' treatise abound. Like Plotinus at *Enn.* 3.2.8.7-11, Euxitheus admonishes us not to be surprised by human wickedness, since man is placed half-way between beasts and the divine (23,4-7). Even the lowest part of creation, Euxitheus goes on to argue, has its proper place in the universal order, and must not be dismissed by comparison with superior beings (23,15-23). Here, again, Plotinus is in the offing: *Enn.* 3.3.3.1-9 warns against attaching blame on plants for not having sense-perception, or on animals for being unlike men. Aeneas, to be sure, adds some rhetorical flourish to his source, and spends more time on examples. The substance of his thought, however, is already in Plotinus.

To take another example of Aeneas' borrowing from Plotinus' treatise 'On Providence', we may turn to Euxitheus' speech beginning at 28,10. It is littered with near-quotations from Plotinus, such as the claim that 'poverty and sickness and the other so-called evils are in general nothing to the good' (30,4-5, taken from *Enn.* 3.2.5.6-7), and the important point that Providence cannot be extended to everything so as to leave us with nothing (30,11-13), quoting verbatim from *Enn.* 3.2.9.1-4.

If Aeneas, then, has a thorough knowledge of Plotinus, he is also eager to demonstrate his understanding of the Platonic tradition. He can refer to the views of earlier Platonists such as Harpocration and Numenius on the soul's reincarnation (12,6-11), and also knows Atticus' views on the creation of the universe (46,16-21). Porphyry's interest in oracles, as displayed in his work *On the Philosophy from Oracles*, is mentioned at 45,5-7, while his preoccupation with demons features briefly at 34,8, as little more than an aside. Porphyry's and Iamblichus' views on reincarnation are grouped together at 12,12 and 14,2, while the most recent in Platonic thought enters the dialogue with the views of Syrianus and Proclus on the soul's reincarnation, and the distinction between three kinds of body that plays an important role in later Neoplatonism. It is against these views that Aeneas turns his polemic with the greatest success, as we will see in the next section.

5. Aeneas as a polemicist

As a polemicist, sarcasm is Aeneas' weapon of choice. He stands in a long tradition of Christian authors mocking or aiming to refute pagan beliefs, but his acquaintance with the latest modifications of Platonic theory gives his rhetoric a particular sting.[4] Syrianus' and Proclus' view that reincarnation of rational souls into animal bodies consists in an outward association in particular makes an easy target. At 14,19-24, Euxitheus reasonably asks what criterion one is to use in order to determine which human soul becomes bound to what kind of animal:

> Are we to suppose that Odysseus accompanies an ant, for both are household managers and are able to undertake many labours, or will Hector be bound to a wasp, for both have gleaming helmets and are war-like, or if Cleon be linked to a frog, for both croak often, or that a fly should attach itself to Hyperbolus, for shamelessness is the hallmark of either of them?

Evidently, Euxitheus considers none of these possibilities worthy of serious consideration, and his listing of absurd examples has a powerful effect in undermining the theory. His second blow is to bring in another aspect of Syrianus'-Proclus' position, namely that the kind of human soul that can undergo punishment and become attached to other animals is not truly incorporeal but a quasi-material 'pneumatic' soul-vehicle. The resulting scenario is not unlike that of a child (the animal) pulling a kite behind it (the soul vehicle), or, as Euxitheus puts it more poetically elsewhere (at 15,7-8), that of Odysseus clinging to the foot of an ant.

Later in the dialogue, Theophrastus is asking his interlocutor Euxitheus to add precision to the doctrine of resurrection: is the body that is resurrected 'luminous, airy or oyster-like' (52,5), a threefold distinction very common in Platonist writings at the time. In reply, Euxitheus derides the very idea of one soul carrying a multitude of bodies with it as if it were driving 'a herd of cattle' (53,11), and pokes fun at the notion that the soul in its descent through each celestial sphere attracts elemental stuff that makes up the different types of body. His analogy between an insect 'caught in spiders' webs' (52,10) and the soul becoming entangled in its different bodies during its descent is an inspired piece of polemic and illustrates the sophistication with which Aeneas is able to attack the Platonic thought current in his day by revealing the absurdities that result from it.

Notes

1. By L. Massa Positano, *Enea di Gaza, Epistole*, Naples 1950, p. 66.

2. Cf. the references to Hierocles in the *Theophrastus,* at p. 2, 9 and 20 Colonna.

3. Cf. 'An Alexandrian Christian Response to Fifth-century Neoplatonic Influence', in A. Smith (ed.), *The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity*, Swansea 2005, pp. 215-39.

4. For an argument that Aeneas' rejection of the pagan belief in the pre-existence and reincarnation of the soul can be read as an oblique polemic against Origenism, see M. Champion, 'Aeneas of Gaza on the Soul', *ASCS Proceedings* 32 (2011): 1-11.

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Translation

Theophrastus. Dialogue of the Sophist[1] Aeneas:[2] That there is no pre-existence for men and that the soul is immortal[3] 1,1

The main points of the dialogue are as follows:[4]

That there is no pre-existence for man: a critical examination of the disputatious claims of the Greeks;
That the human soul does not transmigrate into other men and into irrational animals;
Also, concerning providence: why do those who are born suffer what they do?
That the difference in their ends is useful.
That the souls of men both come into being and are immortal;
That they are limited and not infinite;
Also, concerning the generation of the world and its change toward the better;
That there are not many bodies for one soul, but only one which is resurrected and partakes of immortality;
Why there is not also a resurrection of irrational animals;
That even in this life oftentimes resurrection of bodies has occurred as a proof of future resurrection.

The characters of the dialogue:

Aegyptus, an Alexandrian (AE.)
Euxitheus, a Syrian (EU.)
Theophrastus, an Athenian (TH.)

The dialogue

TH. Where are you going, Euxitheus, and where have you come from?[5] 2,1

EU. From Syria to Athens, Aegyptus. A contrary wind forced my ship off course and cut short my journey. So here I am with you, gazing at the Nile, not the Ilissus, at Pharos, not Piraeus.

AE. Truly I am deeply thankful to that wind, because it has forced you to dock your ship amongst friends. Or do you not remember the philosophy of Hierocles,[6] in whose school we studied from childhood with much mutual affection, and also had many lovers? Now as for me, I do not know that I ever felt such grief as when you sailed away from us and loaded yourself down with manifold wisdom among the Syrians. Although it's been a long time, still it has not yet destroyed my love, but it blooms just as if you had sailed yesterday. And yet these many years I have not seen you nor even supposed that I would see you. However, some fortune has joined in the hunt with me, and has tracked down, contrary to all hope, <the man I long for>.[7]

EU. Now I also rejoice in this good fortune. And the wind was not, then, contrary but favourable and a friend of love, if it really sends the beloved to the lover. But tell me, are there those still amongst you who give instruction in the rites of philosophy, of the sort that our teacher Hierocles used to be? Do fine young men still attend on him, like Protagoras the Lycian,[8] my equal in age, but my superior in beauty and talent?

AE. All was fine back then, but now that is gone and come to an end. For the one enrolled as a student does not wish to learn, and he who has taken on the role of mystagogue does not know how to teach. The theatre and the horse-race are flourishing, but philosophy and the haunts of the Muses have sunk into a dreadful stillness.[9]

EU. It was because I myself suspected this that I bypassed Egypt and was making for Athens, to see if there was somewhere any wise man left among the Athenians. For I want to hear his views on a topic that has presented a great problem both to men of old and to those of the present day, such as leads them at various times to express various opinions concerning it.

AE. But you have in fact gained Athens, my friend. For if what you want to see is not so much the Acropolis nor the Propylaia nor the dockyards, but a wise man, then Theophrastus, the great glory of Athens, has docked among us and has been here three days already. But come now, let us go to him. From him you might either learn what you are seeking, or you might learn that it is not at all fitting to seek an answer to this question from men. For neither among the Athenians nor among any others will one meet anyone wiser than Theophrastus.[10]

EU. You are describing a god-send, if I should find along the Nile the philosophy of the Athenians, so as not to have to ply the wide sea to

learn these things. Come then, let us go. For already you have made me an admirer of Theophrastus.

* * *

AE. I have come bringing Euxitheus to you, Theophrastus, a rival lover, for he too is a lover of philosophy. 4,1

TH. Truly Euxitheus is a very old friend to me, if indeed he is a lover of philosophy. For this is a fine and rare event, since even among the Athenians, where philosophy was most manifest, it has been wholly banished and set at naught.

EU. There was no point, then, in my journey to the Athenians, if you say that no one remains of sufficient capacity to respond to my inquiry. But it was not in vain that I broke off my journey, if in accordance with some divine favour, I discover along the Nile one who is prominent in philosophy and is the best of the Athenians. Come, then, tell me, for Aegyptus says that there is no one to learn from other than yourself. May I then ask you what I particularly desire to know?

TH. Go ahead, ask, if indeed you wish to do me a kindness. For no one these many years has asked me anything new.[11]

EU. We are indeed fortunate, if we may at the same time learn and do a kindness to the one who teaches us! My question is, then: has the soul lived before in this world and will it live again, or, having lived its present life, is it released from the state of affairs here?

TH. It has lived before and will continue to live. For this is the very thing that the wise men of old wish me to teach. 5,1

EU. Do you mean that the same soul oftentimes comes down into this life?

TH. Well, I do – at least, unless you have some wiser solution to reveal.

EU. Will it come back again willingly or out of necessity?[12]

TH. I will attempt to reveal to you, just as one does in the sacred rites, the secrets of the ancients.[13] For, Heraclitus, positing a necessary succession, said that the passage of the soul proceeds continually upwards and downwards.[14] Since it is wearisome for the soul to follow along with the Creator and for it to journey round the whole universe

on high with God, and to be ordered and ruled by him, for this reason, he says, the soul is carried downward by the desire for repose and the hope of sovereignty. Empedocles, in turn, strikes fear into us when he says that it is a law for souls to fall in to this world when they sin.[15] Under the inspiration of his wisdom, he rooted the perpetually- and self-moving soul in a vegetative life. Indeed, he says then – for opportunely I recall the verse –

6,1 'but I became a girl and a boy / and a bush and a bird',[16]
indicating indirectly what Pythagoras intimated in a riddle.[17]

And indeed Plato, our forefather, says in his dialogues many beautiful things about the soul and its journey, and, although he speaks about the soul in many places, he does not say the same things in every place; on the one hand, <his> Socrates in the *Phaedo*,[18] disdaining the entire sensible world and censuring the association of the soul with the body, laments that the soul is buried in the body as in a prison and in a tomb, and he marvels at the account contained in secret teachings because it relates that, since we arrived in this world, we are confined in a sort of 'guard-post' (*phroura*).[19] And Empedocles has made this whole universe a subterranean cavern,[20] while Plato in the *Republic*, changing the nomenclature, calls it a cave.[21] And further, he has declared the journey hence of the soul to be a freeing from bonds and a flight from the cave. Elsewhere, too, the Socrates of the *Phaedrus* says that he sees the descending souls stripped bare of their wings; for the soul, having shed its feathers, becomes heavy and is borne downward until it comes to a stand in the vicinity of the body, and when the wicked horse[22] of the soul is weighed down, it is not possible for it to stay above and maintain a stable course; and this is the cause of our arrival in this world. And the periodic cycles carry the soul, after it has ascended again to the upper world, back down here, and send it for judgment and punishment; and lots, chance, and necessity drag it down.[23]

7,1 But then, after in all these places censuring the downward path of the soul to the body, when he comes to compose the *Timaeus* Plato changes his position and commends the arrival of the soul, and, marvelling at this world, calls it 'a blessed god', and celebrates the soul's appearance here.[24] He is persuaded that the soul was bestowed upon us by the goodness of the Creator, and he is prepared to persuade others of this also; it was necessary, after all, for this world to possess intellect (and this could not happen without soul), and also to be perfect; and this is what the soul of each individual gives to the whole, by rousing up the sensible realm, and containing, ordering, and arranging it, so that a willing soul serves a willing creator in order that his whole noble work not remain imperfect. For he wished to reveal in the sensible world as many things as pre-existed in the intelligible world.

Such, then, were the views of our forefather.[25] His student Aris-

totle, however, did not agree, but, coining a term, declared that the soul was an 'actualisation' (*entelekheia*), such that it brings perfection (*telos*) to matter, and is not an immortal form, but that the 'mind from outside' – for thus he named it – alone is immortal, and the soul originates from outside as well; for it does not possess innately the capacity to be illuminated by intellect as by the sun's ray.[26]

EU. You are blessed,[27] Theophrastus, because, although many and diverse are the doctrines of ancient times, nothing has escaped your notice, but you teach everything clearly, like one who has discovered them yourself, rather than expounding the positions of the ancients. You have showed yourself superior in memory to Hippias[28] himself, and not unpractised in your subject. But what am I to do? I still remain ambivalent, and do not know what is to become of me, since I do not know whom I ought to follow: Heraclitus, whose view it is that the flight to this life is the soul's rest from the toils above;[29] or Empedocles, who casts the soul out here as punishment for wrongs previously committed; or Plato, rather, who <sends>[30] the soul forth in whatever way takes his fancy, now as a punishment, now for the perfection of the entire universe, now unwillingly, now willingly, sometimes by force, sometimes by self-movement. Of Aristotle I will not speak, who through an overstraining of wisdom destroys the immortality of the soul. They all severally nullify each other's position and purpose, by proposing philosophical positions opposite to the others and to themselves.

TH. Those from the Academy want to persuade us that Plato himself is <not>[31] inconsistent, by transposing concepts and words however they wish, like people who interpret oracles according to their own preferences. However, they seem to me wholly to force the issue; for neither has anyone been nor could anyone be more capable than Plato of explaining clearly all that he wishes. But they, being ashamed that he should appear inconsistent, by way of defence, expose him to a different criticism; for either the philosopher is an unclear teacher or he is obscuring his meaning out of begrudgery. Plato, however, suffers from neither of these two defects, but those who deal sophistically with his positions have failed to appreciate that he has introduced the philosophy of the Chaldeans and the Egyptians to the Greeks[32] and has revealed the teachings of Pythagoras and Heraclitus and Empedocles. It is for this reason that he presents different accounts at different times, so that nothing of those wise discussions from all quarters should escape the notice of those studying philosophy in the Academy. For example, even concerning matter he suggests that in one way it has come to be and in another that it is un-generated. And later philosophers, being ignorant of the subtle and multifaceted quality of Plato's knowledge, and each one straining

to be first to contrive something new, were confused among themselves, and, becoming disparate in their views, ended up neither following Plato nor one another.

9,1 EU. Right nobly now do you bring forth solutions to problems which have caused me many travails. It was because my mind was bewildered by this problem that I set out to sail to Athens, abandoning my country and my loved ones. But now having met you and marvelling at the wisdom manifest in you, I wonder still more that, having grasped this fact so thoroughly, you are still prepared to share confusion with Pythagoras and Plato, the Chaldeans and the Egyptians, who do not all say the same things about the same subjects, nor does each say the same things as themselves. It is a sign of inexperience to articulate contradictory propositions, not a sign of knowledge, and, as it would seem, God is not the instigator of this philosophical doctrine – for surely then the same position would be adopted by everyone – but instead, it is some human opinion, in which many opposite positions variously appear.

TH. I know, my good fellow. But even Plato felt it right to hold to his own view until a more divine man should appear who would teach the very truth, whom it is fitting in turn to follow.

EU. Well said, indeed! But tell me this, whether you have ever given thought to this issue (for the confusion of the philosophers of old confuses me extremely now), namely that some cast away the soul again into other men, while others cast it away into beasts.[33]

10,1 TH. If you knew the whole story you would be amazed how great a battle rages among those who have something to say on this matter. For, I, taking a stand on my own ground,

'out of the place where men are killed, the blood and confusion',[34]

have been observing as from a vantage point the diversity of the contests. And so I wish to give an account of this question, since you are a lover of listening and a lover of learning. First of all, it is the view of the Egyptians that the same soul puts on the body of a man, an ox, a dog, a bird, and a fish; and so at one time, for them, it inhabits the earth as some beast, an ant or a camel, and at another time, slipping into piscine nature, it becomes a whale or a sardine, and enters into the sea. And again, changed into the nature of a bird, appearing as a jackdaw[35] or a nightingale, it flies into the air. And so at various times it reveals various forms of living creature, until having gone through every form it ascends again to that point whence it first descended.[36]

AE. Heavens, what a catalogue of wonders! Happy indeed would I be, were I to become a camel or a whale or a jackdaw.

EU. You may jeer, Aegyptus. I, however, am astounded at Theophrastus, if, with this knowledge of how things are, he is still prepared to be mixed up with Egyptian doctrines.

TH. Apollo himself and his son Plato[37] have come to be of the same mind with the Egyptians: Apollo, by issuing oracles and commands that we in all cases believe in the discoveries of the Egyptians;[38] and Plato, in turn, in putting forth his *Timaeus*, declared that the souls of men, when they become effeminate in this life, live again in women, and when they are filled with evil, descend into wild beasts and live in herds with land animals, fly in flocks with winged creatures, and swim in schools with water-creatures.[39] And, in expounding the conversation of Socrates with Phaedo,[40] he transforms those who are excited by greediness and zealous for rapacity into kites and wolves, and the one enslaved by his desires he drives off to join the asses. Again, when he establishes his blessed city,[41] he relates there somewhere that Orpheus, son of Calliope, when he ended his life, having been torn apart by women, shunning the role of man, became a swan because he was of a musical nature and made music.[42] And Thersites, who was the ugliest of all those who were under the walls of Ilium, because he imitated Achilles who was not fighting in the war but casting reproaches upon Agamemnon, was transformed into a monkey and imitated the deeds of men, throwing off in the change the form but not the habits of men.[43]

EU. Why, then, my dear fellow, do the initiates in the rites of Plato not come up with some clever interpretation in this case just as they do in others, nor do they conceal their guffaws by changing around names and mixing up concepts?

TH. The ancient mystagogues introduced no change in the tradition, knowing well that Plato had taught himself the doctrine of the Egyptians, and had had it dinned into him by them that the soul of men transmigrated into all living beings, so that he everywhere spread the doctrine of these sayings. Plotinus,[44] therefore, and Harpocration,[45] and indeed[46] Boethus[47] and Numenius[48] also, having received from the tradition Plato's kite, have handed it on as a kite, and the wolf as a wolf, and the ass as an ass.[49] And for them the monkey is considered nothing other than that, namely, a monkey, and the swan nothing other than a swan; and they say that it is possible for the soul to be filled with evil before entering the body and to take on the likeness of irrational animals. And, accordingly, to whichever animal it was likened, down into this it is carried, diverse

souls putting on different animal bodies. Porphyry[50] and Iamblichus,[51] however, coming along later, the one a polymath, the other divinely inspired[52] by reason of their wisdom despised their predecessors and were embarrassed at Plato's ass and wolf and kite, observing that the essences of rational animals and of irrational animals are different and that they are not transferable, but rather the essences persist in the same way as they first came forth.[53] For rationality is not accidental to the soul in such a way as to migrate, but is a differentia of a firmly-established essence, and it is wholly impossible for the rational to transmigrate into the irrational, unless one will assert that it is possible for the irrational to steal away the nature of reason. Having worked this out at this late stage, they skipped over the irrational species of animals, and changed the doctrine, asserting that man lives again not in the form of an ass but in that of an ass-like man, not as a lion, but as a lion-like man. For they say that it is not the nature but the shape of bodies that men change, just like the actors of tragedy on stage[54] who at one time play Alcmaeon, at another time Orestes.

13,1 EU. They join flax with flax,[55] Theophrastus, as the proverb goes, and were trying to heal evil with evil.[56] For what is the point of freeing the soul from the body, if it is to be sent back down to body? Death is then futile; for one should rather have extended the life of the wicked in order to give room for the appropriate punishment to be imposed. And from another point of view, if the soul should fall into licentiousness, dominated in this life by a myriad of desires, as if of mistresses, and is shamefully enslaved to them, if because of this, it is sent back, under the requirements of justice, to live again in the form of an ass-like man in order to be enslaved still more to the desires, it has received as its retribution a further provision of evil; and the punishment becomes not a removal of the licentiousness, but a more durable addition to it. And yet justice is held to be medicinal for the passions,[57] contracting them, curtailing them, cutting them up, and wholly eradicating them, but not exciting them or sharpening them, nor devising a further occasion for passion. For if this were the case, it would be quite as if a judge, taking a man convicted of theft, commanded that he not suffer any punishment, but rather prescribed that he frequent the sacred sites for the purpose of taking whatever he wanted, in order that he may give free rein to his greed[58] and allow himself to seize without fear the temple offerings, since he was convicted of theft. It would be better, after all, to postulate that one who was a pederast and destroyed the virtue of the young, should in turn become a beautiful youth in order that he himself might suffer these things; and that another, an adulterer, be changed into a woman, in order to be violated by adultery.[59]

AE. Heavens, what a paradox! Justice becomes a pimp.

EU. Yes, Aegyptus, in fact the learned Porphyry and the divinely-inspired Iamblichus urge this by referring that which depends upon us to the judges in Hades and blaming justice for human failings. It is these that Theophrastus wishes us to follow. 14,1

TH. I should not wish it any longer, Euxitheus. For neither Syrianus nor Proclus followed these thinkers, but they have come up with a newfangled theory of their own.[60]

EU. What is this, Theophrastus?

TH. The soul equipped for robbery they do not change into a kite, for it is unreasonable that the rational soul be transferred into an irrational creature; nor do they send it out into a kite-like man, for it is strange if the punishment is to become the cause of further greed, but they say that the kite has its own irrational soul, and that the human soul has been bound to it, remains with it, and flies along with it, and this is the manner of retribution.

EU. This is a pretty novel piece of ingenuity, but it is even more ridiculous than the original. Are we to suppose that Odysseus accompanies an ant, for both are household managers[61] and are able to undertake many labours, or will Hector be bound to a wasp, for both have gleaming helmets[62] and are war-like, or Cleon be linked to a frog, for both croak often, or that a fly should attach itself to Hyperbolus, for shamelessness is the hallmark of each of them? And the ant, wasp, frog, or fly would thus latently be a double entity. For it is not without body that Odysseus or anyone else follows along with them, if indeed he does so. For you maintain that one still in need of punishment is not absolutely freed from body.[63] 15,1

TH. We do indeed.

EU. Therefore, is Odysseus hidden inside an ant, or is he attached to its foot, just as he hung from the ram in the Cyclops story,[64] and he is dragged along whithersoever the ant decides to go? Why do you laugh at this, Aegyptus?

AE. Well, is it not laughable that through their arrogance they fail to see the fictional nature of this account?

EU. Come now, Theophrastus, consider this. If you should see a flock of sparrows or of cranes making a din while flying, perhaps you would say that men who had lived chaotically in an army or on the stage,

insolent and noisy and licentious, have, after they died, been bound together with these birds and make the same sort of cawing as these creatures do and follow them everywhere; and if one should catch these birds and sacrifice them, the slaughter of the birds becomes the escape of the captives; for they are released by the dissolution of that soul to which they were bound.[65] Indeed, they [sc. Syrianus and Proclus] are not going to claim that the irrational soul is immortal.[66] What, then? If the souls of men should be bound together with sardines, and the net of the fishermen works well, won't the souls be laughing because they have been released from punishment? For the capture of the fish is the release of the souls, and the hunting down of the sardines translates into freedom for the human souls.

16,1 Often in the past bee-keepers, on their bee population declining, have contrived the following sort of device. Driving an ox into a hut, they strike it with sticks until it falls dead. After the ox has fallen, it is laid out; and after sealing the doors with great care, in order that no air may enter from any quarter, they then leave. After counting out forty days and afterwards opening the doors, they find the ox rotted and a myriad of living things flying around instead of one.[67] So the hut appears all of a sudden full of bees, which came into existence from the ox, and after being nurtured in a cluster, they begin to make use of their wings. After catching these up and tending them, the beekeepers make them engage in the production of honey. So then, is it the case that one soul, sliced up, has been dispersed into a myriad, which, when collected together, the ox alone contained; or has the one soul summoned to itself these many souls, and so organised the swarms of bees? Either of these alternatives seems to me plainly ridiculous, but do they not appear so to you?

Perhaps they will come even a fourth time with more newfangled proposals. But great as is the battle of words, even so great is the error of their teachings. Whither are you carried away, Athenians,[68] in your trust of anyone who turns out stories? For do you see how the very argument, rubbing against itself, like those stones which harbour fire, beams forth light and exposes the things lying hidden in the shadows, and no longer permits us to acquiesce in the position that the soul has had a previous existence?

TH. These considerations have often weighed on my mind before this, and have threatened to alter my view. But respect for my ancestral tradition and the lack of someone to fight alongside me, have hampered me and held me back.

EU. Did this following point not come into your mind before anything else? If the soul has lived before, it would remember that or it would recollect it; and indeed the ancients, of course, called acts of learning
17,1 acts of recollection.[69] So then, the soul remembers the Creator and

the beauty of the intelligible world, from which it has for a long time been separated, yet it wholly forgets the pursuits and experiences, the country and parents of its previous life from which it emigrated only yesterday. And yet what logic is there in its remembering the beautiful things but forgetting the painful things, by which memory is much rather impressed and imprinted? Now when punishing my son or my servant for things he did wrong, before the punishment I often declare ahead of time the reason for the punishment and think it proper for them to be reminded of it so that they no longer fall into the same errors. Will God, on the other hand, though imposing penalties of an extreme nature, not teach those who suffer them the things to which the penalties pertain, but instead take away the memory of the sins, while imposing a vivid perception of the punishment? What profits it if the punishment conceals the sin? On the contrary, in that case, it will provoke the sinner and carry him off into madness. Readily and rightly does a person castigate his judge, if he undergoes punishment while having no consciousness of wrongdoing. But yourself, Theophrastus, tell me, while recollecting such great theories as these, do you become forgetful of yourself alone, and are you unable to tell us whether you have been a soldier or a philosopher, or indeed a rabbit or a lion, or whether you have been linked to a swan or a kite?

TH. Well, Pythagoras is said to have remembered that he was once Euphorbus of Troy.[70]

EU. When he said these things, he was falsely dissembling, contriving a stratagem to persuade people of the very thing which he was teaching, namely, that the soul has lived before. With the same intention, he hid in an underground chamber for ten years and then, forsooth, came up from Hades and said that he had heard from Pluto that the soul was immortal, and he was widely believed.[71] Later Apollonius[72] the Cappadocian, having become an admirer of this pretension, related a myth to the Greeks about wise men among the Indians, how they knew who they once were – having recourse to witnesses outside the civilised world. But nevertheless he is refuted. For neither does Ctesias,[73] though he has composed many mythical stories about the Indians, anywhere tell this myth, nor did Arrian,[74] 18,1 who composed his histories with a tendency more towards truth than mythology, make mention of this doctrine, and yet he gave a thorough account of the interaction of the Brahmans with Alexander, in which they urged Alexander to abstain from greed. The occasion demanded such a contrivance, in order that, by contriving anew invisible objects of fear, they might terrify Alexander, since nothing visible alarmed him. For at that time, when their kinsmen ran the risk of slavery and disruption, it was more necessary to show the

superiority of their philosophy. But, nevertheless, neither did they demonstrate any such thing to Alexander, nor later, when they sent a letter to the Hellenes, attacking the philosophy of the Greeks and glorifying their own, did they include in the letter anywhere any such preposterous claim. If therefore no one either of the earlier nor of the later writers supports the account, Apollonius, since he alone relates these falsehoods, is exposed as a liar.

Hierocles, not our teacher but the purveyor of wondrous tales,[75] added also this following improbable story: that a young male prostitute – the young fellow was a Corcyrean – was on a voyage with his lover Myron, and, when the boat anchored at some deserted spot, he disembarked and then fell to lamenting, on recalling that here some one of his lovers in a previous life, having failed to seduce him, hanged himself, and he wept because he had not gratified him before he died. But is this not ridiculous, if a male prostitute can recall his past life, but Socrates cannot recall his, nor yet Plato, and they make no claim to know anything from their previous lives? And yet those among the Chaldeans, the Egyptians, and the Greeks who go about touting mystery rites, and who promise to conjure up the souls of persons who have died long ago and who by incantations promise to drag them along wherever they wish, say that, if they should wish to summon up the soul of Homer, or of Orpheus, or of Phoroneus, or the
19,1 soul of Cecrops, by sacrificing cocks and inscribing mystical characters, they claim to be able to call them up and exhibit them. But if one of them becomes a nightingale, and another a swan, or a man, or a lion, how will they come when summoned, unless they come leaving behind the bird, the beast, or the man without a soul? How will the swan know, or the lion, that he was once born a man, when even the man will not know? And in fact these fellows indulge in fraud with their rites. For they do not display your father and your wife, but rather some wicked demon acting the part of father and wife. At any rate, as soon as the sun rises the vision is dissolved. So this much-vaunted procedure is a mere old wives' tale,[76] and utterly devoid of plausibility.

TH. You seem to me to speak well, and make a very respectable case for the opposition. But if we are to wholly remove the previous life of the soul, the result would seem to be disorder, if the evil flourish, while the good suffer misfortune.

EU. I will answer that, if you like. But tell me first, what do you mean by misfortune? Do you mean sickness, and poverty, and being put on the rack by the wicked, and being beaten and ultimately put to death?

TH. That is what I would mean.

EU. This argument is suited to those who are passionate for wealth and power and pleasure, but not, surely, to Theophrastus. You do not forget, do you, that poverty and sickness and death seemed neither shameful nor evil to Socrates and to philosophy, seeing that each of these has indeed often benefited many people. Socrates himself, indeed, thought highly of poverty and called it wealth and a guardian of philosophy,[77] just as he also said that the sickness of Theages contributed greatly to his philosophising, stating, if I recall correctly: 'Certainly also for our companion Theages everything contributes to his giving up philosophy, but the nursing of his disease holds him back and keeps him to it.'[78] And indeed Plato too – for he had always been healthy – chose a pestilent place in which to found his school, depriving himself of the greater part of health, and purchasing temperance at the cost of bodily vigour.[79] Again, he very piously called death a freedom and release from evil, teaching that God, in his compassion for man, has rendered his bonds also mortal.[80] If therefore, this is a cause of good, how could it be evil? But licentiousness and greed and ignorance and cowardliness are and are called the most shameful of evils, which have no share in the good; but happiness is always present, and it is not right that it should be absent, if indeed moderation and justice and courage and prudence are true happiness, no part of which is absent from good men. One who chooses to do injustice will not detract from these things; for he cannot. Of course, he is able to rob one's purse and to cut up one's body, but he is not able to detract in any way from happiness. He has mastery over these other things, but virtue owns no master,[81] and acting under one's own power is the most noble honour of the rational soul; it is for us the first and greatest gift of the Creator, which I welcome more than anything and for which I give the greatest thanks to the one who has bestowed it. For what is more holy than freedom, which by laying hold of man makes him a god? 20,1 21,1

TH. But would it not be better for men to become good by necessity than in the name of freedom to choose evil?

EU. And what would virtue amount to for a soul compelled to serve? For nothing imposed by force is a very good lesson nor is anything which comes about by necessity a suitable subject for commendation. How would man be better off: if he were a stone carried about wherever the mason wished,[82] rather than if he produced a note from himself, which the Creator then arranges beautifully in accordance with the harmony of the universe?

TH. But I am astonished that, through his hatred of the evil of the worse kind of person, he does not along with it abolish the free power of the better sort.

EU. What? Is it not more becoming, for the sake of the good, to put up with the disobedience of the bad, rather than on account of the disorder of the worse to cast aside the good order of the better? Come now, consider this. If some fellow, although ordained to farm and being called a farmer, suddenly runs off from the vines and goes to town, and then takes up with some floozy he meets, brilliant with
22,1 loveliness and gold ornaments, redolent in perfume, flirting expertly and heaping him with flatteries; if he, struck with amazement, follows after her, forgetting all about his grapes; if, then, his partner in the farming operation, having heard about his colleague's love affair, attends to his tasks more enthusiastically and looks after the vines all the more assiduously, so as to make up for the lack of his disorderly friend – if you happened to be the master of the property, would you lock out from the house the one who was temperate and kept working because of the one who was infatuated and was carousing in town?

TH. Not at all. For thus my land would only have gone back to wilderness!

EU. Do you not, therefore, rather praise the one who continued farming because, even though it was possible for him to go to town and to binge with the lover, he rejected pleasure in favour of noble labour done by the sweat of his brow?

TH. Of course, if I want my grapes to do well. But one ought to preserve the good, while either not producing the bad at all, or at least destroy them as soon as they are born.

EU. And yet the legislation of Solon does not permit one to establish a law for the individual man, but rather the same law for all Athenians. You, however, do not allow the law of the great Legislator to be common to all, nor do you concede that the same law should be established for all men, but there are those whom you separate off, bidding some to be begotten and nurtured, while for others you urge
23,1 that their death take precedence over their birth. On that principle, then, let not the sun warm all nor the earth bear fruit for all.[83] Or does this go without saying, that you wish all men to behave correctly and to err in nothing? You have too high a regard for man, and therefore you are astonished if he errs at all. But man does not belong to the highest rational part of creation but the lowest, seeing that, by virtue of immortality of soul and rationality, he prevails over irrational animals, but by virtue of the corruptibility of his body and his need for nourishment he falls short of the rational beings above him.[84] This is in no way unreasonable for those who are subject to generation. For if the soul, in a state of separation from the body,

were to be led on to desire and anger, this would be extraordinary; but as it is united to a body, it is necessary for soul to pay attention to bodies here in this world, <which>[85] are preserved by physical sustenance. Therefore, let one pursue desires well and within measure, says the Creator. Otherwise, on what basis does the child newly born desire milk, and whence does it grow angry at what causes it pain, other than to strive to preserve itself by taking to itself one thing, and rejecting another? To live then according to nature is noble and leads to preservation of the body; living contrary to nature is shameful and attracts punishment; but to live above nature is great and worthy of honour. If we should write off the lowest entities because they are not first, would we not rapidly dissolve and destroy the whole order of things? For consider: if we should resolve to reject the stone because it does not yield fruit as plants do, and to criticise plants because they do not work the land as oxen do, and to abuse the ox, since it does not possess the same sort of will as the farmer, then let the farmer himself be dismissed because he does not neglect physical sustenance like the powers of heaven above. By the application of such irrational wisdom would one ascend as far as the divine beings, and complain that the powers of heaven above had not been ordained to create, but merely to assist the Creator![86]

If we should proceed in this way, what of the things which exist will we leave standing in its place? But may the Creator be well disposed to us, and let everything remain according to his ordering. For nothing of things which have come into being are trivial, but all are noble and great and well-ordered. Even the stone is noble, <*qua*> stone, and the tree, <*qua*> tree.[87] Even the lion is noble, though he should attack in accord with the principle of the irrational life; for there is nothing better for him than irrationality, and so he is free from responsibility for whatever it is that he should do contrary to reason. Man is a thing of moral weight and grace, whenever he *is* man, ascending to the good and to the wisdom of the good, but he also desires physical sustenance and is perceptive of what causes him pain. For with respect to both aspects he is a man: a good mind, making use of an irrational body, but endowed with autonomy (*autokratôr*),[88] migrates up and down under its own power, choosing one thing rather than another; for this is the power of human choice. The power of reason is well-ordered and a ruling principle; but the rush of irrationality is a disordered impulse, unless it is regulated by reason. And if reason is inoperative due to laziness or a timid hesitation or alternatively ignorance and concern[89] for things here below, together with forgetfulness of the realm above, desire and spiritedness are thrown into confusion like a pair of horses when the charioteer falls out of the chariot.[90]

But the situation is not free from oversight. For the Director of the Games has explained beforehand the exercises to be performed, and

has announced ahead of time how many events the contestant is to enter. If it neglects these things, reason pays the penalty not for what it has done, but for what it has failed to do, not for what it has committed, but for what it has allowed to happen. For reason, which is capable of stopping the disorder of irrationality, if it overlooks it, in the truer sense brings it about. We must therefore not entrust authority to the child in us,[91] or, if we do, do not wonder if all our affairs should become topsy-turvy. For the child desires many things, but the best intellect and spirit, in alliance with it, restrain and curtail its myriad desires. If the power of the worse part goes wild, a confounding of the better part results; which is something that can be cured. There are in fact many remedies: good nurturing, education, reason, custom, the practice of noble deeds, habituation, knowledge, and the bringing to order of everything. And of course the shifting nature of the flow of things is a sufficient lesson in temperance for those who are observant. For instance, there are frequent changes in financial affairs which give a good lesson to those who aspire to profit that they have acquired nothing despite all their sweat, and console those who are in a state of deprivation that they have been freed from a faithless and unsecurable resource. He who has not been mindful of these points is unable to be at peace, but thrown into turbulence he is borne about randomly and, like one who stumbles in the dark, falls to complaining, because he is quite unaware of the good things which lie in his midst, but in his witless ignorance of his very ignorance[92] he is twice sick, not seeing his situation, and rejecting what lies at his feet and not wishing what happens to him, but imagining that whatever appears to him so is fine and useful.

Therefore, if the bad man injures the good man, spurred on as he is by irrationality, God is not responsible;[93] he injures whoever is in his way, as when a bowman fires a shot, whoever happens to be in the way is wounded, whatever sort of man he is. The greedy man does not proceed in an orderly manner; God, however, steers the disorder of greed towards order, like a first-class craftsman who makes excellent use of whatever comes to light for the common good of the overall project, and who clears up that which has been tossed off randomly and is useless to others, forces it to harmonise and arranges it in accord with the whole. Therefore, the resultant injury is both an evil and an injury to the one who does it and the perpetrator would not be able to slough off responsibility, nor will he escape justice; but to the victim of the injury it is not an evil but a thing of use, in so far as the suffering brings about an addition to happiness for him and it is accounted a benefit to the common good, since the fact that the good man does not shun virtue because of the fear of death is a sufficient encouragement for those well-disposed towards virtue. For this reason, God has established virtue as devoid of superfluity, domination,

and pleasure, so that the good competitors choose virtue not for anything else but for itself in order that they not mix up virtue with emotion. And he allows sufferings to precede noble deeds; like a good Director of Games who wishes to excite the whole power of the soul, so as to be able to undergo such great danger for a noble cause, so that misfortune becomes a manifestation of strength not of weakness.

And besides, if the one suffering is good, even the end of death results in a good for him; for it is possible, I maintain, even for one who has died to live in the truest sense and to ascend as far as the first principle and no longer to fear change, but rather to possess immortal happiness and luxury fitting for a pure soul. For these things are to be deemed the prizes of virtue,[94] not kingly power nor abundance of wealth, which things have often exchanged many masters, and neither are these things good, since they are actually the causes of evil, nor immortal, but rather shadowy and ephemeral images. Sometimes a man is eager for virtue, but he slips and he either does or intends something unlawful. To us he may seem to be well, for our veils and his have become a hindrance to seeing clearly what is within, and we are amazed if ever one suffers something, due to our ignorance of the reason for this. But to the Judge all things are laid bare, and, when he perceives that a man in general is behaving well, but that a certain small aspect of him is corrupted, but curable by medicine, in that case he allows him to suffer something and to pay a penalty so as, having become pure, in purity to have enjoyment of the goods in the higher realm. But if some one, while doing another person an injustice, should himself suffer ill at the hands of another, he himself has suffered justly, but the one who inflicted this on him acted unjustly, and shall never escape punishment. God put both together, and brought the one who was to suffer together with the one who was fitted to do what the other was doomed to suffer, and, when each lets his voice be heard, like <a musical note>[95] from himself, the one better, the other worse, the one man acting and the other <suffering>,[96] God nonetheless imposes upon them a single harmony. Not that it is for this reason evil arises in the world, that it might be made the subject of harmonious arrangement, but, since it has arisen from us, it has been brought to order by Providence.[97] And this is actually a great power, namely, to make good even of evil things, and to be able to bring to completeness in other forms things which have emerged ill-formed from us. In this very way, that which is proportionate to the merit of souls is accorded to them, and that which was sick is cured, and the common good is preserved. Let the wicked one for a time be rich and healthy, says the benevolence of Providence; for he could become better either by therapy, just like children who by way of certain pleasures are encouraged to acquire a skill, or else, after standing convicted and having had to reveal everything what-

ever that was festering in his soul, and exhibiting himself whole, he himself prepares for himself the purifying flame, heaping up much fuel, and then falls into it, with no excuse or forgiveness. For he would not be able to claim that through any lack of money he was unable to help those in need of solace – for he was wealthy – nor that by want of authority he was forced to neglect those who were wronged – for he was a tyrant – nor that by weakness of mind he yielded to pleasures – for he possessed bodily strength. For the Judge wishes, because of his superlative degree of justice, that his judgement not be in doubt, but that the one convicted should both suffer and marvel at the verdict of his judge.

If death were a release from everything, I would rightly be surprised, if a wicked man should end his life still possessed of tyrannical power;[98] but as it is, since in fact the soul is immortal, neither does it escape justice when departing into Hades, but there especially it is sensible of its punishment, having fallen into Tartarus from which it will never emerge; so that it would be a godsend for the evil to be sick in this world, or deprived of resources, or enslaved. For there have been cases when a man has in private life committed some small fault, and, after the harmony of his limbs has been dissolved,[99] if he has understood the cause of this and wept over it, he would be delivered from punishment in Hades. Another, having had his eyes put out and become an example of justice here in this world, because he came to hate the occasion for his suffering, has been let free from his guilt.

TH. My good fellow, you have right nobly expounded these mysteries! But that man you mentioned was deprived of his eyesight, because he committed injustice; how about a child simply born blind? If he did not live in a previous life, surely he did not commit a prior wrong? For how could he have? Whence, therefore, tell me, derives the disease of his eyes?

EU. Well, I for my part reckon that the majority of these things are a misfortune of the body, not a punishment for the soul. For if the ruling principle does not do its job, the things which follow upon it must necessarily be thrown into confusion. For what would hold together if that is dissolved upon which the whole depends? If therefore the principle and power of the seed prevail over the matter, that which is composed by the creating power and formed and set in order becomes a fine embryo, like a living work of art. But when the seed is wasting away because of the lack of heat and the matter swells up because of an excess of moisture, the form is flooded out and slips away more and more and sinks completely, and it is inevitable that that which is being generated should change into its opposite. That which is opposite to potency is impotence, to vigour, corruption, to

health, sickness. And in this way, rather, do weaknesses, malformations, and mutilations come about in children. Hence, one is burdened with an extra finger, while another is found to be short of a finger, the one going beyond nature, the other falling short of it; one derives a consumptive element from his birth, another's eye is left imperfect, one has his feet contorted, another finds his right hand curled up. And of these some have ascended to the heights of philosophy, and their body, though stricken, has constituted no hindrance to that; while others, having descended into vice, do not accomplish as much as they wish, and the affliction of the body actually becomes for them a protection for their soul, and to observers their suffering appears rather as a salvation, and not a punishment.

Some, like those who wander in darkness, leaving the eye of their soul maimed and incomplete, denigrate the soul of the blind as though it were already being punished in Hades. But I am able to relate to you another, esoteric argument. The law of Providence looks not only to the present but also to the future, and from this vantage point arranges a due outcome for those to whom it is fitting. It permits one to become a slave, because he would have been revealed as a harsh master, another it has left a beggar, because he would have used his wealth badly.[100] And another, because he would have deceived and flattered and sharply hunted down anyone who stood in his way, is maimed in his head, where the activity of the soul is predominantly located, and his power of reason has been neutralised, and hence he remains without understanding. It is just as if some one, all set to commit a murder, when his right hand fails him, has to be satisfied with inaction. Let that blind child, of whom we made mention previously, come into our midst, guided by the reasonableness of our argument. This child [we argue], will use his eyes intemperately, if he gets to use them at all; for this reason it was permitted that they remain shut. This misfortune, however, was advantageous to him who suffered it, and that blind child would be happier than Lynceus,[101] if only he is more just.

This, however, does not happen to many; for it is not to be granted that many things come about contrary to nature, in order that nature, which the Creator himself ordered, not be thrown into confusion. However, it is always granted that aberrations happen in order that we may learn by the juxtaposition of the ill-formed how great a thing beauty is and whence the provision of beauty in nature has come; the experience of the ugly contributes to the most accurate knowledge of the beautiful. And the most exquisite aspect of this situation is that there is not just one manner of therapy; for the healing art of Providence would not use merely one remedy: it applies different ones to different ailments, but it offers treatment to everyone. The art is manifold, for the pathologies are manifold. One is freed from using sight in an evil way by not seeing at all; for another,

who despises this remedy and appears more keen for pleasure than for seeing keenly, Providence seeks another cure; but sometimes he must await both fire and the knife. For one the lack of money is sufficient for temperance, while for other persons different remedies are advantageous: there is not one and same remedy for all. And for each pathology many are the remedies with which the art of Providence adorns itself. But one who is inexperienced at the healing art, if he observes a medicine which he does not know, heaps abuse on the doctor; while another, approaching the skill without reason or knowledge, because he has learned one remedy, applies the same one to all who are sick, making no distinction, not nature, not temperament, not country, not age, not pathology, none of which escape the notice of the truly skilled physician.

Poverty and sickness and the other so-called evils are in general nothing to the good, because their concern is not for wealth or strength of body or beauty; on the other hand these things are considered a misfortune for those who are worst, but nevertheless even for these they are yet rather to be taken as useful.[102] For pleasure promotes every vice just as olive oil stimulates flames. Pain, on the other hand, puts it to sleep just like the mandrake root.[103] This is so because, not only for the body but also for the soul, opposites become cures for opposites.[104]

However, future evils are not always checked beforehand by an illness. Providence, after all, must not exist in such a way as for us to be nothing; for if Providence extended to everything, it would be nothing.[105] For what would it concern itself with, if the divine were all that there was? For this reason indeed one must blame fathers for weaknesses in their children: the bald also come from the bald, and the sick from the sick, as Hippocrates[106] would have it, and the true account as well. Intemperance and strong drink harm offspring by furnishing seed that is weaker and dissipated in strength so as not readily to admit the form coming from reason-principles, just as adulterated silver on account of its weakness frustrates the skill of the craftsman and rejects the form. It is due to this that many deformities and diseases arise. And yet neither are these things wholly useless to the universe as a whole; for they constitute a reproach to intemperance and awaken and persuade others to be vigilant about embarking on procreation in a sober state. Indeed, I would approve of that law of the Hebrews which prescribed stoning the father of a disabled child because through lack of self-control he did not await the period of his wife's purification, whence arises an excess of matter and the most disgusting disease for the child.[107] And the lawgiver of the Lacedaemonians made a good decision when he did not permit even women to be idle.[108] For when both men and women are stronger, it is the norm that also children are born stronger. This is the reasoned procedure of Providence, which no one

gainsays except by reason of irrationality, just as those with no experience at painting criticise the varied and polished and graceful aspects of this art.[109]

TH. So it is not anomalous for one to have died at birth, and for another to do so at the threshold of old age?

EU. God for our benefit both shortens life and extends it to the greatest length. For if the soul should depart more quickly,[110] it nonetheless organised its matter to which it has imparted the form, and it has departed before suffering <harm>[111] and has gained the experience of birth and, by a juxtaposition with the mortal body, knows immortality to be better,[112] and, most importantly, has sowed upon the mortal body the principle of immortality, and has taught the living not to trust in everything to Nature. For it is not Nature that possesses the supreme control over life; otherwise surely it would have proceeded by fixed rules and measured out the time and provided the same for all, giving no consideration as to whether it would be better or worse. But in fact this is the role of Providence, not of Nature.

Therefore, Providence makes distinctions in Nature for the advantage of the soul, and alters it in whatever way seems good to the Administrator of the universe. If someone should reach old age, there would on the one hand be risk, but he may enjoy greater rewards, if he should depart this life, having understood and accomplished what has been prescribed for him, having introduced all wisdom and skill into his life, and having set in order not only himself but also the 32,1 whole world. For it would have been wrong for the same time to be allotted to all; had that been so, people would have spent their prime in wickedness before coming to rely on temperance with their grey hairs, and enjoyed themselves at others' expense in youth before making justice the defence of their old age. For if now they are pursuing intemperance and greediness so readily when they do not know whether they will live until evening, what would they have done, had they known well that they would reach old age? Let no one indeed seek after money for the sake of his children,[113] when he considers it uncertain whether they will perish before coming into their inheritance. And to be sure divine also is this law, that some depart before their time and that the best lives beyond his limit, if circumstance and need should beckon. For it is the role of Providence to dispose things for a noble end and to change the disposition for one supremely noble, whereas if the limit were firmly fixed, it would appear to be the mark of necessity, not of Providence. But as things are, Providence allows this limit to be transgressed, teaching those able to understand it that she sets everything in place and changes things for the better, by her own free power, not out of necessity; she

lets go or does not let go in accordance with reason, not at random, and for instruction, not by way of coercion. These actions are marks of power, not of weakness, of diligence, not of indifference.

Let no one be amazed if accidents befall bodies in great numbers; for they are not imposed at random, but often the material, because it was unable to follow the soul before it manifested itself well and properly, falls into a base condition. Those who introduce matter simultaneously with the Creator and bring it into equilibrium with him[114] knew that it was a last, not a first principle, that it was weak, not a rival entity, that it draws life from outside, not from within itself. But at any given moment the orderly arrangement of the body may be thrown into confusion and dissolved; for either a beast attacks and tears it to pieces, or a stone falls and strikes it. Sometimes a man chokes through having drunk too much, or gives up the ghost through having drunk nothing: excess and privation produce the same effect. And again, an enemy, attacking, kills whoever he encounters, and the sea sucks someone down, and an earthquake envelops another, and a thunderbolt wipes out a third person. Indeed it is not remarkable if one is caught in the midst of such mishaps; rather it would be remarkable if one managed to avoid them all. One thing, indeed, may be opposed to another, but nothing is contrary to the whole; for this is precisely the role of harmony,[115] even from opposing sounds to make one melody.

If then the father of a child who has been killed was unjust, the misfortune of this death was not prevented in order that, by having suffered more, he might become more moderate; whereas, if he was just, then the death emerges as a more glorious test for him. So one who has reached old age, in a vigorous struggle against suffering, procures a nobler reputation in return for the loss of his child, and he lives with good hope, being borne along on which he more easily bears[116] the grief of the premature death of the child. For that child might have turned out to achieve nothing noble, nothing fine; for if he had been going to do well, he would surely have been saved contrary to expectation and beyond all hope – as indeed has often occurred. Pelias,[117] for instance, and Telephus[118] and Cyrus[119] are said to have been cast out, just after birth, into the midst of wild beasts, but nonetheless were nurtured by these animals which were picked out to nurture them; for they were destined to perform great and marvellous works. In like manner it is related in song about Heracles that, when the boat on which he was sailing was wrecked, he was caught up by a whale and was saved by ending up inside it.[120] Indeed a multitude of heroes surface who fell into great danger and who escaped by divine favour but against expectation.

Most men, however, when an accident befalls them, succumb to it, but all are overcome for their own profit and that of those who witness the event. For some, the disease of their intellect has been a

stabilising factor, for others it is a thing of terror. Even one who has acquired virtue might suffer so that he should not get above himself and commit outrage on virtue, and so that those who often are saved by him do not, becoming oblivious to his nature, proclaim the man a god and not a man – an error, in fact, which many of the Greeks and Thracians and Egyptians and Italians have fallen into, by considering their benefactors or those in general who ruled over them not heroes but gods, and by prostrating themselves to them and paying such respects and offering to them such rites and sacrifices as belong to the gods. Thus in the city of Therapnae[121] in Laconia people number among the gods Menelaus and, by Zeus, even Helen, after Alexandros,[122] after Deiphobos,[123] and celebrate them along with the gods, by honouring them with rites and dedications. Everyone as far as the Pillars of Heracles[124] claims that Dionysus the son of Semele and Heracles the son of Alcmene are gods, whom by way of refutation Porphyry showed to be mortal. In a work of his which provides a comprehensive discussion of demons,[125] he somewhere says that the worst class of demons set ambushes and traps for good men and attack them suddenly, just as Hera did to Dionysus and Hercules. The Getai live in Thrace dwelling along the river Ister; they treated the follower of Pythagoras – this was Zalmoxis,[126] who had run away and revealed to them the philosophy of his master – as their sole god, and by sacrificing their noblest and best people to him, elevated them, so they supposed, to divine stature. And Proteus[127] was believed to be a god among the Egyptians, and Helen, whom her initiates called the Foreign Aphrodite,[128] assumed a share in the rites with him. And the Italians counted their kings among the gods, enumerating all of them. Alexander was declared a thirteenth god[129] by the Athenians, but because he often got wounded and suffered sickness, after he died, he who had just recently been enrolled among the gods was recognised to be of mortal nature.

Thus the sufferings of the noble become fine lessons for men. And in general, a man would undergo suffering either for purposes of exhibiting virtue or for the cessation of evil; but if it does not cease, then the punishment serves as an example for others. And earthquakes and droughts and floods and sickness caused by plague and abnormal meteors and failures of crops and the fall of thunderbolts restrain the evil which pours forth from men. Let a public scourge chastise the outrageous behaviour of the people in general, by cutting out the part that the whole might be saved, even as the best doctor, when a malady weighs heavily and is extensive, hands over the patient's leg to those assigned to amputate it, in order for the man to be healthy in the rest of his body. You, however, are abusing the doctor, not the sickness which through mistrust and forgetfulness of what the doctor prescribed turns out to befall you.

TH. You seem to me to speak well, and it is a fine thing, as it seems, for me to change my opinion. For no longer does any of the things which occur in this world force me to accept that the soul has lived a previous life.

EU. Well done, my friend. The soul that uses reason will not wish, after its trial, to shoulder such a risk again, nor are we allowed to compete a second time: the present life is enough to show our paces. From our childhood onwards, the strength of the soul is displayed to the Director of the Games,[130] its strength and weakness are known before the wrestling begins, and our subsequent pursuits and choices and actions do not escape the spectator's eye, let alone the judge's. So the judge does not wait for a second life or a second examination, like people who neither understand the present nor have foreknowledge of the future. It is the soul which has done honour to the contest, displayed strength and skill and held firmly by all the rules of the games, that he has crowned victor and thought deserving of nectar[131] and honour and the choir above, which one is not allowed to desert. The
36,1 cowardly, lazy, foolish and garrulous soul, which upsets the audience and subverts the rules, he hates: he sends it straight into custody,[132] to the prison of punishment, from which escape is forbidden.

TH. Whence then does he summon all these competitors, if so many have gone first in the long course of time? You don't mean the same ones, do you?

EU. No.

TH. Then where do they come from? Please tell me.

EU. God makes the things which come to be, while remaining what he is. He is not diminished by making other things, nor spent by putting forth many things: indeed, he remains all the more a Whole, the greater the multiplicity of what he fashions. The Creator is a creator not because of things that individually come to be, but from his own being.[133] Even in human affairs, the architect is not split up into the things he builds, nor is any part of his soul or his whole knowledge taken away because he is at one time building temples, at another houses, and at another dockyards. The Creator is first: the things which come from him abide, but they need the Providence which comes from him. So postpone the question 'where from' – that
37,1 is <above>[134] you and me – listen to the women's view that nothing in the world is impossible to the Creator of the world, and do not ask whence the competitors who are coming down to the arena come from. The Director of the Games summons them, his proclamation becomes Nature. So, according to his wish, He established the intel-

lectual powers, and none of them was moved to ask the question 'Where?' Thus He made heaven and earth and adorned the one with the stars, the other with plants. You see that the plants are now laden with fruits, or pregnant with fruits which have not yet come. When the season summons them again, they obey the proclamation and bring forth display and yield their mature fruits, because the power by which they first generated these remains within them. Again, there is often abundance of fruits, but nothing of the root is spent, <except>[135] that it actually becomes more secure. So why are we still surprised that the Creator has encompassed all things which were or are or are to come, and, in his wisdom and skill, always produces each as He wishes, when it is right, and as it is best?

TH. But why did God establish beforehand and set limits to all the other rational powers, but continues even now to bring forth the souls of humans, which are rational?

EU. A good lawgiver has foreknowledge, by understanding not by experience, of the sufferings of humans, and does not wait for them all to happen. That is a judge's business. The good lawgiver <only>[136] proclaims that they were there in the beginning, because he bids <the earth>[137] make ready grasses and medicines and cures before the diseases appear. And in this case, God has foreseen that men, marvelling at the rational powers, believing them to be without beginning and un-generated, and making many Principles and innumerable gods, would introduce a disorderly democracy instead of the well-ordered monarchy; praising the perceptible world and standing within it they declared it was a God, without beginning and un-generated; bursting with philosophy,[138] they were wrecked on irrational fantasies. That is why He still produces our souls, which are rational, as an example of his power and as a lesson to the already existing <rational beings> that all things come from the one Creator and that every rational and intellectual power and being has proceeded, and still will proceed, from one Principle (*arkhê*). Do not doubt, when you look at yourselves – newly grown as you are, you who, just like the beings which existed before, walk above the heaven and ascend to the first Principle – what he has done also in the heavenly bodies: he has let the moon, alone of the stars, wax and lose its light and then again begin and become new, so that we may not suppose that any of the upper bodies is un-generated, and so come to grief from our irrationality. Therefore, just as we are taught, by the temporary appearance and disappearance of the last of the stars, that those higher up are also generated, so, from the recent production of the last rational being, the human soul, reasoning well, grasps the fact that the rational powers, which are prior to it, have their origin from the Creator. For He does nothing idle, superfluous or in

vain. But if we are to say that, in an individual human, the soul existed first and the body was fashioned later, the soul was idle and superfluous for a long time before it descended, and did not manifest its power <by activity>[139] nor know what it possessed; this is the advantage it gains by its descent. Even more idle would be the best soul – that which you call incorruptible and pristine – if it had not had experiences of a previous body but was living its first generation in this world; as is said to have happened in the case of Dionysus and Heracles at Thebes. And if it had been doing some task prescribed for it up above, then later, when it descended, it must have left its place there empty, deserted and unused. Other powers simultaneously come forth and are each assigned to their proper places and to the duty, service, ministry, and guard which they must perform; but [these thinkers] make the human soul sit idle for a long time, and ultimately send it in bonds to the prison which is the body. Yet the human soul *is* ordered to adorn the earth (otherwise it would not be a human's) and to proclaim on earth the rites of God, so that no place is abandoned to atheism. So it is surely better to fulfil the prescribed duty at the moment of coming forth than to remain sterile and unfulfilled for so long, and, by not exercising its power at the beginning, to remain in ignorance of it: for activity is the exhibition and knowledge of power.

TH. But if it comes forth in time, how is it immortal?

EU. The creator of the powers of heaven above is not different from the creator of the human soul. The same creator produces both them and it. And if he is the same, there is nothing strange in its being a single power and a single knowledge which produces [the soul] both then and now. The Creator's power does not fade with time, nor is his knowledge limited in scope. So we must *either* concede that those powers too are not immortal, *or* be convinced that it is necessary that the human soul should be immortal, because it ascends as far as the first Principle, as they do. He has made no rational being mortal: how then could he transgress his own law when he fashioned our soul, which he made not of his own substance, but *like* it, an image as it were and <such as to>[140] be made by philosophy to resemble God? What is like the immortal is also immortal; the mortal is not like the immortal, but its opposite. You, who have swallowed Plato whole, say that everything which has come to be is mortal and perishes and is dissolved. I will remind you of Timaeus and the speech of the Creator. As I recall it, the beginning of it runs like this:

> Gods of gods, whose father and creator I am, you are not entirely immortal, for you came into being: but you shall not be dissolved, for you share in my will, which is stronger than death.[141]

He brings both things together at once: their being made and yet not dissolved, and their having come to be and yet becoming stronger than death. Such was the human soul as it came forth, a rational being, perpetually moving and acting under its own power, having life from itself and able to confer life on an instrumental body – these are things that no mortal being has been granted, but are in truth the tokens of immortality. You may well marvel at the inner power of the soul, when you discern it from the variety of its outward powers: every skill, knowledge, action and contemplation suffices <to reveal>[142] the immortality of the soul. He who gave us being gave us also the gift that our souls should be for ever; this gift was Nature. Plato thinks that the whole cosmos came into being, is mortal, and yet is preserved as immortal. What *can* be burned is not necessarily burned in fact. And they praise Plato, even though he says that bodies come into being and yet do not perish; what they readily grant to bodies they will not concede to souls.

TH. One cannot help going along with this. But one thing has escaped us: we say that the other intellectual and rational beings are limited in number, but that the human ones are immeasurably multiplied, unless the argument has conceded that the same soul migrates into many bodies.

EU. The number of human souls is infinite for us, but it is limited for the Creator, as are other beings which are rational, which *you* cannot count, but God has counted. What he comprehended is to us undefined, but to him who comprehended it, it is well-defined. He himself is the measure <of what> he encompassed.[143] With immaterial and rational beings, multitude does not mean lack of room, for all things are one, each fills the whole and the whole receives all, and one is no hindrance to another, as it is with material bodies. Images of what I am saying can be seen also in plants; countless myriad shoots are cut from a single tree, and every shoot cut off possesses the whole of life, so as to grow when it is given to the earth, and yet the whole of life remains as before in the great tree. The [shoots] born of the one [tree] are infinite, and all are one, and none of what comes [from] it is unlike that from which it comes. This seems to us to go on to infinity, and [yet] nothing is indefinite. Furthermore, every compound of unlike things is dissolved at some point in time. Such is the perceptible world: when the parts which make up the whole are destroyed, the whole must inevitably suffer the same as the parts from which it is composed, until it achieves immortality completely. All time is short to God, but very long to mortals. Therefore, if mortal bodies are limited to some extent, we do not extend [the number of] our souls to infinity; the production of souls will stop when the need stops; so the measure for souls is the use for them, and the measure is defined by

what is needed. Can it be that Apollo professes to know the number of all the grains of sand[144], but the Creator does not know the number of the souls which he produces? The whole heaven is full of intellectual powers, the ether is full of angels and *daimones*, the air is full, earth and sea and the regions below the earth are full: as one of your own wise men said, there is no empty space enough to hold a grain of chaff or a hair.[145]

So, even if he wished to extend the life of humans for 10,000 years, I don't think the number of human souls would equal the multitude of the angels and *daimones*. On the present account however there would be a total deficiency of souls for this life; for if [this life] remains as it is, and the good go off to Elysium and enjoy their immortal banquet,[146] drinking their fill of nectar (for that is the rule in Plato's *Republic*),[147] while the wicked, by falling into Tartarus, from which there is no way out for them ever, get no advantage for themselves but lie there for ever as examples of justice (Socrates maintains this in *Phaedo* and *Gorgias*),[148] then, with so many taken out of the measure, they would unknowingly have left life altogether bereft of human beings. You can't say that the soul will have *this* life a second time, for that idea has been refuted and, to put it boldly, is bound in adamantine chains. But if Socrates in *Phaedrus*[149] says that each soul has a part in a body once in a thousand years, and it is said that the number of souls is enough for a period of ten thousand years, then we shall need fewer souls; for we do not say that mortal bodies last such a long time. So that it is from my point of view rather than from yours that the souls are limited in number.

TH. So you leave no ambiguity as regards the soul, Euxitheus, but do you think this universe is dissolved in course of time?

EU. Yes, my friend, if this beautiful spectacle is in matter, and not spontaneously generated (*automatos*).[150]

TH. What do you mean?

EU. The generation of bodies, being a movement, does not want to stay still: for what movement stays still? It always desires the perfect and the One from which it came, and hastens and hurries towards this. Its movement is not purposeless, nor will it stop until it finds the object of its desire – and it will find it, when the Creator himself wishes it; and he will wish it when it is appropriate. After the examination of the souls and the manifest exposure of evil, the entire sensible [being] will change to an immortal, so as to be in harmony with the immortality of humans, and so that again the place becomes appropriate to the blessedness of its inhabitants: it was necessary that a mortal living creature should dwell in a mortal world, and an

immortal creature in an immortal world; for there is a single union of the whole [universe], and nothing is out of order or out of tune, but every thing is friendly and appropriate to everything and has made the will of the Creator its nature. To make the same things both mortal and immortal is the part, I believe, of a wise and powerful being. What wisdom or power does it show that we are aware of our mortality but do not remain within it!

TH. What? Is not the world un-generated and without beginning? How could the Creator be a creator if there was a time when he was not doing his work?

EU. Hear now (as they say)[151] a very beautiful story. The king of all, from whom all things come, the beginning and fount of things that are (no barren fount), Good itself, the Father of Wisdom[152] and the Creator of the world, did not begin his power and activity of giving birth within time – for the Father of the Word and of Wisdom is for ever – nor did he beget with pain (for it was not out of necessity) or take a partner in the begetting (for there was none); nor yet did he empty himself of power, for he always has within Himself the child he bore, wholly within the whole of him, filling and filled: he wished (*bouleuesthai*) to be the only Father of an only [son]. The begotten son was not superfluous (otherwise he would not have had him within himself), and is of the same substance, for there is no complexity in him. For this reason he gave birth to the Word substantially, so that [the Word] <might make plain>[153] the substance (*hupostasis*) and power of the Father, being the very Word and the very Mind and gathering all things in its thinking: the Father creates everything through him. For <Wisdom>[154] was needed to fashion this universe, and at the time of the birth he also brought forth the Holy Spirit, of the same substance, not by force of nature, but by the free exercise of his power. Therefore he gave birth to it because he wished, and brought it forth because he could. Inspiring with the spirit intelligible and perceptible things alike he fills them with power, holds them together, and draws them to himself: for the Spirit always turns to the Father and draws [towards him] everything that it touches. And so the great wisdom and power of the Father, the Monad, the divine Trinity, is timeless, and does not admit degrees of more or less. For it was before time that a single substance also made and put in order the intellectual beings:[155] for he wished to have <beings>[156] to whom he could do good, and therefore produces the powers of heaven above, which are capable of benefiting from the good and the first good work, for in the good there is no envy about anything.[157] Thus he did not remain in idleness[158] before the sensible [world existed]; he created the heaven (whence time begins), and the earth, air and sea *after* his first [creation]; for he fashions different things at different times

according to his own free power, but always fashions them himself; he gives the universe matter, stirs it up, fits it together, orders it and adorns it. Matter is not un-generated or without beginning. The Chaldaeans teach you this too, and Porphyry gives a general title to the book he published, 'The Oracles of the Chaldaeans',[159] in which he insists that matter came into being, and, interpreting Plotinus' book *Where does evil come from?*,[160] says somewhere, arguing that matter is not un-generated, that to reckon it as a first principle is to be rejected as an impious doctrine. Therefore, if matter is generated and not a first principle, but comes last,[161] how can the perceptible world be un-generated or without beginning? That which is made of matter is not prior to matter. Plato himself – you remember how he declares without ambiguity in *Timaeus*,[162] asking first whether the universe has come to be or not, <that it came to be>.[163] And then he adds the cause: 'it is visible and tangible.' The stars are the most beautiful thing in heaven, yet they also have come into being: for their migration and courses, reversals and ascent to the north or descent to the south, and the eclipses of the sun and the moon, are all things perceptible, which Plato believes come to be and never securely *are*.

TH. Plato's interpreters say that 'came to be' does not mean 'came to be' but 'came to be by a cause',[164] just as my body is the cause of my shadow, but doesn't make my shadow; this merely came along with it.[165]

46,1 EU. So the Creator is not a creator if he does not create what he has made because he wishes to (*bouleuesthai*),[166] but this world, if it has not come to be, is a spontaneously generated thing. The body facing the sun does not allow the light to come from behind it, and this makes the shadow: which is why the outline of the shadow corresponds to the body. The Creator however is incorporeal and unlimited, being the light itself. So how or whence has the shadow come? How could he be better or truly a Creator, by himself making and fitting together things as he wished, or with a shadow following him out of necessity? Who would want to adorn or purify his own shadow? Thus the argument of these fools destroys Providence too: there could be no care for a shadow. Furthermore, a shadow appears simultaneously with the body, but it is impossible to conceive matter simultaneously with the Creator. Plotinus, in his study of Matter, says this plainly, and ridicules Anaxagoras for not saying it, but introducing the Creator and Matter together.[167] It is impossible to do this, because the maker must always be older than the thing made. The great Atticus,[168] Plato's lover, expounding his beloved's views, said somewhere that he was seeking the nature and order of the universe, and, being such as it is, it was not un-generated or eternal, but

created by one greater in power and more perfect, the oldest God, the intelligible God: for, being visible, tangible[169] and in every way corporeal it was impossible for it to be un-generated. How can we not admit that things whose being needs the help of something else to ensure their existence, have come into being and are preserved by their maker? He calls Aristotle ridiculous, because he admits on the one 47,1
hand that this world is visible, tangible and corporeal, but contends strongly that it is ungenerated and indestructible. How can he not be ridiculous, if he won't follow even the Egyptian prophets who, speaking of the origin and generation of the universe, fixed the birthday of the cosmos under the sign of Cancer?[170] Apollo, too, in an oracle,[171] sings that *daimones* were created, and were created before humankind and before the construction of the cosmos, and serve the Creator for the benefit of humanity. The oracle runs: 'There were created before you, who are the divine offspring of the cosmos, indestructible spirits for your service.' So are not Plato's interpreters, who introduce intelligible and sensible things together, contradicting, in their ingenious argument, both Apollo and Plato? All things do not happen at once. Now is the season of summer and plants are beautiful with fruit, winter has not yet burst upon us: so is the Creator the creator of summer but not yet of winter? Does he not bring rain or prepare the earth for producing its fruits because summer does not come together with winter? This is not a sign of weakness or disorder, but of order and power. Silence was a dogma of Pythagoras, yet he was <a man of words>,[172] even if at that time he decided to be silent. Sculpture was Phidias' art, but he was artist even when he had not yet made the statue on the Acropolis or at Olympia.

TH. Then was this world badly constructed?

EU. It could not have been better.

TH. On what basis, then, will it be dissolved? 48,1

EU. Because what is bound together is not simple, for <one thing>[173] is combined with another. What is bound together out of many dissimilar and contrary things, is potentially easily dissolved, and having a potential apt for dissolution it will one day activate what its potential was labouring to give birth to.

TH. What? Do you think it is the part of wisdom to break up what was well bound and fitted together?

EU. Yes, if he [the Creator] left the parts mortal, he also predetermined the break-up of the whole, for the whole is made up of the parts. If eye and finger and every part can suffer, the body is not

exempt from suffering, but the whole will suffer the same as the parts do. Secondly: if dissolution involved destruction of the whole, it would have been stupid to dissolve it, but if the dissolution also dissolves the destruction itself, then it is a mark of great wisdom and indescribable power to make mortal things immortal.

TH. Then why didn't he do so at the beginning? Is it that he could not or that he did not wish to?

49,1 EU. God's power does not fall short of his wish. It was in accordance with his wish that he made intelligibles immortal and sensibles capable of change.

TH. Out of jealousy? Or what?

EU. There is no jealousy of anything in the Good.[174] But if all things had been alike, they would not have been at all, for they would have been one. But as it was he created the rational and intellectual beings, and the intelligible world[175] as a whole, to be immortal, and there was no jealousy in him. In the second place, he added the perceptible things, beautiful and great, but inferior to the first things. It was not a sign of jealousy to add these second things – it would have been if he had left out any of the beautiful things he was capable of making. To create both an invisible and a visible order was the <responsibility>[176] of power, not weakness. It is the part of the perfect Word and the Creator to make not only different things, but things which are opposite to one another, like white and black, hot and cold, immortal things and mortal things – which, by his overwhelming power he will change into immortal. That is why he sowed the seed of the immortal in mortal things, seed which will grow, conquer, wipe out what is less than it, convert this into itself, and have fruits that last for ever. Not the least proof of this argument is the fact that the purest parts of the heaven and the earth – what the 50,1 oracles often call Olympus, the Isles of the Blest, and Elysium[177] – are still preserved and immortal, to show that the whole of heaven and earth *will* be so. For nothing created in the Creator is wholly mortal: so nothing remains mortal. He allows the perceptible and material to accept coming to be and destruction for a time, intending a greater good. He gives the Ideas (*ideai*)[178] and the varied beauty of the Forms (*eidê*) space, so that they are often imprinted on destruction and coming to be, the beautiful figures of shape are exercised on matter by the continuity of change, and the principles (*logoi*) of Forms are strengthened by practice and demonstrated in movement, so that the variety of external things makes us marvel at the notion of what lies within. It is as if a painter, having a beautiful exemplar, were to make many reproductions of it, such that none of its beauty is lost

but shines through everywhere and shows his art to greater effect. At the same time [as doing all this] he shows to the rational beings[179] (1) that he is granting them immortality not out of necessity but as a free gift, and is setting them among the first things deliberately and not because of a shortage of the second beings,[180] and also (2) that the first things must take care of the second, not absorb anything of them, but make contact with the ultimate things and be dependent on the first Principle, always looking towards it, doing its bidding, and being willing to be ruled rather than to rule: for freedom and power in the truest sense consist in the urge to serve the Good. Therefore those who have been assigned rational being must, of their own free will, soberly submit to rule, if they are to make good use of their ability to act under their own power, which is the greatest token of immortality which they have received from the Creator. If they[181] grudge serving the First, and each one feels aggrieved that he is not first, and yearns after tyranny and begins to act lawlessly, then they will be torn away from their ordered place and fall into disorder: deserting the Light of the King they will indeed not become mortals (for they were first made immortal in him) but will have perception of mortal things as if in the dark, as if they had fallen into a river, and are swept along this way and that, controlled rather than controlling.[182] Foreseeing this, the Creator proceeded to find a way of stopping it from happening. He did not take away the ability of his subjects to act under their own power because of the rebels but exposed the weakness of those rebels by means of material things, because once left alone, they had the knowledge to destroy but not to preserve. Pitying this state of affairs, he does not let them suffer, because he has made mortal that of which they crave to have a bigger share, and, when this is broken up, its tyranny is broken up also. After the fall of the tyrants he will once again make immortal that part which, because of the tyrants, he had first let go as mortal. This was expedient both as a bait to trap the tyranny, expose it and destroy it, and as an exhibition of the power, justice, gentleness and love of humanity of the Creator. Plato knows about this destruction, even if he did not know of the coming immortality. For in *Timaeus*[183] he introduces the destruction not only of the earth but of the heaven, saying that the heaven is nurtured from its own destruction. So if there is nurture and destruction, where is the immortality – unless the Creator is going to reverse the destruction of heaven and earth, binding the universe to immortality, after which there will be no end or revival of evil or any mortal thing? The Stoics thought that heaven and earth are many times destroyed, and many times renewed.[184] But if they are to be destroyed again, to change them is futile. Better, then, is the once-for-all change, after which there is no more change, and man will live again without dying again; for nothing will be mortal, but all things new and immortal, the whole universe and man alike.

TH. Will man live again with the body or not?

EU. With the body, since man is a rational soul making use of the body as an instrument.

TH. But what sort of body? Luminous, airy, or oyster-like?[185] The soul is filled with these various kinds and sizes of body according to the nature and extent of the places through which it passes.

EU. You are saying that the soul carries round with it a burden of various bodies. Just as little animals, when they are caught in spiders' webs, are at once enveloped and made prey, so (it seems) the human soul, when it approaches bodies (even if they are different bodies), quickly enters them and is captured; if it passes through heaven, it attracts a heavenly body, if through the stars, a starry body; if its path is through ether, it is entrapped in an ethereal body, whereas if it comes down to the air, it is surrounded by an aerial body, and if it is seen on earth, it is an earthly body that is fastened to it.[186] So, if it is so easily filled with these other elements, what is to prevent it being caught in a fiery body, if it falls into a fire, or sucking up a watery body if it is drowned in the sea? Do you want to have experience of bodies like these, Aegyptus?

AEG. I haven't time to be burnt or drowned!

EU. But Theophrastus says that every body fits a soul, like a cloak. We didn't realise that there were three or four layers to him!

TH. You're making fun of the secrets of the ancients, Euxitheus.

EU. But are you serious, Theophrastus, and don't you think it ridiculous for the incorporeal to be joined to any body, or for it to fasten and stitch one body to the other, or to enter into many bodies at once? If bodies are ensouled – and of course they are, for bodies belong to soul – you are telling us that one soul drives many animals, like a herd of cattle all joined together, and draws a train of animals treading one on top of another!

TH. These things do seem absurd, and you let nothing pass without exposing it. But have you heard of the shadowy phantoms around tombs?[187] These are the airy bodies of souls, what they call ghosts (*eidôla*).

EU. You who have learned everything haven't yet learned that evil, material demons (*daimonia*) simulate human souls, and people clever at sorcery who profess to call up the long dead, do not raise a

man by their spells, but the demon which takes the form of the man's image, his ghost, and performs wonders and utters words, simply to deceive us? But the sun appearing above comes and dissolves the drama below: if it had been a human soul, it would have been happy to talk and be with those dearest to it even in the daylight. Pythagoras – not the Samian but the Rhodian[188] – making ready to give an account of an oracle of the dead, inquires first who are to be summoned, whether they are gods or demons or effluences of these, whether it is one demon seeming to be different at different times, or many, differing among themselves – some tame, some savage, some sometimes telling the truth, some wholly bogus – and, describing the confusion of the ancients and the moderns, finally reveals that the phantom is the efflux from a demon. 54,1

TH. Then how shall a soul feel pain when punished, if we eliminate the aerial body? It will not feel pain without a body.

EU. You are right to say not without a body. But it will recover its own body, which it used visibly, as soon as the time appointed for judgement comes. It is not that one body had pleasure and another will feel pain, or that one did service but another is hauled to judgement.

TH. You mean its earthly body? That would be a wonder indeed! After all, it was dissolved and scattered; one is devoured by fish, one torn to pieces by birds; some again are caught by <wild beasts>[189] and destroyed, so that there is not a trace of human body left.

EU. You're raising bogies, my poor sir: when you understand, you'll be more amenable. But answer me: is the human body simple or composite? 55,1

TH. Composite, obviously.

EU. And of what is it put together? The four elements?

TH. Yes.

EU. And when the composite is broken up, does it not return to the elements of which it was composed?

TH. Of course.

EU. So the body of the man and the fish and the bird and the wild animal go back to the elements, and each is dissolved into that from which it came together.

<TH. Yes.>[190]

56,1 EU. So if the elements are preserved, the basis of our body is also preserved, and it is collected together from everywhere whenever the 5 Creator calls for it. If at the beginning a little formless moisture[191] brought forth a whole human being, I should not be surprised if the entire human body, scattered among the elements, gave back, not indeed more, but its exact measure. I have seen a large, beautiful, 10 flourishing and shady vine, which graced my house, which was not planted by a farmer or grown from cuttings: a dried grape-seed had provided it all. Where then was the trunk hidden? Where were the thousands of leaves? Where was the fruit concealed? Expert farmers rub a fig onto a rope,[192] cover the rope with the fig-seeds, and bury it. 15 After a little time, fig plants appear in a row, corresponding to the quantity of fig-seeds. But a fig-seed is a tiny, indivisible thing, just a mathematical point as it were: yet, after perishing first, it is pregnant with a great tree! The palm-tree soars into the air: but a dried stone is the cause of its existence. There is a human technique, which 20 I mentioned before, which produces bees. Bee-lovers kill a bull, bury it in a building to a moderate depth, close it up carefully, and let it corrupt and rot. The extraordinary thing is that the killing and corruption of a single animal turns into the production, existence and life of a myriad bees.[193] A mass of animals floods out, owing their 25 generation to corruption. Theophrastus finds none of this surprising: 57,1 but that a human body comes back to life, he marvels and is incredulous – he who is convinced that his Athenian ancestors sprang from the earth.[194] The Creator, however, anticipated this unbelief by producing so many similar spectacles, so that this too, later on, should not be seen as incredible. He commands the earth to put forth many 5 animals and plants and countless seeds, preparing her to give birth, so that his command should not seem to her to be in vain; for if she produces living and animate bodies, it would not be seen as strange to give up the mere bodies of men.

10 TH. Up to a point[195] you convince me. However if the body remained in its shape, it is not implausible that the soul should enter it again, as though it was a statue: but if the 'harmony' of the body has been broken up for many years, how can the soul make use of it afterwards?

15 AEG. Bodies in our country perhaps will come back to life easily, because they are mummified and ready to receive the soul.

EU. Oh, the wit of Aegyptus! Theophrastus has not yet understood that there is no difference between a dead body dissolved and one 20 remaining intact: the 'harmony' is broken in both. The soul would not

abandon the body if the 'harmony' were not broken, so that the dead man is no better than a man in a painting, only weaker: for the painted figure is nicely coloured and youthful, and the corpse has lost its freshness and is altogether past its prime. So we must *either* think 58,1
colours and worked stones superior to a dead body as a place to receive the soul *or* admit that there is no difference between a united body and a fragmented one in regard to the soul's participating in it; as things are, the soul does not find the body perfect when it arrives in it; the seed is shapeless, and it is not the outward appearance that is strong, but the hidden power within. 5

TH. Then how will each soul retrieve its own body?

EU. The body is made up of matter and form. The matter corrupts and is dissolved, but the principle of the form itself remains. Do you 10
not see that grain, when men sow it and hide it in the earth, itself is destroyed and diffused and dies, whereas its creative principle,[196] solid and welded together, remaining immortal (as it were) and strong, collecting the earth around the seed, absorbing the surround- 15
ing moisture, and warming it with heat, revives the extinguished grain, puts down roots, grows leaves, raises the stalk, nourishes the ears, and, in a word, makes the grain come to life again, both upwards and downwards? Again, the principle of spelt preserves spelt, the principle of beans preserves beans, and nothing of this is incredible. But if a human is to be saved, demons are jealous and men disbelieve! 20
Therefore, if the principle of the form is immortal in mortal creatures, surely the principle of the immortal soul is immortal and is not destroyed in the course of time, but remains within itself, and, when the appointed time comes, arouses the matter and orders it in the old 59,1
way according to its own power, so that the form is very well known to the soul, and God, who calls them together, despatches each soul to its own and separates and distributes them, just as, in our world, good shepherds easily marshal every one of their myriad sheep in the 5
right place, and there is no risk of any confusion. And now God sends rain: there are myriads of trees and plants and herbs, but only one water, and the principle of each [plant] that attracts the water changes it to its own proper form, shape, colour, and size – sweet or bitter, warm or cold, fragrant or not fragrant. This process is always 10
a paradox, but it has not troubled the wise. But if the Creator's proclamation has gone forth and the immortal soul remembers, recognises and recovers its own proper form – about this, and this alone, they are puzzled and dispute it. The form remains just as it first came forth, while the matter (for matter underlies all quality) 15
forms a kind of receptacle and admits change.

Similarly, suppose there was a bronze Achilles, the Achilles was broken by the passage of time, and some people took the abandoned

bronze, cut it up into pieces and scattered it all over the place; and suppose also that the wise craftsman (*dêmiourgos*), approving the matter of the bronze as suitable for his art to use as bronze, were to find all of it by gathering it together, and then – melting it down and purifying it, and by some wisdom and power turning the bronze into gold[197] – impose upon it the form of Achilles, then the once bronze Achilles would be seen as a golden Achilles, but an Achilles all the same. Even so the matter of bodies, escaping heaviness, disorder, and mortality, becomes, by the generosity and skill of the Creator, pure, light and immortal. For it was needful that, being made <for partnership with the immortal soul>,[198] [matter] should at some time have a share in immortality, which it would have enjoyed at first, if it had not, for reasons often stated, been allowed to die for a time, so that its wickedness could be eradicated and it could find punishment for itself. For if bodies were dissolved into nothing, why did so much strength dwell in them, that they are more powerful when set in tombs than when they were proudly walking all over the earth? You have heard how Oedipus lying at Colonus[199] was thought to be lucky for the Athenians. And it is said that when the Athenians suffered from plague, Apollo advised them in an oracle to bring Theseus[200] the son of Aegeus back to Athens (he had been buried on Scyros, because he had been murdered treacherously there), and warned them that there was no release from their sufferings until Theseus, though dead, was settled among the Athenians. No sooner had Theseus' remains landed in Attica than the plague ended. Or have you not learned that Orestes' whole body was hidden in a grave in Arcadia, and that, long after his death, the Spartans, successful in other wars, came off badly at the hands of the Arcadians, and, not knowing what was to become of them, consulted Apollo, whose response was that they should not summon up hoplites or collect cavalry, but find one dead man to be their ally; and he taught them (obscurely indeed, but he did teach them) that Agamemnon's son was lying in a smithy, and if they stole him they would bring victory home with him? They discovered Orestes, stole him, and were thenceforward victorious.[201] So, if Oedipus, who lay with his mother, Orestes, who killed his mother, and Theseus, who destroyed his innocent son by his curse, are said to save their land when they are lying underground, surely men who have measured out their whole life in virtuous deeds and gloriously accepted death for religion's sake [can do as much]. For I have known of many bodies of good men which frighten away the ranks of demons as much as these frighten the man they have hunted down, and which easily mitigate, purge and altogether eradicate countless diseases on which the art of the doctors has failed. But if bodies were wholly without a share in future immortality, they would be weak and of no use, and it is in vain that Plato advises us to honour the guardians of his city when they die and revere the tombs where

their bodies lie.[202] You know about these things. Again, if it is necessary for the wicked to go, with whatever sort of body you people choose, to the prison of punishment, how can it not be right for the body to enjoy the good things of the soul, since it does not run away from her companionship in misfortunes? It is a clever contrivance that the soul should part from the body, so that the suffering becomes a lesson in the extent of the soul's power and the nature of the body's weakness. The law is that it comes back to life. It would be wrong for the body to be cast away for ever in vain, since at first it tasted the immortality of the soul. But [it is not the law that] it comes to life in this life; its first birth is enough to teach it experience of the present struggle. Again, death would be superfluous if it returned again to the same life. Or rather, *this* is a fable, as we showed before – you have an excellent memory and you have surely not forgotten – but the more truthful account is that it will live again for an immortal life, one long desired by the good, but terrible to those who previously did not fear wickedness.

TH. You press your argument right nobly! But if bodies are immortalised because of their association with soul, then the bodies of irrational animals will also be like that, since they also have a share of soul.

EU. Only of irrational and mortal soul, O wisest of men, which suffers 62,1
dissolution along with the body. If therefore the soul has faded away, it is a waste of time to raise the body, for bodies rise not for their own sake, but for the benefit of the soul. There is no seed of immortality in irrational creatures. Death is stronger than their souls as well [as their bodies], whereas our soul, which is immortal, when it came to unite with the body, left the seed of immortality in it. Most important of all, man is the begotten child and handwork of the Creator; therefore nothing of the human substance could remain entirely mortal. He ordained the elements to bring about the generation of irrational animals, and his ordinance was nature and power. Coming from such parents, they are subject to total dissolution, for they did not taste immortality, whereas the human body, cooperating with the immortal soul, was nourished by the immortal, and, moving with it in a manner appropriate to every art and also elegant, caught from it something of immortality, not even altogether without some taste of nectar. When it falls therefore, it will not lie [dead] for ever. If, when the sun falls on cold water, warmth follows and makes fire and flame rise from the water, who would not believe that the body of a man, having received an entire immortal soul, has acquired the power and light of immortality? Sulphur is, as it were, earth made into fire, which remains cold to the touch and inactive for a time, but when it gets near fire it readily takes up that for which it was from

the first secretly adapted; it is quickly kindled, exhibits its power in action, and rapidly attains the status of fire. Similarly, the bodies of men, mixing with the immortality of the soul, are most of the time thrown aside, cold and motionless; but they are adapted to have communion with soul, and, if they ever mix with it again, they are readily warmed, rise, follow [the soul] with delight and ascend to immortality. Change of matter to a better state is not implausible, for, among us too, experts in materials, taking silver and tin, making their form disappear, melting them down together and colouring them, and so changing the matter into something grander, have produced excellent gold. Again, sand is scattered and soda is abundant everywhere, but human skill has made glass out of them, new and transparent. Farmers celebrate the changes of plants. Why then have you supposed the Creator of men to be weaker and less experienced than men? Why has not belief in daily happenings driven out disbelief about the future? There is much training before the competition, but you have forgotten it all and are ruined when the competition comes round. If the world has come into being, as indeed it has, man was first earth-born[203] in his body – what else could be his origin? So it is natural that man should afterwards be born of earth. Why then do you fight so fiercely against true and admitted facts, while you happily accept obscure and absurd notions? If Polyeidos[204] the prophet is said to have come from Argos to Crete and resurrected Glaucus the son of Minos when he suffocated in honey, having learned the herb to use from a snake, you accept the story without question. That Asclepius [resurrected] Hippolytus or Tyndareus (for that is told too),[205] Heracles [resurrected] Alcestis[206] and Theseus[207] and Tymon the Lydian and Timosthenes the Athenian[208] – all this you believe on the authority of Eudoxus, in his book on such matters.[209] Pindar of Thebes[210] and Herodotus of Halicarnassus relate that Aristeas[211] of Proconnesus went into the fuller's shop in Proconnesus, died there, and, after his disappearance, spoke openly with the people of Cyzicus, and 240 years later was seen in Italy by the people of Metapontum, and ordered them to honour himself and Apollo with sacrifices. 'I follow Apollo,' he said. 'I was then a raven, but now I am Aristeas.' The Metapontines (Herodotus says) sent to Delphi and asked Apollo if they should obey Aristeas, and the Pythia responded that it would be well to do so. And now there is a statue with the name of Aristeas next to the statue of Apollo, and the sacrifice is regarded as common to both of them as gods. You people go along with this without inquiry, like cattle reaching for green shoots,[212] and you enjoy your Corybantic madness together.[213] No one raises objections in writing. But if the Creator himself promises the immortal soul to make its body also immortal, you urge one another to wage a war without truce or herald against him. Yet Plato brings Harmonios[214] back from Hades to the living in the body, and Zoro-

aster[215] foretells that there will be a time when there will be a resurrection of all the dead. Theopompus[216] knows what I mean, and himself teaches the rest. None of the wise men of old opposed those [writers], but the moderns are arrogant and rise up to war against the Divine Word. Rebelling against the divine dispensation, and dragging in much irrationality, they not only leave the body mortal for ever, but in their unreason force the soul itself to die. For ignorance of virtue is the death of the soul. The oracles of the Hebrews,[217] which the oracles of Apollo praised,[218] everywhere proclaim that the whole man, not merely a part, comes back to life. There are actually some men who, having lived a moral life from childhood to old age, raised their soul to intelligible things and persuaded their body to be subject to it even in sleep, and having attained the peak of philosophy both in action and contemplation and displaying their kinship with God and piously invoking him, have made corpses come back to life, offering this as a sufficient proof of their doctrine. With them, doctrine is never confined to words, but acquires credibility from actions. He who beholds the marvel goes away an undoubting disciple. What I am saying is no fable, nor is the wonder an event of old, cut off by time. I have myself seen a very fine old man, entirely devoted to God. He had an acquaintance who was a farmer, a simple man and the father of one child. He used often to visit the old man, with the boy, wanting to learn and do some good thing, and he used to take with him the first-fruits of his crops, as though to a temple. After a little while, the boy fell ill and died; and after his death, the father, instead of burying him in the earth, as the law commands, laid him in a basket, covered him with leaves, and, carrying him on his shoulders, went to visit the old man. He put down his burden, greeted the old man as usual, sat for a while with a fixed gaze, and, after a short exchange of words, departed again, leaving the child behind, as if it was an offering of his grapes. When the sun set and the old man prayed and was about to reach for the fruit, as he moved the leaves aside he discovered not bunches of grapes, but the dead child. Amazed at the father's hopes, he lifted his mind to God, fell upon the child, and did not rise until the child rose up. Then he sent the boy to his father, and himself went into exile, so that wondering admirers should not trouble him. Thus the deed accords with the word. He could not have done such a great thing if he had embraced false doctrine; but, having learned the word from God, with God's aid he brings the word to action. This is the greatest form of proof: to do what you claim to be possible.

TH. An extraordinary tale indeed! But one must not lightly disbelieve a truthful eye-witness.

EU. I have another thing to tell you too. Hear what I have seen

myself. There was a pupil of a good man who was not a bad person, but, with much beauty of soul, was deprived of his eyesight. When his teacher was dying, the blind man stood beside him and asked him to give him what help he could. 'If my doctrine is true,' said [the dying man], 'if God is kind, on the seventh day the darkness will be dissipated and you will see this sun.' Having said this, the old man breathed his last. And so it turned out. Seven days passed, and the blind man, who was being led by the hand, suddenly marvelled at the light of the sun, took up the scriptures, read aloud in public, amazed the eye-witness and convinced a contentious pupil that the soul is immortal and that, given good rearing and education, when it departs it resurrects that which died in the body.

TH. You are a fortunate man, and I share your delight in your story and in what you saw.

EU. This happened in my country: other instances have happened elsewhere, and will happen. What happened the other day, I imagine you saw yourself.

TH. What do you mean?

EU. A harsh tyranny oppresses Great Libya.[219] Humanity and true doctrine are distrusted by tyranny, for the tyrant makes the religion of his subjects an offence, and orders the priests to deny this good doctrine. When some do not obey – O what impiety! – he cuts out their pious tongues, just as Tereus in the fable cut out the tongue of the maiden he had violated, thinking thereby to forestall her accusations.[220] But the girl wove the story in a robe and revealed it by her skill, since nature no longer gave her the means of speaking. But [the priests] needed no robe or skill, they called on the Creator of nature, and he granted them a new nature on the third day, not giving them another tongue, but the power of speaking clearer than before without a tongue. I used to believe that it was impossible for a flute-player to display his skill without a flute, or a lyre-player to perform music when lacking a lyre; but this new spectacle has made me change my mind and think that nothing which we see is fixed, if God wishes to change it. I have seen the men myself and heard them speak. Wondering at the clear articulation of their speech, I looked for their organ of speech; not trusting my ears, I passed the judgement over to my eyes. I opened their mouths and saw the tongue entirely torn out from the root. I was amazed, and wondered not only how they spoke clearly but how they survived. Let this destroy even the doubts of the thoughtless as to whether dead bodies rise again. For in that other world the resurrection of the body is from things that are, but here the

harmony of voice comes from things that are not. If these persons can do this, who is so foolish as not to follow the beliefs which they hold?

TH. No one, my dear friend. But tell me, where do the wise get the learning through which they convince by action what they first teach by words?

EU. Let no one speak of God who has not learned from God. It is no Italian or Greek or Chaldean or Egyptian who teaches the wise to do and say these things, but only God, my friend – God, who remains as he was, who became man because he loves man, and breathed the wisdom of the word and the power of the deed into those fitted [to receive it]. He first, being God, raised his own body to immortality and promises this gift in common to all. To be convicted of false doctrine is wrong for a wise man, and still more so for God. He who obeys his laws is an immortal god, no more a mortal,[221] so that he has his share of immortality, does the same work as the intellectual beings, and now proudly stands at the side of the Great King and follows him firmly everywhere.

TH. I am convinced. I now feel the kindness of God. Farewell, Academy: let us go to Him. Plato himself bids us obey Plato only until someone appears wiser than he.[222] And nothing is wiser than God.

EU. Since I have convinced you, let us sacrifice to God – not a hecatomb as to Athena at Athens, not an ant as to Helios and Poseidon at the Isthmus, not even a son, as Creon sacrificed Menoeceus, or a daughter, as Leos sacrificed Praxithea[223] – nor indeed a human, as they do in Arcadia to Kronos[224] – but purifying our mind so as to become like God. For the impure to touch the pure is held to be wrong.[225]

O King and Father and Creator of the world, O First Wisdom of the Father, O Word, by whom He brought all things forth (for how does God create save by Wisdom and the Word?): O Holy Spirit, through whom God, by breathing on all, unites and preserves and brings to perfection. O holy Trinity and holy Monad, grant us the memory of the beauty above, and grant to the universe immortality.

We have prayed enough. Let us go.[226]

Variations from Colonna's Text

JMD = John Dillon
DAR = Donald Russell

2,15 Reading *pothoumenon* for *potoumenon* (DAR)
6,6 Reading *auto* for *autôi* with BD and *Bo*
8,6 Reading *ekpempei for ekpempesthai* (JMD)
8,10 Reading *ou* with M *Wf* and *Bt*
23,10 Reading *ha* for *ho* (DAR)
23,25-6 Reading *hêi … hêi* for *ei … ei* with BD and *Bo*
26,18 Reading *phthongon* for *phthongou* (JMD)
26,20 Reading *paskhontos* for *phaskontos* (JMD)
31,14 Reading *blabês* for *hulês* with MT *Wf* and *Bt*
33,4 Omitting the second *kai* with M *Wf* and *Bt*
33,9 Deleting *to gêras* as a misguided gloss on *to pathos* (JMD)
36,20 Reading *huper* instead of *peri* with *Bt*
37,11 Reading *hoti* <*mê*> (DAR)
37,22 Reading *monon* with *Wf*
37,23 Inserting *tên gên* (DAR)
38,3 Reading *philosophiâi* with *Wf* and *Bt*
38,21 Reading *energeiâi* with MT edd.
39,23 Reading *kai* <*hoian*> *têi* (DAR)
40,13 Reading *hermêneuein* with M *Wf* and *Bt*
41,6 Reading *hôn* for *hôi* with M *Wf* and *Bt*
44,12 Reading *dêlôsêi* for *diêgêsetai* with BD *Wf* and *Bt*
44,14 Reading *Sophias* (DAR)
44,23 Reading *hous an* with M edd. [fort. *ousias has an*? – DAR]
45,14 After *gegonen* add <*hoti gegonen*> (DAR)
47,17 Reading *logios* in place of *logikon* (DAR)
48,4 Reading *allo* instead of *alla* (DAR)
49,13 Reading *aitía* (so accented) with *Bt*
54,22 Reading *thêriôn* instead of *heterôn* (DAR)
56,1 Insert: <The. *Panu ge*> with M *Wf* and *Bt*
57,10 Reading *hêi* in place of *ê* (DAR)
59, 24 Reading *pros* <*tên pros*> *to* (DAR)

Notes

1. The term sophist (*sophistês*) in the eastern portion of the Greco-Roman world of the fifth and sixth centuries identified persons who received a classical Greek education in secular schools. Thus, for example, the Gazan scholars Procopius, Choricius, and Aeneas, as well as Zacharias, were known as 'sophists' insofar as they had acquired secular learning in Greek rhetoric and philosophy. On the term 'sophist' see R. Cribiore, *The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch*, Princeton 2007, pp. 37-8; B. Puech, *Orateurs et sophistês grecs dans les inscriptions d'époque imperiale*, Paris 2002, pp. 10-15. [SK]

2. On the historical figure of Aeneas, particularly the high respect paid to him by Gazan Christians, see Zacharias Scholasticus *V. Isaiae* 8 Brooks and *V. Severi* p. 90 Kugener. Only a few general studies of Aeneas of Gaza have been published: see M. Wacht, *Aeneas von Gaza als Apologet. Seine Kosmologie im Verhältnis zum Platonismus*, Bonn 1969; O.J. Storvick, 'Atticism in the Theophrastus of Aeneas of Gaza', diss. University of Michigan 1968; and S. Sikorski, *De Aenea Gazaeo: Dissertatio Inauguralis Philologica*, Breslau 1909. More recently, Edward Watts has written on Aeneas and Zacharias of Gaza; see 'The Enduring Legacy of the Iatrosophist Gessius', *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 49 (2009): 113-33; 'An Alexandrian Christian Response to Fifth-Century Neoplatonic Influence' in A. Smith (ed.), *The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity: Essays in Honour of Peter Brown*, Swansea 2005, pp. 215-30; and the general study of late antique Platonic schools, *City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria*, Berkeley 2008. In addition to *Theophrastus,* Aeneas also wrote a small corpus of twenty-five letters. See L.M. Positano, *Enea di Gaza, Epistole*, Naples 1961; on the network of letter writing in the fifth century, see G. Ruffini, 'Late Antique Pagan Networks from Athens to Thebaid', in W.V. Harris and G. Ruffini (eds), *Ancient Alexandria between Egypt and Greece*, Leiden 2004, pp. 241-57. On the historical development of Christianity in Gaza, see C.A.M. Glucker, *The City of Gaza in the Roman and Byzantine Periods*, Oxford 1987, p. 51 and Christian Wildberg, 'Philosophy in the Age of Justinian' in M. Maas (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Justinian,* Cambridge 2005, p. 323; and C. Saliou (ed.), *Gaza dans l'Antiquité tardive*, Salerno 2005. [SK]

3. The alternative title *De animarum immortalitate* is given by Ambrogio Traversari in his Latin translation of the dialogue; see C. Stinger, *Humanism and the Church Fathers: Ambrogio Traversari (1386-1439) and Christian Antiquity in the Italian Renaissance*, Albany 1977, p. 79. Ambrogio apparently had access to a valuable manuscript tradition so that his translation is of some use in constituting the text of the dialogue (cf. Colonna, xxvii). [SK]

4. The summary of the dialogue, along with the topical, supplementary title and the *dramatis personae,* occurs in all eight manuscripts of the *Theophrastus*, even where some of them, e.g. Parisianus 461, contain only a portion of the text of the dialogue. [SK]

5. Plato's *Phaedrus* begins similarly; cf. *Phdr.* 227A. One may note the signifi-

cance that the '*poi kai pothen*' formula took on in later Platonism: it came to symbolise the *telos* and the first principles. Cf. also *Ion* 530A.

6. This is Hierocles of Alexandria, a student of Plutarch of Athens. Plutarch died an old man in 431/2; assuming that Hierocles survived his teacher for some years, scholars give the period encompassing his life as 408-450, corresponding to the reign of Theodosius II; see H.S. Schibli, *Hierocles of Alexandria*, Oxford 1990. He returned from Athens to teach in Alexandria. [SK]

His teaching renewed the city's Neoplatonic heritage and was praised e.g. in Damascius' *Life of Isidore* (fr. 45A Athanassiadi = Photius *Bibl*. Cod. 242.54, 338b-339a**)** He is the author of a treatise *On Providence* and a commentary on the Pythagorean *Golden Verses*.

7. Reading *pothoumenon* for *potoumenon*. Note that the phrase *para tên elpida* is probably borrowed from Plato *Polit.* 295d1-2, where the context also involves contrary winds.

8. Protagoras the Lycian does not appear to be an historical person. Although no allusion is likely intended, it is interesting to note that Proclus (*c.* 411-485), although born in Byzantium, grew up in Xanthus in Lycia, his parents' city of origin. [SK]

9. Aeneas' account of the state of philosophical teaching in Athens in the 480s seems to be supported by Damascius' *Life of Isidorus*, which describes a Platonic school torn apart by internal faction and increasingly marginalised after the death of Proclus in 485. Cf. frr. 145A and 151E Athanassiadi. See also the excellent discussion in E. Watts, *City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria*, Berkeley 2006, pp. 118-28.

10. As a *dramatis persona* the character of Theophrastus is fictitious. However, the name invokes the well-known student and colleague of Aristotle, Theophrastus of Eresus (*c.* 371-287 BC), who became the successor of Aristotle's school at his master's death in 322 and remained at the head of the Peripatos until his own death at the age of eighty-five. The character Theophrastus represents in the dialogue not just one school of philosophy but the entire rich tradition of Greek philosophic thought broadly taken: he espouses not just Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neoplatonic theories on the life and nature of the soul but also the theories of the Eleatics and the Pythagoreans, as well as those of Chaldean and Egyptian religious teaching. See M. Colonna, *Enea di Gaza: Teofrasto*, Naples 1958, p. xi. The historical Theophrastus, originally called Tyrtamos but renamed by Aristotle 'because of the divineness of his speech', is not an inappropriate figure to present this tradition. He began his studies with Plato but then went over to Aristotle's school (Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers* 5.36). [SK]

11. An echo of Plato *Gorg*. 448A. Aeneas is here assimilating the character Theophrastus to the pompous sophist Gorgias.

12. The question whether the soul descends willingly or out of necessity into the world of generation was a matter of considerable debate among Platonists. Plotinus, at *Enn*. 4.8.5, denies that there is any incompatibility between the willingness and unwillingness of the descent, but the precise way in which he defends this view is a *quaestio vexata* of Plotinian scholarship. An important doxography on the soul's descent is provided by Iamblichus in his *On the Soul*, §§21-30 Finamore-Dillon (Stobaeus *Anth*. 1.378.19-380.29). His own favoured approach is to classify the kinds of descent according to their 'goals': those souls that descend in order to perfect the sensible world descend without blemish (and so presumably freely and willingly), while those that descend to care for their bodies and to train their character do not have the same kind of freedom. For a

good discussion of the issue, see M. Baltes, *Der Platonismus in der Antike* Band IV.2, Bad Cannstatt 2002, Baustein 172.1, with commentary on pp. 163-73.

13. A reminiscence of Plato *Phd*. 59E.

14. Fr. 33 Marcovich, not listed in DK. See Plotinus *Enn*. 4.8.1.11ff. ; 4.8.5.7. Iamblichus, in his *On the Soul*, also attributes the same view to Heraclitus, at §28 Finamore-Dillon (Stobaeus *Anth*. 1.378.21ff.).

15. Perhaps an allusion to Empedocles DK B 115. Cf. Plotinus *Enn*. 4.8.1.17-22, and the texts collected by B. Inwood, *The Poem of Empedocles*, pp. 86-90.

16. Empedocles DK B 117; cf. Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.77

17. Pythagoras was famous in antiquity for teaching through pithy and often obscure sayings, so-called *akousmata*. Most relevant to the question of reincarnation are two preserved by Iamblichus, at *De Vita Pythagorica* 85 and *Protrepticus* 108.15 Pistelli. Empedocles is charged with 'stealing' Pythagoras' discourses at Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.54, which may stand in the background to Aeneas' claim here.

18. Read *auto* for *autôi* with Boissonade.

19. Plato *Phd*. 62B.

20. Porphyry *De antro nymph*. 8 (= Empedocles DK B 120).

21. Aeneas is here referring to Plato's famous allegory of the Cave, at e.g. *Rep*. 7.514A; 515A.

22. Cf. Plato *Phdr*. 247B3.

23. This passage is based on Plato *Phdr*. 248E-249A.

24. The whole following passage is based on Plato *Tim*. 30B-C.

25. This passage, from 5,12 to 7,11 bears some similarity to *Enn*. 4.8.1.11ff. See S. Sikorski, *De Aenea Gazaeo*, Breslau 1909, pp. 22-4. Aeneas' conclusion, however, diverges from Plotinus': Plotinus says that all the things said by Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Plotinus on the descent of the soul agree, whereas Aeneas concludes that 'many and diverse things' were said by the above thinkers on this topic. [SK]

26. The Aristotelian passages on which this is based include *De An*. 2.1 (*entelekheia*), and *GA* 2.3 (*thurathen nous*).

27. A deliberate echo of Socrates' ironic address to Adeimantus at *Rep*. 4.422e1.

28. Hippias is Socrates' main interlocutor in two Platonic dialogues, the *Lesser Hippias* and the *Greater Hippias*. He boasts of his expertise in the art of memory in both.

29. A quotation of fr.33 Marcovich, not included in Diels-Kranz's collection of Pre-Socratic fragments. Part of the same fragment is quoted above; see n. 14.

30. Read *ekpempei for ekpempesthai*.

31. Reading *ou* with M *Wf* and *Bt*.

32. For the idea that Plato's philosophy is derived from ancient peoples such as the Chaldaeans and the Egyptians, see, for example, Numenius, fr. 1 Des Places.

33. On the transmigration of souls into animals see Porphyry, *On Abstinence*, where the transmigration of souls into animal bodies is presented as an argument against eating animal flesh; 1.6.3, 1.19.1-3; 4.16.2; Augustine *De Civ*. 10.30. While Porphyry thought that the animal soul was rational, and transmigration into animal souls hence possible, Iamblichus, Hermias and Simplicius all endorsed the view that animal souls are not rational. See pseudo-Simplicius *in DA* 3 187.35ff.; 211.1ff.; Proclus *in Tim*. 3.294.25-6; Hermias *in Phdr*. 170.15-171.2. For a larger discussion of this debate, see R. Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals*: *The Origin of the Western Debate*, Duckworth/Cornell 1993, ch. 13. [SK]

34. Homer *Il*. 11.164 (Lattimore's translation).

35. Pierre Courcelle, on p. 164 of his article 'Anti-Christian Arguments and Christian Platonism' (in A. Momigliano (ed.) *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century*, Oxford 1963, pp. 151-92), points out that the choice of the jackdaw (and the frog, which occurs later at *Theophr*. 14,22) as example may have its origin in satirical literature such as Lucian's *The Cock*.

36. On the migration of the soul into bodies that reflect the character of the soul, see Plutarch's myth in *De Sera Numinis Vindicta* 563B-end. Here, Plutarch describes, e.g., how the wicked, exhibiting a proclivity for the earth, take on darker, heavier bodies, and how wicked Nero is made to take on the form of marsh creature (567F). [SK]

37. On the divine origin of Plato, see Apuleius *De Plato et eius dogm. Init*.; Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers* 3.2. [SK]

38. This oracle is probably the same as the one Theodoret reports to have been used by Porphyry in his *Philosophy from Oracles*. 'God [*sc*. Apollo] testified', says Porphyry, 'to the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Chaldaeans, Lydians and to the Hebrews that they have found [the road to the gods]' (*Graec. aff. cur*. 1.42.6-7; tr. Pasztori-Kupan).

39. Cf. Plato *Tim*. 42B-C; 90E-91A.

40. Plato *Phd*. 82A.

41. i.e. in his work *Republic*.

42. Plato *Rep*. 10. 620A. See also *Symp*. 179D.

43. Homer *Il*. 2, 216; Plato *Rep*. 10.620C. On the concept that behaviour in one life determines the body in the next, see Plotinus *Enn*. 3.4.2.16-30 where those who cherished human life, become men again; those who lived purely by senses, become animals; those who combined senses with anger, become wild animals; those who lived not by their senses with passions, but by a sluggishness of sense with passions, become plants, and so forth. Furthermore, in Plotinus *Enn*. 4.3.8.6-10, Plotinus says that souls make their choices in accordance with their previous lives. [SK]

44. For passages suggesting that Plotinus understood transmigration literally, see e.g. *Enn*. 1.1.11.8-15 and 6.6.7.6.21-7.8.

45. Harpocration of Argos, active *c*. late second century AD, was known by later philosophers for his commentaries on Plato. Little is known about his life; fragments from his work are collected in J. Dillon, 'Harpocration's Commentary on Plato: Fragments of a Middle Platonic Commentary', *California Studies in Classical Antiquity*, 4 (1971): 125-46. See also J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, London 1992, pp. 258-62.

46. The Greek word for 'indeed' here, *amelei*, has been conjectured (by Barth) to be a corruption of the proper name Amelios, who was a student of Plotinus. See L. Brisson, 'Amélius: Sa vie, son œuvre, sa doctrine, son style', in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt,* vol. II.36.2, Berlin 1987.

47. There is some uncertainty about the identity of the Boethus in question here. Possible candidates are Boethus the Stoic philosopher, or Boethus the Peripatetic, who are both from Sidon. Boethus the Peripatetic is often thought to be identical with the Boethus to whom Porphyry's treatise *On the Soul* is addressed, which would link him in some way with a prominent Platonic author.

48. Numenius of Apamea, in Syria, was a Platonist philosopher who flourished in the middle of the second century AD. Fragments of his works are collected in E. Des Places, *Numenius*: *Fragments*, Paris 1975. The reference to Numenius in Aeneas' *Theophrastus* is listed as fr. 49 in des Places' edition.

49. A reference to *Phd*. 81E-82A.

50. Here, Aeneas assimilates the opinions of Porphyry and Iamblichus on transmigration. Aeneas argues that Porphyry and Iamblichus say that humans take on a human, but animal-like soul. It is, however, difficult to understand Porphyry's account of the issue, as he appears to take on different opinions at different times; in Augustine *De Civ.* 10.30, he is said to deny transmigration. For the debate on whether Porphyry takes transmigration literally or metaphorically, see C. Helmig, 'Plutarch of Chaeronea and Porphyry on Transmigration – Who is the Author of Stobaeus I 445.14-448.3 (W-H)?', *CQ* 58.1 (2008): 250-5; W. Deuse, *Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre*, Mainz 1983; A. Smith, 'Did Porphyry Reject the Transmigration of Human Souls into Animals?', *Rh. Mus.* 127 (1984): 276-84. Porphyry, however, does argue that animals have rational souls, see *De Abstinentia*, book 3. [SK]

Richard Sorabji has suggested that the different interpretations of Porphyry will be explicable if he was following Plotinus' hesitation at *Enneads* 1.1.11.9-15 between the rational soul not entering the animal, and its being present, without being present in, or belonging to, the animal. This plumps neither for nor against transmigration, just as the later suggestion of Theodorus of Asine (see n. 60 below) that the rational soul can animate an animal without entering its body, is not easily classifiable. See his *Animal Minds and Human Morals*, London and Ithaca NY 1993, ch. 13, pp. 190-1.

51. On Iamblichus' view, see especially Nemesius *On the Nature of Man* 2.35.7-17 Morani.

52. According to David *in Isag.* 92.4, this description of the two philosophers goes back to an utterance by the Pythia at Delphi.

53. See also Gregory of Nyssa *De Hom. Opif.* 28 on the absurdity of transmigration of souls. [SK]

54. The choice of example here is noteworthy: Christian attitudes towards the theatre were often hostile, although Choricius, a Gazan contemporary of Aeneas, wrote a speech in their defence, as Michael Champion points out ('Aeneas of Gaza on the soul', *ASCS Proceedings* 32 (2011): 4).

55. An ancient proverb, known already to Plato (*Euthyd*, 298C6). See *Paroem. Gr.* 1.113, 96 Leutsch-Schneidewin, Hildesheim1839, for further references.

56. Another proverbial expression; cf. e.g. Herodotus *Hist.* 3.53.4; Thucydides *Hist.* 5.65.

57. See Plato *Gorg.* 478D for the idea that justice can curtail the passions.

58. There may be an echo of Plato *Gorg.* 494C-E here, where the idea of 'giving free rein' (*apthonôs ekhein*) to one's desires plays an important role in Socrates' argument. In Aeneas' example, the thief is tempted to commit the much worse crime of sacrilege.

59. Cf. Plotinus *Enn.* 3.2.13.14-15: a man that murders his mother will become a woman and be murdered by a son; a man who rapes a woman will become a woman, in order to be raped in turn. [SK] See also Plato *Laws* 9.872E, which stands in the background of Plotinus' and Aeneas' discussions.

60. The views of Syrianus and Proclus on reincarnation are in agreement, and seem to have taken the position of their predecessor Theodorus of Asine as inspiration (cf. Proclus *in Remp.* 2.310.5, where Theodorus is credited as the first to have formulated the correct opinion). Both deny emphatically that rational souls can 'enter' (*eisdunai*) into the bodies of irrational beasts. They allow, however, that the two can become 'intertwined' (*sunepipleketai*), as Hermias, our main source for Syrianus' view on the subject, puts it (*in Phdr.* 170.17). This intertwining involves a 'relationship' (*skhesis*) between rational soul and irrational animal, which is

determined by the way in which the soul is ordinarily affected (its *prokheiron pathos*). The soul of a man who does not follow reason, for example, would be 'drawn along' (cf. *sunephelkusamenon* at *in Remp*. 2.310.7) with the corresponding irrational animal life by means of the soul vehicle. What particular animal his soul will become attached to depends in turn on the kind of emotions or desires that he has predominantly displayed in his life. The solution thus proposed by Theodorus, Syrianus and Proclus is in effect an ingenious compromise: it allows them to maintain the unchangeability of the soul's essence, which never fully descends into the irrational life on their account, but instead remains outside (*exôthen*; cf. Damascius *in Phd*. 1.355.10), and at the same time avoids interpreting those Platonic passages that suggest reincarnation in purely allegorical terms. On Theodorus' solution, see also n. 50 above.

61. Odysseus' quest to return to, and to put back into order, his own household (*oikos*), is one of the central themes of Homer's *Odyssey*.

62. Hector is often described as wearing a 'gleaming helmet' in Homer's *Iliad*, e.g. at 2.816; 3.83; 3.324 and elsewhere.

63. Vehicles of the soul can serve as conduits for punishments for souls after death. See Philoponus *in DA* 17.26-18.27; Olympiodorus *in Gorg*. 47.7.1-25 Westerink. Both texts are translated in R. Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators: A Sourcebook*, vol.1: *Psychology and Ethics*, London 2005, 8(b), pp. 222-4.

64. Homer *Od*. 7.425.

65. Plato *Phd*. 67D.

66. The immortality of the irrational soul was a question on which Neoplatonic philosophers took a whole variety of positions. Proclus gives a detailed survey of opinions in his *Timaeus Commentary* (*in Tim*. 3.324.8-238,23). His and other texts are now collected and translated in R. Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators: A Sourcebook*, vol. 1: *Psychology and Ethics*, 12(c), London and Ithaca, NY 2005, pp. 264-8.

67. For the belief that bees and wasps can come to be from dead horses or bulls, see e.g. Nicander *Ther*. 741; Virgil *Georg*. 4.295-314. An Old Testament parallel for this is the story of Samson at Judges 14:18.

68. Probably an echo of *Clitoph*. 407B.

69. Aeneas here uses the term *anamnêsis* which for Plato was a memory of the universals known to the soul before it was placed in the body (see *Phd*. 75B-C). [SK]

70. Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.4.7ff.

71. This story is related by Hermippus in Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.41.

72. This Apollonius is more commonly known as Apollonius of Tyana. See Philostratus *Apoll. Vita* 3.19.

73. Ctesias of Cnidus (late fifth century BC) wrote a history of Persia and the first known separate work on India. He is mentioned together with other writers on India by Strabo *Geog*. 1.2.35.39

74. Arrian *Anab*. 7.1-2.

75. This Hierocles is probably the author of a lost work titled *The Lover of Truth*, which exercised Christian writers because it drew a parallel between the miraculous deeds of Apollonius of Tyana (whose life is recounted by Philostratus) and the life of Jesus of Nazareth. Eusebius, a Christian author, composed a treatise against Hierocles, and is likely to be Aeneas' source here.

76. An echo of Plato *Gorg*. 527A.

77. Perhaps an echo of Xenophon *Symp*. 3.9, as Sikorski thinks (*De Aenea Gazaeo*, Breslau 1909, p. 21).

78. *Rep*. 6.496C.

79. Cf. Aelian *Var. Hist*. 9.10. This pseudo-biographical story is referred to also by Basil *De leg. gent. lib*.9.80ff.

80. Cf. Plotinus *Enn*. 4.3.12.8-9. Unlike Plotinus, who talks about Zeus, Euxitheus credits God with making our bonds mortal.

81. Cf. Plato *Rep*. 10.617E.

82. See Plotinus *Enn*. 3.1.5.18 for the analogy between an agent acting without freedom and a stone that is 'carried about'.

83. An echo of Matthew 5:45.

84. The passage from 23,4 onwards bears some similarity in thought to Plotinus *Enn*. 3.2.8.7-11, although there are no strong verbal similarities.

85. Read *ha* for *ho*.

86. Compare this passage (23.15-22) with *Enn*. 3.2.3.9-19 and 3.3.3.1-9.

87. Reading *hêi … hêi* for *ei … ei*.

88. Mind is described as 'self-ruling' (*autokratôr*) in a famous fragment by Anaxagoras (DK B12), quoted at, e.g., Plato *Crat*. 413C.

89. This must be the meaning, but it is a curious use of *skholê;* one would expect rather *askholian*.

90. Plato *Phdr*. 247B.

91. Cf. e.g. Plato *Phd*. 77D for this phrase.

92. For the Socratic theme of 'double ignorance', see e.g. *Ap*. 23A-B; *Meno* 84A-B and *Tht*. 210B-C.

93. Probably a reference to Plato *Rep*. 2.379C, rather than to 10.617E.

94. The phrase 'prizes of virtue' also occurs at Plotinus *Enn*. 3.2.5.4.

95. Reading *phthongon* for *phthongou*, possibly a misprint by Colonna.

96. Reading *paskhontos* for *phaskontos*, perhaps a misprint by Colonna.

97. Cf. Plotinus *Enn*. 3.2.5.21-3, a passage which closely resembles Aeneas' thought here: 'And evils did not come into existence for these reasons, but we have explained that, when they have come into existence, the formative principle uses even them to meet a need' (tr. Armstrong).

98. Cf. Plato *Phd*. 107C, 113E.

99. The meaning of this is obscure. Does it perhaps refer to torture, or just to some debilitating illness?

100. Cf. Plotinus *Enn*. 3.2.13.7.

101. Lynceus is a mythological figure who is described as possessing the sharpest eyesight of all who live on earth by Pindar (*Nem*. 10.61). He is connected to the story of the Argonauts, who sail in search of the Golden Fleece. Plotinus refers to his ability to 'see what is within the earth' (5.8.4.25). See also Plato *Ep*. 7.344A1; Pausanias 4.2.7; Apollodorus *Bibl*. 3.10.3.

102. Cf. Plotinus *Enn*. 3.2.5.6-7.

103. Cf. Xenophon *Symp*. 2. 24.

104. Cf. Hippocrates *De flatibus* 1.26.25-6 Littré.

105. This passage virtually quotes Plotinus *Enn*. 3.2.9.1-4 verbatim. Plotinus' discussion of providence in *Enn*. 3.2-3 here and elsewhere strongly influences Aeneas' exposition.

106. Hippocrates *De aere, aquis et locis* 14.14-6 Littré.

107. According to Leviticus 18:19 a man may not have intercourse with a menstruant; according to 20:18 he is to be punished with *karet*, a punishment of uncertain meaning usually translated as 'extirpation'. Origen, following the

LXX, takes *karet* to mean 'destruction'. It would then follow that a man who has sex with a menstruant is to be destroyed, which in turn is not far from Euxitheus' claim that the Hebrews have a law that a man who fathers a child at an inappropriate time is to be killed. Note, however, that Leviticus 20:18 specifies *karet* for both the man and the woman, whereas Aeneas specifies the father only (perhaps inspired by 18:19, which attributes the sin to the male only). We are grateful to Shaye Cohen for the information in this note. Another passage to consider in this context is Philo *Spec leg.* 3.32ff., who seems to interpret the biblical prohibition of sex with 'unclean' women as a precaution against the birth of deformed children.

108. The 'lawgiver of the Lacedaemonians' is Lycurgus, legendary founder of much of Sparta's institutions and social structure. Spartan women were famous in antiquity for the freedom they enjoined as compared to, say, women in Athens, who were mostly confined to domestic work such as wool working.

109. Plotinus *Enn*. 3.2.11.9-12.

110. There is an echo here of Plotinus *Enn*. 4.8.5.28-30.

111. Reading *blabês* for *hylês* with MT *Wf* and *Bt*.

112. Cf. Plotinus *Enn*. 4.8.7.15-17.

113. Plato *Leg*. 5.729A.

114. Matter is introduced in balance with the Creator.

115. Omitting the second *kai,* with M *Wf* and *Bt*.

116. Deleting *to gêras* as a misguided gloss on *to pathos*.

117. On Pelias, see Apollodorus *Biblioth*. 1.9.16.1; and 1.9.27.1; Ovid. *Met*. 7.160.

118. Hyginus *Fab*. 252 gives a list of these and similar stories.

119. On Cyrus' abandonment, see Herodotus *Hist*. 1.113.

120. No single coherent account of this story has come down to us from antiquity, but, e.g., Lycophron's *Alexandra* 33-37 preserves some elements of it: Heracles enters the mouth of the sea monster to injure its sides from the inside; he loses his hair because of the heat in the monster's belly. For more details on the story, see J.M. Ziolkowski, *Fairy Tales from before Fairy Tales: The Medieval Latin Past of Wonderful Lies*, Michigan 2009, pp. 74-6.

121. On the cult of Menelaus and Helen at Therapnae, a city on the left bank of the Eurotas near ancient Sparta, see especially Isocrates *Hel*. 63.

122. Alexandros is an alternative name for Paris, the Trojan hero of Homer's *Iliad*.

123. Deiphobos, the son of Priam and Hecuba, is another Trojan hero mentioned in Homer's *Iliad*.

124. This refers to the Strait of Gibraltar.

125. It is difficult to say with any precision which work by Porphyry Aeneas has in mind here. A. Smith, *Porphyrii Fragmenta*, Leipzig 1993, lists the passage from Aeneas as fragment 496F (under the rubric *testimonia et fragmenta incertae sedis*), and provides a number of useful parallels.

126. On the cult of Zalmoxis, who was worshipped by the Getae in Thracia, see Herodotus 4.93-6. According to Herodotus, some Greeks thought Zalmoxis was the slave of Pythagoras of Samos as well as his student.

127. See Herodotus 2.112.1-116.1 for the story of Proteus and Helen.

128. Aeneas' source for this is Herodotus; see the note above.

129. Cf. e.g. Aelian *Var. Hist*. 5.12; Polybius *Hist*. 12.12b. The initiative to confer divine honours on Alexander appears to have been more controversial in Athens than Aeneas suggests.

130. For the same metaphor, see the earlier discussion starting at 24,11.
131. *Phdr*. 247E6
132. *Phd*. 62B, *Gorg*. 525A.
133. On this argument, see Preface, pp. xii-xiii.
134. Reading *huper* instead of *peri*. For 'listen to the women', cf. Plato *Gorg*. 512E.
135. Reading *hoti <mê>*.
136. Reading *monon* with *Wf*.
137. Reading *tên gên*.
138. Reading *philosophiâi* with *Wf* and *Bt*.
139. Reading *energeiâi* with MT edd.
140. Reading *kai <hoian> têi*.
141. *Tim*. 41A.
142. Reading *hermêneuein* with M *Wf* and *Bt*.
143. Reading *hôn* for *hôi* with M *Wf* and *Bt*.
144. Cf. Herodotus *Hist*. 1.46.
145. This expression may be inspired by Xenophon *Symp*. 6.2.
146. Cf. *Phdr*. 247a for the immortal banquet, and *Rep*. 10.614a for the 'rule in Plato's *Republic*', that the good are to be rewarded after death. Both references to Plato are rather loose.
147. *Rep*. 2.363C
148. *Phd*. 113E and *Gorg*. 525C.
149. Cf. *Phdr*. 248E, but note that Aeneas' paraphrase is rather loose.
150. For the meaning of *automatos*, see Preface, pp. xvii-xviii.
151. Plato *Gorg*. 523A. This phrase introduces the myth of the *Gorgias*.
152. The Christian God is one God (or a Monad, as below 44,20), but a Trinity of three persons, Father, Son (Christ) and Holy Spirit. Logos (Word) is used especially of the Son, Wisdom here of Son, can be of Holy Spirit (Lampe). In the Nicene and Athanasian creeds, the Son is begotten (*gennêtai*, as distinguished, only by Christians, from *genêtai*, 'is generated'). The Holy Spirit 'proceeds', according to the Creed of Athanasius. The Same Substance applies to both Son and Holy Spirit.
153. Reading *dêlôsêi* for *diêgêsetai* with BD *Wf* and *Bt*.
154. Reading *Sophias*.
155. The creation of an intelligible world was one of the answers offered to the charge that if the created world had a beginning, God will have been idle beforehand (see 44,25). Philo of Alexandria, the first-century AD Jewish thinker, writing his Hellenised account of the books of Moses, described in detail the intelligible world of Platonic Ideas created by God in his mind as a pattern for making the perceptible world. But so far it could not be used to answer the question of prior idleness, if we can rely on Philo *On Providence* 1.7, as interpreted by Richard Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, London 1983, pp. 203-9 and 250-1, because on that interpretation the intelligible world for Philo was created simultaneously with the world. In that case, it was Origen in the third century who first made this intelligible world of Platonic Ideas an earlier, beginningless creation (*On First Principles* 1.4.5), which could therefore answer the idleness question (see ibid. 1.4.3-5, and fr. 10 Koetschau, discussed in *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, London 1983, p. 251). Origen distinguished the beginningless intelligible patterns from the intelligible intellects that God creates, since the latter do have a beginning (*On First Principles* 2.9.1-2, 2.4.8), although together they constitute an intelligible heaven (ibid. 2.9.1). There was a continuous tradition from Philo to Augustine of belief in a separate intelligible heaven. But Aeneas' version here differs from Origen's in not mentioning what Origen considered relevant to

answering the idleness question, but mentioning only the creation of beginningless angels.

156. Reading *hous an* with M edd. [fort. *ousias has an*? – DAR].

157. A reference to *Tim*. 29E.

158. Idleness was a major Platonist objection to the idea that God as creator of the world gave it a beginning: was he, then, idle beforehand? See R. Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, London 1983, pp. 249-52.

159. It is not certain, but probable, that Porphyry's 'Oracles of the Chaldeans' is identical with his work *On the Philosophy from Oracles*, surviving in fragments. See A. Smith's Teubner edition of Porphyry's fragments, pp. 351-407. The Chaldean Oracles themselves are a collection of oracles with comments probably from the third century AD, a little before Porphyry, perhaps by Julian the theurgist, and taken as a guide to the priestly practice of theurgy.

160. The title given by Porphyry to Plotinus' treatise *Enn*. 1.8. It is indeed the position of Plotinus that Matter is not independent of the One, but (at least incidentally) generated by it.

161. Here (45,10) and at 46,11-16, Aeneas misunderstands the Platonists as meaning chronologically last, when they actually meant last in the order of causation, a distinction which he allows Theophrastus to cite in application to another term, 'has come to be' at 45,22.

162. Plato *Tim*. 28D7.

163. After *gegonen* add <*hoti gegonen*>.

164. 'Came to be by a cause' (45,22), i.e. instead of with a chronological beginning. The Platonist distinction is briefly acknowledged here, though ignored in other applications at 45,10 and 46 11-16; see nn. 161 and 167 and Preface, pp. xv-xvi.

165. On the example of the shadow, see Preface, pp. xvi-xix.

166. See Preface, p. xiii, for how the Neoplatonists tried to give sense to the notion of god's 'wishing' (*bouleuesthai*) to create.

167. Once again, as at 45,10, Aeneas misunderstands the Platonist distinction, this time at Plotinus *Enneads* 2.4.7, 2-10, whose talk of matter as generated implies a causal, not a chronological, origin.

168. Atticus was a prominent second-century AD Platonist. Fragments of his works are collected in E. Des Places, *Atticus: Fragments*, Paris 1977, who lists the present passage as fr. 37.

169. Cf. *Tim*. 31B5.

170. Porphyry, in his *Cave of the Nymphs* 24, reports that according to the Egyptians, the beginning of the year falls under the sign of Cancer. However, Aeneas may well have a different source for his claim that the 'Egyptian prophets' assign 'the birthday of the cosmos' to Cancer.

171. This oracle by Apollo is not included in the *Theosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta* and does not appear to be cited elsewhere in extant Greek sources.

172. Reading *logios* in place of *logikon*.

173. Reading *allo* instead of *alla*.

174. Another reference to *Tim*. 29E.

175. See the n. 155 on 'rational and intellectual beings, and the intelligible world', and on God's creation of an intelligible world of Platonic Ideas as a pattern for the creation of the perceptible world, in Philo, Origen and successors, and for Origen's combination of it, in an intelligible heaven, of intelligible intellects which do have a beginning. Aeneas omits the beginningless Ideas, and speaks here of the beginningless angels that God creates as first beings. Chronologically later, he creates the perceptible world of secondary beings, including humans. He does not

reach humans until 51,5. First at 50,22ff. he discusses the rebellious fallen angels of Genesis 6:2.

176. Reading *aitía* (so accented) with *Bt.*

177. It is remarkable that Aeneas should make use of these traditional concepts to illustrate whatever he means by 'the purest parts of heaven and earth'. What Aeneas means by 'oracles' here is not clear either; perhaps it is no more than a general term for ancient religious tradition, though 'Olympus' occurs in the *Chaldaean Oracles*, which Aeneas may be thinking of.

178. The Greek word that is here translated by 'Ideas' (*ideai*) usually refers to Plato's transcendent Forms; *eidê* can refer to Aristotle's enmattered forms as well, although here Aeneas has no philosophical distinction to make.

179. The first rational beings are the angels.

180. He is putting the angels among the first, immortal, rational beings, not among the secondary, mortal rational beings – humans – and that not because of any lack of secondary beings he might have put them among.

181. These are the fallen angels, also called 'rebels' below.

182. The phrase 'controlled rather than controlling' evokes the passage *Tim.* 43A-44C, describing the soul's original insertion into a body, but in particular 43A6-7.

183. A reference to *Tim.* 33C7-8.

184. For this doctrine, see e.g. the texts collected in D. Sedley and A.A. Long (eds and trs), *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Cambridge 1987, ch. 52.

185. The term is borrowed from *Phdr.* 250C, but the adjectival form is found only in later authors, e.g. Synesius *De Insomn.* 136D and Iamblichus *De Myst.* 4.13.

186. Drawing inspiration from Platonic and Aristotelian texts, Neoplatonic philosophers distinguished different kinds of body. The 'oyster-like' body is the coarsest kind, as Plato himself (*Phd.* 250C6) compares our material body to an 'oyster'. The most refined body, on the other hand, is the luminous one. This last body, according to John Philoponus, is eternally attached to souls and enables them to administer the cosmos and to be in motion (Philoponus *in De an.* 18.26-31). Intermediate between the oyster-like and the luminous body is the 'airy' body, which is more commonly called the 'pneumatic body' in Neoplatonic writings. This 'airy' body is composed of the elements, but derives its name from the element that predominates in it, namely air, as Philoponus tells us (at *in De an.* 17.21-2).

187. For the same idea of 'shadowy phantoms' that hover around tombs, see Plato *Phd.* 81D1. Cf. also Ammonius *In Isag.* 5.23; Proclus *In Remp.* 1.119.18ff.; Olympiodorus *in Phd.* 3.4.3; Damascius *in Phd.* 1.239.6f.; Philoponus *in De an.* 19.18-9; 20.11-12.

188. Pythagoras of Rhodes is quoted as something of an authority on invoking gods and demons in a work by Porphyry with the title *On the Philosophy from Oracles*, which is itself quoted by Eusebius (*PE* 5.8.9)

189. Read *thêriôn* in place of *heterôn*, a change supported by the resumption of this point at 55,17. For food chain arguments against the resurrection, see Preface, pp. ix-xi.

190. Insert: <TH. *Panu ge*> with M *Wf* and *Bt*. A change of speaker seems required here.

191. The immaterial principles in a drop of sperm are appealed to by Porphyry in answer to the question repeated in Aeneas' source, Gregory of Nyssa *On the Soul and Resurrection* (PG 46, col. 124C): how does the immaterial produce the material?

192. A similar procedure for planting rows of thorns is recommended by Palladius 1.34.

193. See n. 67 above.

194. A light-hearted reference to the traditional Athenian claim to be descended from an 'earth-born' race in mythical pre-history.

195. Reading *hêi* in place of *ê*.

196. On the notion of 'creative principle'(*dêmiourgikos logos*), see Preface, p. xii.

197. See also 63,2 below for the idea of changing things into gold. Both passages are significant ancient testimonies for the practice of alchemy, and discussed in M. Berthelot, *Les origines de l'alchimie*, Paris 1885, pp. 74-6. The General Editor is grateful to Cristina Viano for her advice.

198. Reading *pros <tên pros> to*.

199. A reference to Sophocles' play *Oedipus at Colonus*, where Oedipus frequently hints that he will be of benefit to the Athenians. Cf. e.g. ll. 92-3; 459-60; 578-9.

200. The remains of Theseus, the mythical founder of Athens, are said to have been repatriated by the Athenian aristocrat Cimon. The story is told, e.g. by Plutarch *Life of Cimon* 8.5.1-6.1.

201. For the story of how the body of Orestes, son of King Agamemnon, was discovered, see Herodotus *Hist*. 1.67-68.

202. Cf. Plato *Rep*. 5.469A.

203. This is a reference to Erectheus, the 'earth-born' king of ancient Athens in Greek mythology. Cf. Homer *Il*. 2.547-8.

204. The story of how Polyeidos resurrects Glaucus is told by Apollodorus *Bibl*. 3.3.1. See also Hyginus *Fab*. 136.

205. Asclepius is said to have been a skilled surgeon during his lifetime; his cult was well established throughout the Greek world by the late fifth century BC. There are numerous reports of resurrections associated with him in ancient literature. See, for example, Apollodorus *Bibl*. 6.3.10; Hyginus *Fab*. 49, and the texts collected in E.J. and L.L. Edelstein, *Asclepius*, Baltimore 1945, T 69-86.

206. Cf. Apollodorus *Bibl*. 1.9.15.

207. Heracles resurrected Theseus in the course of his hunt for Cerberus in Hades, his twelfth labour. Cf. Apollodorus *Bibl*. 2.5.

208. There are no ancient sources for these last two resurrection stories about Tymon the Lydian and Timosthenes the Athenian. 'Tymon' may be a confused reference to the Lydian Tylon or Tylos, said to have been restored to life after a lethal snakebite (see e.g. Pliny *NH* 25.14).

209. It is not known which book of Eudoxus would have contained these stories. F. Lasserre, in his collection of fragments, lists our passage as coming 'from uncertain works' (*dubium*); cf. *Die Fragmente des Eudoxus von Knidos*, Berlin 1966, fr. 372, with commentary on p. 267.

210. Cf. Pindar fr. 284 Bowra/271 Schroeder, and see note below.

211. See Herodotus *Hist*. 4.14-15. According to Origen *Contra Celsus* 3.26, the Pagan Celsus used the story of Aristeas in his attack on Christianity, drawing on Pindar and Herodotus.

212. A phrase borrowed from Plato *Phdr*. 230D8.

213. Another Platonic echo; cf. *Crito* 54D2.

214. Aeneas is here referring to Plato's *Republic* (10.614B), where Socrates recounts the story of man named Er who comes back to life. Socrates introduces Er as 'the son of Armenius', and it seems that Aeneas is misremembering both the name of Er's father and the fact that only Er is said by Socrates/Plato to have been brought back to life. In the later Greek tradition, it was thought that Er was in fact identical with Zoroaster. The basis for this belief appears to have been a

treatise titled *On Nature* and ascribed to Zoroaster, which contained this statement in its preface: 'The following I wrote, Zoroaster, the son of Armenius, from Pamphylian descent, who died in war' (quoted by Clement of Alexandria *Strom*. 5.14.103.3-4 Früchtel-Stählin-Treu and Proclus *in Remp*. 2.109.14-6 Kroll).

215. Euxitheus' report that Zoroaster believed in some form of resurrection is listed as a fragment from Theopompus (who is mentioned in the line after next) by Jacoby, *FGrH* 2b,115, F 64b. See also n. 216 below.

216. Theopompus of Chios was a Greek historian and rhetorician of the fourth century BC. His work *Philippica* is quoted by Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers* 1.9.1ff. and refers to men 'coming back to life' (*FGrH* 115 F 64).

217. Aeneas' source, Gregory of Nyssa *On the Soul and Resurrection*, gives a long case for the Hebrew Old Testament endorsing resurrection, PG 46, col. 129ff.

218. Cf. Eusebius *PE* 9.10, quoting from Porphyry's treatise *On the Philosophy from Oracles*.

219. Euxitheus is referring to the persecution of Christians by Huneric the Vandal. See Procopius *History of the Wars* 3.8.1-5; Evagrius Scholasticus *Ecclesiastical History* 4.14; Victor of Vita *History of the Vandal Persecution* 5.6.29-32; *Codex Justinianus* 1.27.1.4 for other accounts of the persecution.

220. For Tereus' rape of Philomela, see Apollodorus *Bibl*. 3.14.8 and Ovid *Met*. 6.424-674.

221. An echo of Empedocles DK B112.4-5.

222. Cf. *Rep*. 3.388E2-3.

223. For the sacrifice of the daughter of Erechtheus and Praxithea, Chthonia, see e.g. Hyginus *Fab*. 48. A tragedy by Euripides that would have included this story is now extant only in fragments (*Erechtheus*).

224. For human sacrifices in Arcadia, see Porphyry *De Abst*. 2.27.2.

225. Cf. Plato *Phd*. 67B.

226. This echoes the end of the *Phaedrus* (279C), even as the beginning of the dialogue echoed the beginning.

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English-Greek Glossary

ability to act under one's own power, the: *to autexousion*, *autexousia*
absorb, to: *empiplasthai*
abundance: *aphthonia*
abundance of wealth: *periousia ploutou*
accidental: *sumbebêkos*
accidents: *ta sumptômata*
accompany, to: *sunepesthai*
according to (his) ordering: *kata taxin*
according to his own power: *kat' exousian*
account: *logos*
act, to: *poiein*
acting under one's own power: *autexousios, to autexousion*
action: *ergon, praxis*
activity: *energeia*
activity is the exhibition and knowledge of power: *epideixis kai gnôsis dunameôs hê energeia*
actualisation: *entelekheia*
adamantine chains, by: *adamantinois desmois*
adapted: *epitêdeios*
administrator of the universe, the: *ho epistatôn tôn holôn*
admirer: *erastês*
adorn, to: *kosmein*, *diakosmein*
adulterer: *moikhos*
adultery: *moikheia*
aerial: *aerios, aerôdês*
against expectation: *ou kat' elpida*
against nature: *para phusin*
airy: *aerôdês*
ambivalent: *amphibolos*
ambush: *lokhos*
angel: *angelos*
anger: *orgê*
animal: *zôion*
animate: *empsukhos*
appointed time: *prothesmia*
architect: *tektonikos*
argument: *logos*
arouse: *egeirein*
arrange, to: *tattein, suntattein*
arrogance: *alazoneia*
art: *tekhnê*
art of doctors: *iatrikê tekhnê*
articulate contradictory propositions, to: *ta enantia legein*
ascend, to: *anatrekhein, anerkhesthai*
assigned, to be: *dihorizesthai*
assist, to: *diakonein*
association: *koinônia*
authority: *arkhê, dunasteia*
autonomy: *autokratôr*

barren: *agonos*
basis: *aphormê*
battle: *makhê*
be, to: *gignesthai*
beast: *thêrion*
beautiful, the: *to kalon*
beauty: *to kallos*
because he loves man: *dia philanthrôpian*
because of an excess of moisture: *periousiai hugrotêtos*
become, to: *gignesthai*
become effeminate, to: *thêlunoein*
become forgetful, to: *anamnêmonein*
become like, to: *proseikazesthai*
before time: *pro tou khronou*
beginning: *arkhê*
begotten child: *gennêma*
begrudgery, out of: *phthonôi*
behave correctly, to: *katorthoun*
beholds, one who: *theatês*
being: *ousia, to einai*
being forever: *to aei einai*
belief: *pistis*
belong to the highest part of creation, to: *tês prôtês logikês meridos estin*
beloved: *erômenos, erômenos*
benefactor: *euergetês*

benevolence: *philanthrôpia*
birth: *tokos*
blame, one must: *aitiateon*
blessed: *eudaimôn*
body: *sôma*
bond: *desmos*
born, to be: *gignesthai*
bound to, to be: *sundeisthai*
bound together with, to be: *sundeisthai*
break up, to: *dialuein, luein*
breathe, to: *empnoun*
bring back to the living: *pros tous zôntas anagein*
bring forth, to: *proballein*
bring to order, to: *suntattein*
bring together, to: *sunagein*
bringing of order to everything, the: *hê tou pantos taxis*
build, to: *dêmiourgein*

came to be by a cause: *kat' aitian egeneto*
capture: *desmos*
care: *epimeleia*
cast aside, to: *aposeiein*
catalogue of wonders: *teratologia*
cause: *aitia, prophasis*
cave: *spêlaion*
cavern: *antros*
cessation of evil, for the: *pros paulan kakias*
chance: *tukhê*
change: *metabolê*
change, to: *metaballein, metakinein, metallatein, metampiskhesthai, metatithenai*
change around, to: *metakinein*
change into, to: *metapoiein*
change one's mind, to: *metanoein, metatithesthai*
change to a better state: *metabolê pros to kreitton*
character: *prosôpon*
choice: *prohairesis*
choir (above): *khoreia* (*anô*)
clever interpretation, come up with a: *sophizein*
coin a term, to: *onomatopoiein*
come about, to: *gignesthai*
come along with, to: *sunakolouthein*
come back to life, to: *anabiônai*
come down, to: *kateisin*
come into being, to: *gignesthai*
come to be, to: *gignesthai*
come up with a newfangled proposal, to: *neôteropoiein*
coming immortality, the: *hê mellousa athanasia*
coming to be: *genesis*
command: *prostagma*
commit a wrong, to: *hamartanein*
commit injustice, to: *adikein*
commit outrage, to: *hubrizein*
common: *koinos*
common good, for the: *pros to koinon*
common good, the: *to koinon*
communion, to have: *koinônein*
companionship: *koinônia*
compassion, in: *eleein*
competition: *agôn*
competitor: *agônistês*
complexity: *sunthesis*
composed, to be: *suntithenai*
composite: *sunthetos*
compound: *sunthetos*
concept: *noêma*
concern: *skholê*
confounding: *tarakhê*
confuse, to: *ektarattein*
confusion: *tarakhê*
conjure up, to: *goêtein*
consequence of necessity, as a: *pros anagkên*
contain, to: *sunekhein*
contemplation: *theôria*
contentious: *philoneikos*
contest: *makhê, agôn*
contestant : *agônistês*
continuity: *sunekheia*
contract, to: *sustellein*
contrary to: *enantios*
contrary to reason: *paralogos*
contrive, to: *epinoein*
control, to: *kratein*
controlled, to be: *kratousthai*
convert into, to: *metaskeuazein*
corporeal: *sômatoeides*
corruptibility: *phthora*
count, to: *arithmein*
courage: *andreia*
cowardice: *deilia*

craftsman: *dêmiourgos*
create, to: *dêmiourgein*
creative principle: *dêmiourgikos logos*
creator: *dêmiourgos*
Creator is a creator from his own being, the: *par' heautou dêmiourgos ho Dêmiourgos*
Creator of the world: *Dêmiourgos tôn holôn*
credibility: *pistis*
critical examination: *elenkhos*
crown victor, to: *stephanoun*
cure: *pharmakon*
curtail, to: *koloboun, sustellein*
custody: *phroura*
custom: *nomos*
cut up, to: *diatemnein*
cut up into pieces, to: *katakermatizein*

deal sophistically with something, to: *sophizein*
death: *teleutê, thanatos*
deed: *ergon*
deficiency: *epileipsis*
deformities: *ta terata*
democracy: *dêmokratia*
demon: *daimôn, daimonion*
demonstrate, to: *epideixein*
dependent, to be: *exêrtêsthai*
deprived of resources, to be: *aporein*
descend, to: *katabainein, kateisin*
desire: *epithumia*
desire, to: *ephiesthai, epithumein*
destroyed, to be: *diollusthai, phtheiresthai*
destruction: *phthora*
devise, to: *epinoein*
die, to: *teleutan*
diligence: *epimeleia*
Director of the Games, the: *agônothetês, ho ton agôna titheis*
disbelief : *apistia*
disciple: *akroatês*
disease: *nosêma, nosos, pathêma*
disease caused by plague: *loimôdês nosos*
disobedience: *apeithia*
disorder: *akosmia, ataxia*
disordered: *ataktos*
disordered impulse: *phora ataktos*
disperse, to: *diaskedannunai*
dispose, to: *tithenai*
disputatious claims: *logomakhia*
dissolution: *dialusis, lusis*
dissolve, to: *dialuein, kataluein, luein*
divine: *theios*
divine beings: *ta theia*
divine favour, by: *kata theion*
divine law: *theios nomos*
divinely inspired: *enthous*
doctor: *iatros*
doctrine: *dogma, doxa, paideia*
dogma: *dogma*
dominated, to be: *kratousthai*
domination: *dunasteia*
double entity: *diplous tis*
doubt, in: *amphibolos*
doubts: *apistia*
downward path: *kathodos*
dragged along, to be: *episuresthai*
draught: *aukhmos*

earth-born: *gêgenês*
earthly: *gêinos*
earthquake: *seismos*
easily dissolved: *eudialutos*
education: *paideia*
effluence: *aporroia*
efflux: *aporroia*
element: *stoikheion*
elevate to divine stature, to: *athanatizein*
emigrate, to: *metoikizein*
empty out, to: *kenoun*
encompass, to: *perilambanein*
end: *teleutê*
end one's life, to: *teleutan*
enjoy a banquet: *sumposiazein*
enjoy Corybantic madness, to: *korubantian*
enslaved, to be: *douleuein, douleuesthai*
ensouled: *empsukhos*
entire sensible (being), the: *to aisthêton holon*
envy: *phthonos*
equal in number: *isarithmos*
equilibrium, in: *isorropos*
eradicate, to: *ekkoptein*
err, to: *diharmatein*
error of their teachings, the: *hê planê tôn dogmatôn*

escape: *phugê*
escape, to: *apodidraskein*
essence: *ousia*
eternal: *aïdios*
ether: *aithêr*
ethereal: *aitherios*
evil: *kakia, to kakon*
examination: *dokimasia*
example: *paradeigma*
excess of matter, the: *hê tês hulês pleonexia*
excite, to: *anakinein, diageirein*
exemplar: *arkhetupos*
exercise power, to: *energein*
exhibition: *epideixis*
exist first, to: *prohuparkhein*
existence: *genesis, to einai*
experience: *empeiria, pathêma, peira*
experts in materials: *hoi peri tên hulên sophoi*
explain, to: *hermêneuein*
exposed as a liar, to be: *elenkhein*
express an opinion, to: *dialegesthai*
extend life, to: *epekteinein ton bion*
eye of the soul, the: *to omma tês psukhês*
eye-witness: *theatês*

fable: *muthologia, muthos*
failure of crops: *karpôn aporia*
fall: *katalusis*
fall of thunderbolts: *keraunôn phora*
false doctrine: *pseudologia*
fantasy: *phantasia*
fare well, to: *eu prattein*
fashion, to: *dêmiourgein, exergazesthai*
Father: *Patêr*
fictional nature of an account: *muthologia*
fiery: *purinos*
fight alongside with, to: *summakhein*
figure: *skhêma*
fill, to: *plêroun*
fine: *kalos*
first birth: *prôtê genesis*
first generation: *prôtê genesis*
first principle, the: *hê prôtê arkhê*
fit together, to: *sunharmozein*
flame: *phlox*
flight: *phugê*
flood: *epiklusis*
flood out, to: *epikluzein*
flourish, to: *eu prattein*
fly along with, to: *sunpetesthai*
follow, to: *akolouthein, hepesthai, sunepesthai*
follow along, to: *sunepesthai*
foolish: *anoêtos*
force: *bia*
force, to: *prosanankazein*
force of nature, by: *biai phuseôs*
force the issue, to: *ekbiazesthai*
foreknowledge, to have: *progignôskein*
foresee, to: *proeidenai, progignôskein*
forgetfulness: *lêthê*
form: *eidos, morphê*
form, to: *skhêmatizein*
(form of) living creature: *zôion*
formless: *aneideos*
Forms, the: *ta eidê*
fortunate: *eudaimôn*
fortune: *tukhê*
fount: *pêgê*
free, to: *apallatesthai*
free exercise of power, by the: *exousiai dunameôs*
free man, a: *eleutheros*
free power: *exousia*
freed, to be: *apallatesthai*
freedom: *eleutheria*
freeing: *lusis*
from outside: *exôthen*
future immortality: *hê mellousa athanasia*

generation: *genesis*
gentleness: *praotês*
ghost: *eidôlon*
go along, to: *sunepesthai*
god: *theos*
God: *to theion*
good: *agathos*
good, the: *ho agathos*
Good itself, the: *auto to agathon*
good nurturing: *agathê trophê*
good order: *kosmos*
good work: *euergasia*
goods in the higher realm, the: *ta ekei kala*
Great King, the: *ho megalos basileus*
greed: *pleonexia*
greediness: *pleonexia*

greedy man, the: *ho pleonektês*
grow angry, to: *orgizesthai*
guardian: *phulakê*
guard-post: *phroura*

habit: *êthos*
habituation: *sunêtheia*
hallmark: *gnôrisma*
handiwork: *poiêma*
happenings: *ta gignomena*
happiness: *eudaimonia*
harmony: *harmonia*
haunts of the Muses, the: *ta mouseia*
have a part, to: *koinônein*
having life from itself: *zôên ex hautês ekhousa*
healing art: *iatrikê tekhnê*
heaven: *ouranos*
heavenly: *ouranios*
heavenly bodies, the: *ta ourania sômata*
help: *boêtheia*
hero: *hêrôs*
hidden, to be: *anakruptesthai*
hold together, to: *sunekhein*
hope: *elpis*
household manager: *oikonomos*
human: *anthrôpeios, anthrôpos*
human body: *anthrôpinon sôma*
human choice: *prohairesis*
human failings: *anthrôpina ptaismata*
human opinion: *anthrôpinê oiêsis*
human soul: *anthrôpinê psukhê*
human substance: *anthrôpinê ousia*
humanity: *philanthrôpia*

Idea: *idea*
idle: *argos, en argiai*
idleness, in: *en argiai*
idleness: *argia*
ignorance: *agnoia, anoia, apaideusia*
ignorant, to be: *agnoein*
ill-formed, the: *to amorphon*
illness: *nosos*
illuminated, to be: *katalampesthai*
image: *eidôlon, eikôn*
immaterial and rational being: *ahulê kai logikê ousia*
immortal: *ambrotos, athanatos*
immortal, the: *to athanaton*
immortality: *athanasia, to athanaton*
immortalise, to: *athanatizein*
imperfect: *ateles*
impiety: *asebeia*
impious doctrine: *atheon dogma*
impotence: *adunamia*
impress, to: *enduein*
imprint, to: *entupoun*
in accord with the principle of irrational life: *kata logon tês alogou zôês*
in accordance with reason: *kata noun*
in alliance, to be: *summakhein*
inconsistent, to be: *diaphônein*
incorporeal: *asômatos*
incorporeal, the: *to asômaton*
incorruptible: *adiaphthoros*
indefinite: *aoristos*
indestructible spirits: *aptharta pneumata*
indivisible: *atomos*
indulge in fraud, in: *sophizein*
inexperience: *apeiria*
infinite: *apeiros, aperantos*
infinity: *apeiria*
initiate: *mustagôgos*
initiates, the: *hoi teloumenoi*
injury: *adikêma*
injustice, to do an: *adikein*
innately: *oikothen*
inner power of soul, the: *hê endon tês psukhês dunamis*
instruction: *didaskalia*
instrumental body: *organikon sôma*
intellect: *dianoia, nous*
intellectual beings: *noerai ousiai*
intellectual powers, the: *hai noerai dunameis*
intelligible: *noêtos*
intelligible things: *ta noêta*
intemperance: *akolasia*
intemperate: *akolastos*
intention: *dianoia*
interpreter: *mustagôgos*
irrational: *alogos*
irrational, the: *alogia, to alogon*
irrational body: *alogon sôma*
irrational soul: *alogos psukhê*
irrational species of animals, the: *ta aloga tôn zôiôn*
irrationality: *alogia, to alogon*

jealousy: *phthonos*
joined to, to be: *sumplekesthai*
journey: *poreia*
journey round, to: *sumperipolein*
judge: *dikastês, kritês*
judgment: *krisis*
just: *dikaios*
justice: *dikaiosunê, dikê*
justly: *dikaiôs*

kind: *eumenês*
kindness: *eumeneia*
king of all: *basileus pantôn*
King: *Basileus*
kingly power: *turranis*
kinship: *sungeneia*
knowledge: *epistêmê, gnôsis*

lack: *aporia*
lack of money: *aporia khrêmatôn*
lack of room: *stenokhôria*
lack of self-control: *akrasia*
last principle: *eskhatos*
law: *nomos*
lawgiver: *nomothetês*
laziness: *rhathumia*
learn, to: *manthanein*
learning, act of: *mathêsis*
legislation: *nomos*
lesson: *didaskalia, mathêma*
licentiousness: *akolasia*
life: *bios, zôê*
lift, to: *meteôrizein*
Light of the King, the: *hê tou basileôs astrapê*
light: *phôs*
limit: *horos*
limited: *metrôi, peperasmenos*
limited in scope, to be: *mekhri tou dihorizesthai*
linked to, to be: *sunakolouthein*
live, to: *bioun, zên*
live a moral life, to: *sôphronein*
live above nature, to: *to huper tên phusin zên*
live according nature, to: *to kata phusin zên*
live again, to: *anabiônai*
live before, to: *probioun*
live contrary to nature, to: *to para phusin zên*
live in a previous life: *probioun*
living, the: *hoi zôntes*
living being: *zôion*
living work of art: *empsukhon agalma*
lot: *klêros*
love: *erôs*
love affair: *erôs*
love of mankind: *philanthrôpia*
lover: *erastês*
lowest entities, the: *ta eskhata*
luminous: *augoeidês*
luxury: *truphê*

made to resemble, to be: *proseikazesthai*
madness: *aponoia*
make, to: *poiein*
make a distinction, to: *dihorizein*
make contact, to: *ephaptesthai*
make the subject of harmonious arrangement, to: *suntattein*
maker: *poiêtês*
malady: *pathos*
man: *anêr, anthrôpos*
mandrake root: *mandragoras*
marvel: *to thauma*
material: *enhulos, hulê*
material, the: *to enhulon*
material bodies: *ta enhula sômata*
material thing: *to enhulon*
matter: *hulê*
matter, in: *enhulos*
meaning: *dianoia*
measure: *metron*
measure is defined by what is needed, the: *to metron en deonti diorizetai*
measure out, to: *summetrein*
medicinal: *iatrikos*
medicine: *pharmakon*
melody: *melôdia*
memory: *mnêmê*
migrate: *metabainein*
mind: *nous*
'mind from outside': *thurathen nous*
misfortune: *atukhia, sumphora, sumptôma, suntukhia*
mistrust: *apistia*
mix, to: *summeignunai*
moderate: *metriôs*
moderation: *sôphrosunê*
moisture: *hugrotês*

Monad: *Monas*
monarchy: *monarkhia*
mortal: *thnêtos*
mortal body: *thnêton sôma*
mortal world, the: *ho thnêtos kosmos*
mortality: *soma, to thnêton*
motionless: *akinêtos*
movement: *kinêsis*
multitude: *plêthos, poluplêtheia*
mummified: *tetarikheumenos*
music: *mousikê*
musical nature, of a: *mousikos*
mystagogue: *mustagôgos*
mysteries: *ta aporrêta*
mystery rite: *teletê*
mystical character: *kharaktêr*

name: *onoma*
natural: *kata phusin*
nature: *phusis*
nature of things: *phusis*
necessity: *anagkê*
necessity, out of: *ex' anagkês*
noble: *kalos*
noble cause, for a: *hupo tou kalou*
noetic world, the: *to noêton*
notion: *noêsis*
nourishment: *trophê*
number: *arithmos*
nurture: *trephein, trophê*

obscure, to: *apokruptein*
occur, to: *gignesthai*
offence: *egklêma*
offer rites, to: *telein*
old wives' tale: *graos muthologia*
opposite: *enantios*
opposites become cures for opposites: *ta enantia tôn enantiôn iamata gignetai*
oracle of the dead: *psukhomanteia*
oracles: *ta logia*
order: *eutaxia, taxis*
order, to: *kosmein, suntattein, tattein*
order of things: *taxis*
ordered, to be: *tetakhthai*
ordered place: *taxis*
orderly arrangement: *diakosmêsis*
orderly manner, in an: *kata taxin*
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potential: *dunamis*
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powers of heaven above, the: *hai dunameis anô*

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pre-existence: *probiotê*
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purposes of exhibiting virtue, for: *pros epideixin aretês*
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pursuit: *epitêdeuma*
put in order, to: *eis taxin tithenai*
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raise bogies, to: *mormoluttein*
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resurrected, to be: *anhistanai*
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rival lover: *anterastês*
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rub against, to: *prostribein*
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rule, to: *arkhein*
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ruling principle: *arkhê*
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salvation: *sôtêria*
say in a dialogue, to: *dialegesthai*
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scattered, to be: *kataspeiran*
scourge: *mastix*
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second life: *deuteros bios*
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secret teachings, in: *en aporrêtois*
secrets: *ta aporrêta*
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seek after money, to: *philokhrêmatein*
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sensible of: *aisthanesthai*
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sensible world, the: *ta aisthêta, to aisthêton*
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service, to do: *diakonein*
set a limit to, to: *dihorizein*
set in order, to: *diakosmein*
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shadowy and ephemeral images: *skioeidê kai ephêmera phantasmata*
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shape: *morphê, skhêma*
shapeless: *amorphos*
share in confusion, to: *sumparatassein*
sharpen, to: *paroxunein*
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sink, to: *kataduein*
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soul, without a: *apsukhos*
soul that has done honour to the contest, the: *hê ton agôna diakosmêsasa psukhê*
soul's power, the: *hê tês psukhês dunamis*
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sow the seeds, to: *prokataspeirein*
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Spirit: *Pneuma*
spiritedness: *thumos*
spontaneously generated: *automatos*
spread, to: *diaspeirein*
sprung from the earth: *autokhthonos*
star: *astêr*
starry: *astroeidês*
statue: *agalma*
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stitch, to: *surraptein*
story: *drama*
strange: *atopos*
strength: *euhexia*
strength of body: *romê sômatos*
strength of the soul, the: *hê tês psukhês dunamis*
strong drink: *methê*
struggle: *agôn*
study, to: *philosophein*
study philosophy, to: *philosophein*
subject, to be: *douleuein*
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substance: *hupostasis, ousia*
substantially: *ousiôdôs*

succession: *diadokhê*
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suffer misfortune, to: *atukhein*
suffering: *pathêma, pathos*
suffering, exempt from: *apathes*
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superfluity: *periousia*
superfluous: *perittos*
superlative degree of justice: *huperbolê dikaiosunês*
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teacher: *didaskalos*
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that which depends upon us: *to eph' hêmin*
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therapy: *therapeia*
thing made: *poiêma*
things that come to be: *ta gignomena*
things which are: *ta gignomena*
things which exist: *ta onta*
things which have emerged ill-formed: *ta amorpha genomena*
thinking: *noein*
those fitted (to receive): *hoi epitêdeioi*
through an overstraining of wisdom: *di' huperbolên sophias*
throw into confusion, to: *suntarattein*
tied to, to be: *sundeisthai*
time: *khronos*
timeless: *akhronos*
timid hesitation: *oknos*

toil: *ponos*
token: *gnôrisma*
token of immortality: *sumbolon tês athanasias*
tomb: *sêma*
trace: *gnôrisma*
transferred, to be: *metatithesthai*
transform, to: *metaballein*
transformed, to be: *metaskhêmatizesthai*
transgress, to: *parabainein*
transmigrate, to: *metabainein, metatithesthai*
trap: *enedra*
travail: *ôdis*
trial: *peira*
Trinity: *Trias*
turn, to: *epistrephein*
turn out stories, to: *muthologein*
tyranny: *turranis*
tyrant: *turranos*

ugly, the: *to kakon*
unbalanced: *anômalos*
unbelief: *apistia*
undefined: *ahoristos*
under the requirements of justice: *hupo tês dikês*
understanding: *epistêmê*
undoubting: *ouk amphibolos*
un-generated: *agenêtos, agennêtos*
union: *sumpnoia*
unite, to: *sunekhein*
universe, the: *to pan*, *kosmos*
universe as a whole, the: *to pan*
unjust: *adikos*
unjustly: *adikôs*
unlimited: *ahoristos*
unreason: *alogia*
unreasonable: *alogos*
unused: *en argiai*
unwillingly: *akôn*
upset, to: *diatarattein*

veil: *prokalumma*
very Mind, the: *autonous*
very Word, the: *autologos*
vice: *kakia*
view: *dianoia*
violated, to be: *hubrizesthai*
virtue: *aretê*
virtue has no master: *aretê adespotos*
visible: *horatos, horômenos*
vision: *phasma*

watery: *hudatinos*
weakness: *astheneia, kakhexia*
weakness of mind: *arrhôstia*

wealth: *ploutos*
well, to do: *kalôs prattein*
well-defined: *diôrismenos*
well-disposed: *eumenês*
well-ordered: *tetagmenos*
what is bound together: *to sundethen*
what logic is there in …?: *tina logon ekhein*
what was fitted together: *to harmosthen*
what was well bound together: *to kalôs sundethen*
whole, the: *to holon, to pan*
wickedness: *aselgeia*
will: *boulêsis*
willing, to be: *boulesthai*
willingly: *hekôn*
wisdom: *sophia*
Wisdom: *sophia*
wisdom of the word, the: *hê sophia tou logou*
wise: *sophos*
wise men of old, the: *hoi palai sophoi*
wish: *boulêsis*
wish, to: *boulesthai*
without a soul: *apsukhos*
without beginning: *anarkhos*
without understanding: *anoêtos*
wonder: *to thauma*
wondrous tales: *ta thaumasia*
Word: *logos*
word: *logos, onoma*
work: *ergon, logos, poiêma*
world, the: *to pan*, *kosmos*

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Greek-English Index

Zacharias of Mytilene
Ammonius

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Introduction

1. Zacharias' life and writings

Zacharias was born in Maiouma, a port town a few miles outside of Gaza, sometime in the 460s. Like his fellow Gazan Aeneas, Zacharias went on to study in the great intellectual centre of the region, Alexandria, where he doubtless encountered Greek philosophy and the teachings of Ammonius.[1] Later in his life, in around 487, he left Alexandria for Beirut, where his dialogue *Ammonius* is set and most of his writings are thought to have been composed, to pursue legal studies. Afterwards, he moved to Constantinople, to practise as an advocate, before eventually becoming bishop of Mytilene.[2]

Among his writings (which include lives of prominent Palestinian ascetics, namely those of Isaiah and Peter the Iberian, two polemical tracts against Manichaeism, and an *Ecclesiastical History* partially preserved in the *Chronicle* of a later writer with the ungainly name pseudo-Zacharias Rhetor) the document of the greatest importance for understanding the cultural and intellectual influences on Zacharias' early career is his *Life of Severus*. The work is ostensibly a defence of Severus, a friend of Zacharias' who was later to become patriarch of Antioch, against rumours that he had been a committed pagan in his student days in Alexandria. However, when Zacharias discusses his time in Alexandria, the figure of Severus hardly features, and the narrative shifts to the disenchantment with paganism suffered by a certain Paralius.[3] The latter's increasingly confrontational attitude towards his pagan teachers (which included discussions with Ammonius) and religious cult eventually led to him getting beaten up. A group of Christian students associated with the anti-Chalcedonian Enaton monastery in Alexandria, among them Zacharias, seized the moment to respond by starting a riot which led to the destruction of the Isis temple in Menouthis.[4] The aggressive attitude Zacharias and his comrades show towards their pagan opponents in the Paralius story, ready to strike when opportunity beckons, suggest a missionary zeal and polemical fervour that would equally well describe the spirit of the dialogue *Ammonius*, and it is worth bearing in mind this context when reading it.

2. Aeneas' *Theophrastus* and Zacharias' *Ammonius*

Zacharias' *Ammonius* was almost certainly written after Aeneas' *Theophrastus*. Zacharias, on two occasions, quotes 'one of our wise men' (i.e. Aeneas), and at times reproduces passages from the *Theophrastus* without acknowledgement of their author.[5] It is clear, then, that Zacharias was influenced by Aeneas' dialogue, but the difference between the two works are striking and worth bringing out here.

First, there is a marked difference in tone between Aeneas' *Theophrastus* and Zacharias' *Ammonius*. Although he does not shy away from vigorous polemic, Aeneas is on the whole respectful of his pagan opponents. Zacharias, on the other hand, is quick to accuse them of stupidity, ignorance and wickedness. The characters of Aeneas' *Theophrastus* are fictitious, while the frame narrative of the *Ammonius* suggests that Zacharias is reporting conversations at which he himself was present and which involved as interlocutors contemporary figures that would have been familiar to educated readers in Gaza and elsewhere, such as Ammonius of Alexandria and Gessius the professor of medicine. He describes his pagan opponents not as having been persuaded of the tenets of Christianity in civil discussion among equals, but rather as having been silenced and humiliated (see e.g. ll. 995-6 and ll. 1302-3, where the phrase 'having become more speechless than fish and stones' describes the effect of Christian arguments on the pagan opponents). Another important difference between the *Theophrastus* and the *Ammonius* is their respective use of sources: unlike Aeneas, who is in the main content to draw on his knowledge of Greek *paideia*, Zacharias quotes frequently from theologians and Scripture, a fact that might suggest that he is writing for a different audience than Aeneas.[6] The dialogue's dramatic climax occurs at ll. 1122-3, where Ammonius declares himself convinced of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity – a fiction as absurd as it is revealing of Zacharias' intentions.

When it comes to the structure and content of the two works, one also notes marked differences. The structure of the *Ammonius*, divided into four main conversations (one with Ammonius, one with Gessius, and two more with Ammonius), with additional opening and closing dialogues between Zacharias and the anonymous student 'inclining towards paganism' as part of the frame narrative, is more complex than that of the *Theophrastus*, which reads as one continuous discussion. Most significant, however, is the difference in content between the two works: the pre-existence of the soul and its reincarnation are not discussed in Zacharias' dialogue at all, but treated at considerable length in the *Theophrastus*. On the other hand, the question of the eternity or otherwise of the world does not play a major role in Aeneas' dialogue, but is the main subject of Zacharias'. It may, of course, simply be the case that Zacharias felt the pre-

existence of the soul was dealt with well enough by Aeneas, while not enough had been said on the question of the world's eternity.

In two important studies, however, E. Gallicet has shown persuasively that Zacharias' engagement with Aeneas' *Theophrastus* goes beyond filling in the gaps.[7] Where Aeneas' exposition is tangled, ambiguous or at risk of offending orthodoxy, Zacharias, when taking up the same material, quietly corrects and clarifies it. One example of this editing procedure occurs at *Amm*. ll. 1176-1220. Here, student 'B' raises the problem why God did not make the cosmos immortal from the outset, rather than transforming it at the end of time. The same difficulty is raised by 'Theophrastus' in Aeneas' dialogue of the same name, in a particularly obscure stretch of argument.[8] What Aeneas ought to explain is why humans did not receive immortality; what he actually dwells on is how 'rational natures' came to fall and turn into rebels, an event that he fails explicitly to connect to human mortality. Zacharias, on the other hand, leaves no doubt: in l. 1198 he adds 'i.e. human beings' to explain Aeneas' 'rational beings' (which could refer to either angels or human souls), and in ll. 1248-51 substitutes a straightforward past tense for Aeneas' complicated 'if' clause at *Theophr*. 50,22-51,2.

3. Ammonius in the *Ammonius*

A question of considerable importance for our understanding of the history of Neoplatonism is the extent to which Zacharias faithfully presents Ammonius' own ideas. Clearly, some of what Zacharias puts into 'Ammonius" mouth reflects the actual views of the philosopher. When we are told, for example, that the Alexandrian philosopher tried to 'cover up the conflict between Plato and Aristotle' (l. 952), we can corroborate this remark with evidence from one of his students, Asclepius of Tralles.[9] Zacharias' report here as elsewhere, however, is distinctly hostile and uncharitable: Ammonius plainly did not merely seek 'to cover up' the disagreements between the two philosophers, but to give some philosophical reasons why the differences between their positions may be less serious than appears at first sight. But like Philoponus after him, Zacharias is eager to demonstrate how Plato, on the literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*, disagrees with Aristotle on the eternity of the world.[10] The hostile report of Ammonius' project of harmonising Plato and Aristotle should thus be read against this background of Christian attempts to drag Plato into the creationist camp.[11]

The core thesis against which Zacharias argues in the dialogue is 'that the world is co-eternal with god'. This thesis, stated in this way, is not a Platonist one. In no extant philosophical text by a Platonic writer is the term 'co-eternal' (*sunaïdios*) used to describe the relation between God and the cosmos. Platonists such as Proclus

carefully distinguish the timeless eternity of the divine from the infinite duration of the cosmos.[12] To speak of the 'co-eternity' of God and world is to fudge that vital distinction, and it is implausible that Ammonius ever maintained the thesis that Zacharias ascribes to the eponymous character in the dialogue.[13]

To see the extent to which the character 'Ammonius' in the dialogue functions as a straw man for philosophical positions that Zacharias found objectionable, we need only turn to ll. 208-11. Here, 'Ammonius', who has by this point been backed into an corner in the argument, clutches at a last straw to rescue his thesis that 'God cannot break up what is in fine condition': the Christian counter-example of individual human beings coming into being and perishing is not relevant, because individual men are created by 'the sun and their fathers' (l. 211). Not only is the introduction of this thesis clumsy, the subsequent discussion also culminates in a tirade against solar theology and polytheism that is far removed from the actual point at issue (which up to this point has been God's creative activity).[14] The complete inability of 'Ammonius' to defend his thesis, coupled with its tenuous connection to the problem under discussion, suggests that Zacharias is not recording a discussion that ever actually took place, but that he rather casts him as the spokesman of a tradition of paganism that is to be rejected on all fronts.

Notes

1. On student travel between Gaza and Alexandria, and in late antiquity more generally, cf. E. Watts' useful article 'Student Travel to Intellectual Centres: What was the Attraction', in L. Ellis and F. L. Kidner (eds), *Travel, Communication and Geography in Late Antiquity: Sacred and Profane*, Aldershot 2004, p. 16 n. 12.

2. For a fuller overview of Zacharias' life, see G. Greatrex (ed.), *The Chronicle of Pseudo-Zachariah Rhetor*, Liverpool 2011, pp. 3-12. See also Preface, pp. xxiii-xxv, for an account of Zacharias' intellectual training.

3. On the composition of the *Life of Severus*, see especially E. Watts, 'Winning the Intracommunal Dialogues: Zacharias Scholasticus' Life of Severus', in *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 13 (2005): 437-64, who suggests that the Paralius story is an earlier independent composition that was later integrated into the *Life of Severus*.

4. On this sequence of events, see E. Watts, *Riot in Alexandria*, Berkeley 2010.

5. The two explicit quotations occur at ll. 544 and 1345. Other echoes and quotations or near quotations from the *Theophrastus* are marked in the notes to the translation.

6. For quotations from Scripture, see, e.g., ll. 345-8 (Rom. 1:20), 348-50 (Sap. Sol. 13:5), 658 (Isaiah 65:17), 1224-44 (an interpretation of Gen. 1:26-7, explicitly attributed to Moses and *ta logia*); 1457-9 (Sap. Sol 1:7 and Ps. 94:4); and a cluster of Biblical terms for the afterlife punishments of the wicked (ll. 1495-7). For quotations of Christian theologians, see ll. 660-2 (Basil); 906 (Basil); 1115-19 (Gregory); 1288-90 (Basil); 1361-2 (Gregory). It

is clear from this list that Basil and Gregory were held in particular esteem by Zacharias. Severus, too, when he first encounters Zacharias in Berytus and asks him about pious books, mentions only Basil and Gregory by name (*Life of Severus* p. 48 Kugener), although two other authors (John Chrysostom and Cyril of Alexandria) are later mentioned when Zacharias proposes the idea of a Christian reading group to Severus. For the suggestion that Zacharias might be targeting a different audience, see E. Watts, 'An Alexandrian Christian Response to Neoplatonic Influence', in A. Smith (ed.), *The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity*, Swansea 2005, pp. 221-2, and above, Preface, pp. viii-ix.

7. See E. Gallicet, 'La risurrezione dei morti in Enea di Gaza e in Zacaria Scolastico', *Augustinianum* 18 (1978a): 273-8, and 'Per una *rilettura* del Teofrasto di Enea di Gaza e dell' *Ammonio* di Zacaria Scolastico (Parte II)', *Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino* 112 (1978b): 137-67.

8. Cf. *Theophr*. 48,19-51,12. For a lucid discussion of this passage, see M. Wacht, *Aeneas von Gaza als Apologet*, Bonn 1969, pp. 121-9.

9. Cf. *in Met*. 69.22ff. Hayduck.

10. See, for example, *Amm*. ll. 424-8; 565-6; 668-97; 745-6; 843-50.

11. This tactic is used on a grand scale by John Philoponus throughout his *Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World*, translated in this series.

12. At *Elements of Theology* proposition 55.15-6, Proclus clearly distinguishes between two kinds of eternity (*aïdiotês*): one is 'eternal' (*aiônios*) outside of time, and one eternal 'in time' (*kata ton khronon*).

13. For a fuller discussion of the reasons why the 'co-eternity' thesis is unlikely to be that of the historical Ammonius, see the valuable contribution by K. Verrycken, 'La métaphysique d'Ammonius chez Zacharie de Mytilène', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 85 (2001): 241-66. In his forthcoming paper 'A case for creationism: Christian cosmologies in the 5th and 6th centuries' (in B. Bydén and K. Ierodiakonou (eds), *The Many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy* (Athens: Monographs from the Norwegian Institute at Athens, 2012), B. Bydén argues persuasively that Zacharias may have taken the notion of 'co-eternity' from Basil's *Hexaemeron*.

14. Cf. ll. 299-370. See also the pioneering article by Th. Nissen, 'Eine christliche Polemik gegen Julians Rede auf den König Helios', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 40 (1940): 15-22.

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Translation

Summary of the dialogue that follows

There was a certain student of Ammonius, the supposed philosopher, who was slowly inclining towards paganism. He came to the city of the Berytians[1] to study law. This man began to put forward his teacher's pagan counter-arguments about the cosmos to some of his comrades. And when they had passed these on to me and heard my solutions, they asked me to commit these to writing, since at the time I had many arguments about these matters with Ammonius and Gessius the medical teacher (*iatrosophistês*)[2] in Alexandria.

These then are the characters in the dialogue: the one prefaced[3] with the letter 'A' is myself; the one with 'B', the person who gave the occasion for the dialogue; and finally Ammonius, and then Gessius the medical teacher. However, in the arguments with these men my character is marked as 'Christian'. At the end of the dialogue the first characters speak again, the ones indicated with the letters already mentioned. The whole design of the work is Platonic in so far as something from the meadows there[4] has entered the style.

The dialogue *Ammonius* by Zacharias, the Christian advocate who after this became Bishop of Mytilene

That the cosmos is not co-eternal with God, but his creation; and that it has come to be from a beginning in time and perishes when it occurs to its Creator to make this change; and that the argument of the goodness of God is in no way impaired by this; from which it is concluded that the cosmos is not God, but his creation.

A. What turn have events taken,[5] my dear friend, that you have abandoned your studies in Egypt and the Nile and the great city of the Macedonian [*sc*. Alexandria], and are now studying here?

B. My friend, my passion for the laws leads me to the mother of the laws.[6] And look, I have left behind my beloved Aristotle and the interpreters of his mysteries and am staying in Phoenicia to see if I can learn how the lawgivers of the Romans practise the law! For I want to learn the justice of their law too.

A. You do well to do so, my friend. You seem to me to be well enough initiated into the mysteries of philosophy, and not an uncultivated person or one whose soul is not initiated in ritual and teachings of this kind. And besides that you want to be a man involved in the affairs of the city.[7]

B. You're right.

A. But tell me, my dear sir, how is that interpreter of Plato's and Aristotle's doctrines who has left Athens and come back from the Philosopher [Proclus] – or rather that man devoid of both philosophy and wisdom – and is now boasting throughout Alexandria that he is wise, and promises that he will make others properly wise[8] if they come to his classes and lend him their ears?

B. I think you are inquiring about Ammonius, my dear fellow, since you're in the habit of jeering at him with such words.

A. That is so. Tell me then how his school is faring, and the assembly of his students, and if any good and noble young men who are unharmed in their souls are now coming to his classes. For a disheartening fear grips me and I'm distressed by the thought that he may fill young men with his nonsense. The man is an expert at corrupting their souls and sending them away from God and the truth.

B. How is this? Tell me.

A. Do you, who have held converse with him and shared his company often enough, not know what he thinks about heaven and God? That he lifts heaven up to the same level of honour as God, and says that it has come to be with respect to its cause alone, but that it is co-eternal with its maker, and that this universe will never perish?

B. I know, and you're right. May I please ask you whether this is not actually so? Because to me, you seem to argue persuasively and not without sophistication.

A. So my friend, would you like me to describe the discussion between him and myself that took place last year for you? And would you like to hear the arguments put forward by him and those brought up against him by me?

B. Do tell; I should gladly listen.

A. But to avoid anyone from coming to interrupt my speech, here, let

me take your hand and lead you off to the temple of God.[9] When I have first shown you the sights of the holy place, since you are a lover of sights, and provided a proper account, I will then relate to you the discussion in peace and quiet.

B. You would do me a kindness, my dear fellow, by doing that. For it has been dinned into my ears quite excessively that it is the most precious of sights that have ever yet come to be. They say that it has been fully adorned with absolutely wonderful materials of all sorts and that its beauty is so extraordinary that no one who enjoys its sights can ever grow tired of gazing at it. So great is the beauty bestowed upon it by the skill and wisdom of the craftsman, and the generosity of that archbishop,[10] who, as they say, was enthusiastic for this masterpiece.

A. You're right, but what has led you to make such a speech?

B. I hear it said that this is so, my dear fellow.

A. Then trust hearsay no longer, but look at these things!

B. Bless me! My dear friend, what wisdom of the craftsman, what a very beautiful picture (*historia*)! What beauty, proportion and harmony the palace of God has! How such greatness is spread over and propped up by two rows of five columns! And how these columns have been cut out from the same material and preserve among themselves the same form and relationship. For all are white and smooth, and they are made glorious in their whiteness and smoothness, and display the same shape and form. I admire the drawing of the painter and the various delightful sights and the manifold beauties of the painting and the gracefulness and delicacy of the materials and the beautiful colours.[11]

But we will consider all this later. Now you tell me about the discussion with the philosopher and those very beautiful arguments, leaving out nothing that was said and proposed by him, so that our enquiry into the matter is not headless.[12] It is not right for a man who advocates philosophy to do injustice to the truth on the one hand, or to do injustice to friendship on the other, if in fact the greatest injustice is to have formed within one's soul a false opinion about God and matters divine.

Besides, as the makers of proverbs have it, one need not chase down a Cadmean victory[13] from every direction, as those fine rhetoricians do in the law-courts, or those who spend their time with eristic arguments.

A. You really do beguile and charm me with these words, my dear sir.

For I know that you are concerned with the beloved truth and true opinions, which seem more blessed and precious to a man of sound mind than anything else. Besides, philosophy, our shared love, wishes this, as though all happiness and the good life consist in this. Listen, then, listen, my dear fellow, to truth pleading its case in the arguments. But if I seem to leave something out, even when it is not on purpose, bring it forward openly and propose it for debate yourself! For I am not recounting this present narrative to someone who is ignorant of that philosopher's [Ammonius'] doctrines.

B. Go on.

A. One day, I and some others of his students were in the school listening to a lecture on natural philosophy,[14] in the summer when the west wind blows sweet and shrill, and the great river thoroughly inundates Egypt with its streams and waters the Egyptian fields as it floods. Like interpreters of oracles, Ammonius was explaining and making clear to us the wisdom of Aristotle and the principles of what exists, sitting on a high seat[15] like a sophist and in a pompous manner. When he had slipped out a remark about heaven – either on purpose, or because the sequence and order of the argument required it, I do not in fact remember this exactly – he put forward the following proposition:

* * *

AMMONIUS [AM]. Does heaven seem a beautiful thing[16] or not?

CHRISTIAN [CH]. Beautiful.[17]

AM. And its Creator[18] good?

CH. Of course.

AM. If, therefore, heaven is a beautiful thing, and the Father and Maker of this universe[19] good, how can Christians not want beauty to follow along with, and be joined to, the good for all time (*aiôn*)?[20] And if this universe is beautiful, as has now been agreed, how can wanting to break up what is in fine condition and has been well fitted together not be evil?[21] It is in no way right to think this about that First and Single One, for jealousy is far removed from the Good and the one God, and indeed from the whole divine chorus.[22] Or does this not seem so to you?

CH. It certainly does.

AM. Yes, and consider this.

CH. What exactly?

AM. Do people agree that God is good?

CH. Of course.

AM. But also that the universe is beautiful?

CH. Yes.

AM. How then can the beautiful not exist for eternity? For if this universe has come to be in time and is second to its Creator (second not in merit – for this we do concede – but in time) it seems as if God has come to its creation because of a change of mind, or that he has not created it before either because of ignorance of the beautiful, or because of jealousy.[23] But each of these alternatives is foreign to that blessed nature, since God always knows the beautiful and is good.

But consider this too.

CH. What do you mean?

AM. Has this universe been ordered by providence?

CH. Yes.

AM. From where then should destruction be brought to it? For it must be either in accordance with God's will or against it. But if against his will, he is powerless to help though he is anxious to protect it. If, on the other hand, it were in accordance with his will, for what reason does he destroy the best thing among all that have come to be? For – either because he is going to make a more beautiful cosmos[24] – yet this is not possible; – or a worse one – but this is impious to suggest; – or a similar one – but this is the delight of children who play by the shore, making and destroying castles of sand.[25] What craftsman would be futile to such a degree that he changes those of his works that have been well produced?

Therefore, it follows from the premises that either one must affirm that God is powerless, or ignorant, or one must say he does something that it is not right to suggest. But in fact God is neither powerless nor ignorant; and what is more, he is good.

'Therefore the cosmos is imperishable; but if it is imperishable, it has also not come to be in time; for since the creative cause is always existing, the created thing is eternal in time', as Porphyry says[26] and is evident.

CH. Listen now; these are the objections which you people often bring up against those Christians who are untrained in arguments concerning their true and single faith and teaching. Thereby you undertake to scare those who are more simple-minded and to steal them away [from the faith] by constructing very boastful, pretentious and artificial arguments. You think that Christianity is fortified only by faith, and does not also rejoice in, and beautify itself with, inescapable arguments and compelling demonstrations; such that this is the only religion that blossoms and beautifies itself with good faith, sincere reasonings and proofs that derive both from words and from actual facts.

For indeed, our theologians do not bewitch the ears of their listeners with finely put speeches or refined phrases or the harmonious ordering of Attic vocabulary or elegance of diction, because they lack real proofs, as your Plato does and the rest who have written about your gods – or rather, your wicked daemons! They [*sc*. Plato and the rest] are mimicking the Sirens in Homer who charm the ears of their eager hearers with the sweetness of their chant and punish those who listen to them with death. For this reason, I praise and admire that soldier from Ithaca who felt no ignoble weakness, but rather defeated the Sirens' plots by virtue of his wisdom.

This is not at all the case with us. For our savior and his blessed disciples and the prophets of old who were giving oracles about him set forth the truth not with an abundance of words (as if adorned by the art[27] of an embellisher), but naked without any covering, artifice or wordiness. And so its natural beauty shines through and the words are in agreement with actual facts and all your arguments come to naught.

But in order that you may not suspect I am making an argument that is beside the point, avoiding your premises that are no stronger than spider webs, I will now respond to your difficulty – indeed I have come to destroy your arguments, trusting in Christ the only guide and God.

You said that 'if God is good, and this universe is also beautiful since it is the creation of the good God, how is it not right that a beautiful product should follow along with its maker?' and that 'it does not pertain to the good God to break up what is in fine condition and has been well fitted together' and that 'either one of the two [must be true]: either the good God has not made the beautiful because of ignorance of the beautiful, or because of jealousy' and both of these are concluded to be foreign to the good God. Is that not what you said?

AM. Certainly.

CH. And now, my dear fellow, do you suppose that Socrates and Plato and individual men are something beautiful, or not?

A. He agreed.

CH. And they are the creations and products of God?

AM. Of course.

CH. How then can Socrates and Plato and individual men not be eternal? Why do they come to be and perish in time? Or did not Socrates die, and Plato, and do not other individual men end their lives day by day?

AM. Yes.

CH. And though these die and perish, God is good?[28]

AM. You may very well be right.

CH. And he has knowledge of the beautiful, even though individual men come to be and die in time?

AM. Necessarily.

CH. And we do not attribute the affection of jealousy to the good God?

AM. In no way.

CH. If, therefore, God is good and the maker of Socrates and Plato and individual men who are beautiful and come to be and perish in time, and the argument of the goodness of God is not impaired by this – if this is the case, how is he not good both when he creates this universe (even if he creates it when he wants to) and when he breaks it up and transforms it in whatever way seems fit to him, and however he and he alone is disposed to do so?

Or do you not understand, my dear sir, that anyone who allows the parts to perish is also willing to let the whole undergo the same affliction as its own parts? For as the parts of the whole are, so the nature of the whole, of which they are parts, must be.[29]

AM. I do not know how, but you seem to me to be right. But I have got a certain misgiving about <your>[30] opinion, and just don't[31] believe you. But to resume the argument, I affirm that the creator of Socrates, Plato and individual men is not God, but both the father of each and the sun.[32]

CH. Well then, according to you, father and the sun have come to be the new creators! So each man ought to make[33] his father a god rather than the only Creator and Maker of all.

AM. That's not what I mean, but rather that through the sowing of the seed each father is the cause of the generation of each individual.

CH. But, my dear fellow, it is not this that we ought to consider now, that God uses fathers as instruments and through them produces the first principles[34] and sows the seed of generation. Rather, we ought to consider who shaped what has been sown through his power of transformation and brought it into form; who has inserted proportion and concord into the parts, and combined and framed the living being from bones, nerves, veins, flesh and their agreement, concord and harmony in each case (*kath' hekaston*); who ties the soul to a body that has been shaped, so that a small drop of liquid, having been sown into the workshop of nature, results in a rational mortal animal, capable of receiving intellect and knowledge; and indeed this, i.e. man, is what is really remarkable. For no one would say this is the sun, for even the sun is a creation of God, if we should believe Plato.[35] Or does it seem to you that something is able to create when it has come to be by another, when it is not by its own nature divine?

AM. No.

CH. But you think that the sun is a god?

AM. I should think so, unless you have another suggestion.[36]

CH. Come now, then, let us consider this first, whether the sun is a god. And if this is agreed at least, we will also allow that the sun is the creator of bodies; we will not, I suppose, also allege it to be the cause of the soul's bond with the body. For neither would Plato himself allow it, who teaches in the *Phaedo* that we must not 'be infected with the body's nature but cleanse ourselves from it, until God himself delivers us'.[37] He nowhere says that the sun delivers us, but by the addition of 'himself' he clearly hints – or rather shows very plainly – that it is the one and only God. And in the whole dialogue too, Plato nowhere mentions the sun, when through the mouth of Socrates he pursues the argument that suicide is not allowed, and that a captive is not allowed to flee his prison,[38] but that he must await his imprisoner, so that he should also release him.[39]

Come now, then, let us prove that the sun is neither a god, nor the creator of individual men.

AM. Go ahead.

CH. Do you think that God is something intellectual and incorporeal?

AM. Yes.

CH. And, further, indestructible and immortal and always remaining the same and free from any limit?

AM. Certainly.

CH. And also simple and incomposite and unmixed with bodies and alien to all bonds, being blessed and free from harm and unblemished, both self-sufficient and perfect, not having come to be, and different from everything that undergoes generation and destruction?

AM. You may very well be right.

CH. And also invisible and shapeless, both intangible and without parts, and separate from all mass (*onkos*) and qualities and quantity, being incorporeal?

AM. Certainly.

CH. But what do you say the sun is? Is it not, *qua* body, perceptible, and has it not come to be, since it is a body? And again, perishable because it has come to be, and not set free from all limit (for heaven encompasses it) nor again from composition and form and quantity and all that pertains to bodies? And in truth, does it not come to be and does it not change, given that it is every day subject to solstices and eclipses but never really is?

AM. Clearly so.

CH. But a thing of such a nature is neither self-sufficient nor perfect, since it has come to be by something else, and depends on the providence of this and needs it both for its being and subsistence.

AM. You're right.

CH. And we must not suppose that the Creator or God is of such a nature.

AM. So it seems.

CH. Come now, then, and let us list the chief premises again, for they

say that it is a good thing to say and consider good things two or three times.[40]

Have we agreed that God is intellectual and incorporeal?

AM. Yes.

CH. And again that he is something indestructible, immortal and always remaining the same, since he is simple and incomposite, and one and free from any bond or limit or relation?

AM. We did say that.

CH. And further, that he is perfect, self-sufficient and has not come to be?

A. He agreed.[41]

CH. And have you agreed that the sun is perceptible *qua* body, and generated? And that from this it follows that the sun is perishable and that it can be dissolved since it is composite, and again that it is both limited and given a specific form, since it has come to be by another and depends on this one?

AM. This was said too.

CH. But it was agreed that a thing in this state was least perfect and self-sufficient?

AM. You may very well be right.

CH. And this too was agreed:

AM. What exactly?

CH. That we should not suppose the sun, which is of such a nature, to be either the Creator or God, since it does not possess perfection. For imperfection is far removed from the divine nature and blessed God.

AM. You're right.

CH. If, therefore, the argument has demonstrated this to be so, how can the sun be the maker of individual men? And if it were also admitted by the willful error[42] of those who hold such opinions and that great stupidity of theirs that the sun is the creator of bodies and entirely a god, how will the same question not appear once again? For

I suppose that you who are telling tall stories about God and the sun and, acting like the giants,[43] make the sun a god, must agree that it [*sc*. the sun] is also good, and the maker and creator of everything beautiful.

How then will you be able to escape this marvellous and formidable puzzle of yours if, speaking off your own bat, you foist the sun on us as a god, behaving just like actors who often make the common man a king. For here too will follow the jealousy, ignorance of the beautiful, creation from a change of mind and the dissolution of what is in fine condition and well put together, and all the other clever and silly puzzles arising out of your arguments.

But who is it that ties souls to their bodies? For we must certainly not also attribute this to the sun, even if those who throw everything into confusion and are filled with a frenzy turn existing things upside down, as they are dragged down and fall into a crowd of gods through ignorance of and erring from the one and only Creator. And they invent for us new chains[44] of creators that are ignorant of and strangers to creation and making, as they do also chains of evil and deceiving demons, and they accept them into the series of gods, on no occasion paying attention to the wisdom of Homer, which lays down as law that 'the rule of many is not good, let there be one ruler, one king'.[45] They attribute democracy to the divine beings, which is disorderly and the most shameful of constitutions, and always confused and in conflict, and unable to perceive the beauty of monarchy, nor do they embrace the immaterial and blessed nature of its splendour. But having become dizzy in the face of the truth of our doctrines, they acknowledge the good God and the Creator with the voice alone, but steal the creation of this universe away from him, attributing it either as a whole or in parts to whomsoever they wish.

And they do not want to understand what the nature of the Creator and the Maker is, and what the nature of God's creations and his products; nor that the sun, having been placed by God like a lamp in this great hall, illuminates this universe, but is least of all able to make or effect anything – with the exception of what it has been ordained to do by its Commander (*taxiarkhos*)[46] and sole Creator: to give light, I say, to animals and to warm plants, to consume and dry up any excessive humidity and the places and parts of putrefaction.

For these and the like are the only activities with which the Creator endowed the sun, and this is the nature he has given it. Thus, obeying his law, it goes around this universe like a wheel, with a uniform involuntary motion like a slave; it is inanimate and not at all a rational animal, as those suppose who make it a god[47] or who gape at the wretched doctrines (*doxaria*) of these people. Instead it produces a harmonious and orderly motion, not exceeding the limits set to it by the demiurge nor the position it has been allotted, but proclaiming in silence its Creator, in friendship and concord with this

universe. It is as though a well-built house adorned with beauty were to proclaim its builder who is often absent and not seen, and the admirable wisdom of its architect.

For this reason the blessed Apostle (this is Paul)[48] spoke rightly about God and the cosmos in a philosophical manner; for he said this: 'for those things of him that are invisible are clearly seen from the creation of the cosmos, being understood in his works.'[49]

And in truth Solomon the wise too has expressed the same thought in different words, since he said this somewhere: 'from the greatness and beauty of created things their Creator (*genesiourgos*) is seen by analogy.'[50]

* * *

A. That day when we had finished the discussion which was more or less like this, I and the philosopher broke up our conversation, since for him too it had reached its end with the explanation of Aristotle's theses under discussion. Many who took part in the meeting at that time, and who appreciated the discussion (being themselves among those experienced in demonstrative methods and elaborate mazes of syllogisms, and often breathing and admiring your beloved Aristotle and Plato) – these sided with and voted for our argument – or rather that of the sacred truth dear to Christians. They went back home marvelling at the Christian proofs and above all eager to hear the words of truth often.

The next day, his most senior student Gessius, who now plumes himself with the wisdom of Hippocrates of Kos and that of Galen of Pergamon and has the chair of teacher of medical philosophy by the Nile, thought it worthwhile to stir up again this same company and gathering, thinking that he was indeed able to say more [on the subject] than his teacher. Taking me by the right hand, he brought me to the temple of the Muses,[51] where poets, rhetoricians and grammar teachers[52] are wont to make displays [of their skill]. He began like this:

GESSIUS [G.]. How is God a creator, my friend, if he is not always creating?[53]

CH. God is always a creator by having the creative principles[54] within himself, just as a doctor is and is called a doctor by having the principles of healing within himself, and so again for the carpenter, the builder and the rhetorician. Or does it not seem so to you?

G. Certainly. But we would not call or name someone a doctor who is not healing, nor a carpenter or a builder someone who does not bring into actuality the art of carpentry or of building, just as we would not

call someone a musician who does not exhibit music in notes or delight the souls of his listeners with the harmony of notes or charm their ears. Nor do we call someone a rhetorician who does not deliver panegyrics or attempt to persuade the judges in court with speeches or the counsellors in council or the citizens in the assembly.

Therefore, he would not be a creator who does not create in actuality or visibly bring forth the principles he possesses or transform and change formless matter into form and shape.

CH. Well said. But listen, my dear fellow, so that we can grasp and think what is most correct about God. We say that he is always a creator, since he has the creative principles within himself and brings them forth when he wishes. In no way do we attribute idleness to God, nor do we deny that he is a creator, because sometimes he does not create. But while we know the Creator from what has come to be, we conceive of him as free from all relation, necessity and tyranny, since he is God and one. For the free and blessed nature does not create by necessity, nor will he actually be placed at a far remove from being a creator because sometimes he does not create, nor [because he sometimes creates] in a disorderly way or all at once. Or does it not seem pretty strange to you, my friend, on the one hand to know and recognise someone as a doctor who, even if he does not always exercise the art of healing, has embraced it and become skilled in it and carries it about within himself, healing with it one body or another that is sick and at risk of having the harmony of its elements broken up, but on the other hand not to conceive of God as Creator since he creates when he wishes?

G. Certainly.

CH. But then the carpenter or builder, the musician or rhetorician too would not suffer any dishonour by a temporary rest (*argia*) in their activities.

G. No indeed.

CH. Very well! We accord all these men freedom, and suppose that as far as the exercise of their proper arts is concerned, they are free, independent and beyond all necessity. But we will put the King of All, the only free one and the provider and distributor of all true freedom to others, under the yoke of that necessity which governs everything that is coming to be and undergoing destruction, and suppose that he is enslaved by it, so that either it would not be agreed that he is a creator, since on our part he is accorded freedom and not compelled to create, either by himself (for no conflict or struggle belongs to the divine nature that is free of conflict and struggle and solitary and

peaceful, or rather peace itself,[55] since it is complete simplicity and the one itself and nowhere composite) or by something else (for nothing is superior to the king of all); or, if one were to suppose that he is a creator, we would think that he creates because of the bonds of necessity.

G. You're right.

CH. Do you not know, my dear friend,[56] that not necessity, but goodness alone has initiated the creation and making of this universe, and rules over it and governs it? And, if you wish, listen to that Plato of yours who says that this is the only cause of the composition of the whole, when he writes in the *Timaeus* thus: 'Let us state[57] the reason why he who framed this universe framed it. He was good, and in him who is good there is no jealousy anywhere concerning anything.'[58]

Besides, consider this.

G. What?

CH. If God is not a creator, since he has not been creating for as long as he is God (for he is eternal), and in addition he is not a benefactor or good, since he is not always creating, what would he therefore be creating now? Surely you would not say other universes, since in fact 'this cosmos is unique', according to Plato.[59]

G. He is making this cosmos now also.

CH. Listen then, how such a thesis and admission is irreconcilable with your school's doctrines.

G. Go on.

CH. God either made perfect what exists, or he left some things imperfect from the beginning. If, then, he made things perfect, the care and activity for what is in perfect condition and soundly ordered would be redundant. But if imperfect, it was either through jealousy that he did not make them perfect in the beginning, or through ignorance of the perfect. But each of these is foreign to God, and not worthy of the only one who possesses knowledge and is good. And how do you escape this dilemma (*peridexion*)[60] of yours and the formidable contradictions and puzzles of your blessed wise men? Or is it not completely absurd to think this about God?

G. How could it not be?

CH. Therefore it is not necessary that the good God be always

creating, unless on the contrary the good and wise God and the one knowing the good and perfect is not a benefactor if he creates in time. How therefore can he be making this universe in the present? For according to your argument, he is neither creating souls nor bodies now. You people say that souls have not been created now, since your argument maintains that God has made them in a limited number from the beginning. That they have lived before their bodies and put on many different bodies of irrational living beings and humans is something that your wise men Pythagoras and Plato have dreamt up by being too clever and vulgar, taking the fable of reincarnation from the Egyptian wise men and raving along with them. But you did not admit that the Creator is the creator of individual men that have been born, for you make their fathers and the sun[61] the cause of this.

A. The medical teacher was dazzled and baffled by these arguments. He burst out with a very loud and immoderate shout:

G. How improper you are,[62] my friend, in your efforts to demolish and overturn the opinions of the ancients! No respect or consideration for the fame and distinction that those blessed and wise men enjoy among everyone who lays claim to love of learning enters your mind!

CH. No, since it is right to honour what is ancient [only] when it also contains the truth that flourishes with time. But when it is mere fable that bewitches the ear with choice words and polished diction, then we shall certainly put wax in our ears in the way Homer tells, so that we may escape the deadly song of the death-bringing Sirens, recognising that the cup of poison [too] is seasoned and smeared with honey. Otherwise, indeed, we would end up accepting with admiration the Homeric fables about the gods, which Plato himself banishes from the republic that he has constructed, after having anointed their poet with perfume, like women do with swallows.[63] And indeed Plato himself very solemnly assigns the poet a place outside his republic, not paying any attention to his age or antiquity (*arkhaiotês*), or to his eloquence, on the grounds that he would have corrupted the youth if he had been allowed a place in it.

So we too do not concern ourselves with age, so long as the false causes trouble, and our beautiful beloved, i.e. reason and truth, are nowhere brought to light.

G. What claptrap are you talking?[64] As if we were lacking in reason and its companion, demonstration, and this about the most important of opinions!

CH. Then let us follow reason <wherever>[65] it drags us to, because

you must know well that nothing among all noble things seems more honourable, holy, and august to me.

G. Very much so.

CH. Tell me then,[66] how God is a creator now, and what he is creating.

G. He creates by holding together[67] what exists and caring for it providentially.

CH. But creating cannot be this, since according to us, he is a creator who produces substance itself from what does not have being in any way whatsoever, and who generates ordered matter together with form. For we say that God is a maker of substances, and not merely of shapes (*skhêmata*). But according to your doctrine, he is a creator who moulds formless and shapeless matter into form (*eidos*) and shape (*skhêma*) and who delivers it from its primordial formlessness (*amorphia*) and confusion and its inherent disorder.[68] This, then, is the definition and account of the Creator according to our two opinions. Holding things together and caring for them providentially would be something different from creating them, for holding things together means both tying together tightly what exists and what has come to be, and protecting it; and taking care of them providentially means taking thought for both what exists and what has come to be.

G. You're right. But I should like to learn from you what you conclude from the fact that God is either creating now or is not creating.

CH. I'll certainly tell you.

G. Well, tell me.

CH. If he is not creating now, you suppose that he is a creator because he has created before, since it is not necessary that he always create. For the same reason, he will be a creator from himself, even when he has not yet created what exists, since he stands in need of nothing, but contains the creative principles within himself, and so he is going to create in actuality also. For it is not necessary that the Creator should always create, as the argument has demonstrated.[69] But consider this too:

G. What exactly?

CH. If we say that the cosmos is co-eternal with God, it will, in accordance with this, surely be absolutely equal in honour to him also. But what would be a greater impiety than this, if we were to

raise up what is limited and visible and tangible and has a material body[70] to the same level of esteem and honour as the unlimited and invisible and highest of all natures?

G. This is not so, and, if you will, I shall guide you to the question with a factual example. For they[71] say that, just as the body comes to be the cause of each thing's shadow, and the shadow is simultaneous with the body but not equal to it in honour, so indeed is this cosmos a by-product[72] of God, since he is the cause of its being, and co-eternal with God, but not also equal in honour.

CH. Then you don't really have a full sense of the absurdity of what you've said. For, firstly, they [the Platonists] make up the fable that God is an involuntary cause without deliberate choice in the constitution of what exists, since they are supposing that the cosmos is a by-product of him, as indeed the shadow too is a by-product of the body; for our shadow of course follows alongside us even if we don't want it to. Therefore, even though God didn't want it to, the cosmos has followed him along, and simply came to exist alongside him[73] spontaneously,[74] and it is in vain that they assert that God is its cause. Furthermore, they don't consider this:

G. What do you mean?

CH. That there is another concomitant cause[75] of the shadow: for it is evidently not the body alone. And this [other concomitant cause] would be light: if there were no light, the shadow would not be formed or follow along, since there must be light and a body in the middle which produce the shadow. Therefore, what sort of cause concomitant with God are they going to bring in besides, those who say that God is an involuntary cause of the cosmos without deliberate choice, as the body is of its shadow, given that he is *intellectual* light, and that there is no body in the middle, which the shadow habitually follows along with? 'A body that is standing against the sun', says one of our wise men,[76] 'does not allow light to fall behind it. And this is what shadow is; hence it is given whatever outline the body has.' But that these thoughts and statements about God are strange and fill the soul with outrage will be very clear to anyone endowed with a modicum of sense. But who would not be amazed, or rather burst out laughing, at this example? For they say that the shadow is not equal in honour to the body, but they do not consider more widely[77] that, according to another argument, these things could not be equal in honour. For the body both is, and is defined as, extended in three dimensions, and one would not go wrong in saying that the shadow is an image of the body; but regarding their being present at the same time, there is no difference between them.

G. You're right. But, my dear fellow, if everything that comes to be, comes to be in time, but time exists together with heaven, and heaven together with time, then time will have come to be together with heaven. For time is the measure of the revolution and circular rotation of the cosmos.[78] But it is necessary that what is measured should exist together with the measure, since they are relatives, and relatives exist together by nature.[79] But if time has come to be, and everything that comes to be exists in time, then time has come to be in time; so that there would have been time for time to exist; therefore time existed even before the cosmos did.[80] But this is impossible. Yet if this is absurd, then time has not come to be, nor has this cosmos, since everything that comes to be, comes to be in time.

CH. Well said, my friend. You people are in the habit of demolishing the opinions of wise Plato, even though you profess to be his followers and are eager to be called among men by the name of Platonists. But aren't these his words: 'time has come to be together with heaven, so that having come to be together, they will be dissolved together, if indeed their dissolution were to come about.'[81] So in order that we may fight together for both the truth and this argument, we must quickly and simply dissolve this whole edifice made from sand of your pseudo-arguments. For we say that the first premise[82] which says that 'everything that comes to be, comes to be in time' is not true.

G. In what, then, will time and heaven come to be, if not in time?

CH. In eternity (*aiôn*), my dear; for time is an image of eternity.[83] It is therefore not necessary that time come to be in time, or else there will be a ridiculous and enigmatic search for timeless time, to account for the existence of time.

G. You're right. But tell me this: given that you agree that God is good and that you say he has made this universe because of his goodness, and think that this is the only cause for the order among what exists, do you then say that this cosmos perishes, even though it has come to be from the Good and is beautiful, since the Good makes everything beautiful? Will the good God therefore take a turn for the worse and become what it is impious to suggest, so that he can desire that what has been beautifully made and well ordered should perish?

CH. Not in the least. This idea about the good God, the Single and One, who always is, having no point of coming into being, ever remaining firmly and strongly, and never going to admit of any change – we should not allow it to enter into our souls, not even in thought. For absolute changelessness, and steadfastness and firm-

ness, and true being, and the One itself, and complete freedom and stability, and the peak of blessedness, and ungrudging eternal goodness, that towards which every desire is striving, this is the Good and the nature of the Good.

G. How then can you say that this cosmos perishes, or has it not come to be from what is eternal, and [yet] that God remains in his goodness?

CH. I will tell you what I was saying yesterday to the philosopher[84] who was asking about the same things as you.

G. Tell me, I would gladly hear it.

CH. So I'll tell you then.

G. Yes, do.

CH. Do you think that Socrates the son of Sophroniscus and Plato the son of Ariston and Alcibiades the son of Klinias and the founder of the Peripatos, I mean Aristotle, and all individual men are in some sense beautiful,[85] or not?

G. Yes.

CH. And creations of the good God?

G. It would seem so.

CH. How is it, then, that Socrates has died, and Plato too, and yes, even handsome Alcibiades, and the head of the famous Peripatos, Aristotle, and that individual men die; but God remains good and creates beautiful things in time (for these certainly do not come from eternity, since eternity only belongs to God, and the cosmos could not share a part of it with him), and has set it down as a law that these perish, since it had to be so? It is because the blessed and ungrudging nature acts for the benefit of all things that have come to be and for their future benefit.

G. I shall clear up your error with a factual example.

CH. But I would be delighted if you do this, my dear fellow, since you must know well that you will delight me, your friend, with nothing more than with this, if you should deliver my soul from error and opinions that are not true. Whichever one of us can do this will do the greatest favour to the other, does it not seem to you?

G. Certainly.

CH. Tell me then what you want to say.

G. It is just as, when an officer has thirty or a hundred soldiers under his command, he would train them for battle and educate them in tactical matters, but if one of them should happen to die, he will add another one to the enrolment list.[86] In this way, the work and the whole task of the thirty or the one hundred do not suffer any harm or idleness, since a fallen soldier is replaced by the decision of the officer, and their number remains the same. In exactly the same way God, by creating other individuals in place of those that have died, also does not suffer any damage to the complete harmony and structure of the universe, and in this way he remains in his goodness, while the individuals that have come to be in time die and perish.

CH. Bless me! What a smart example, and what extraordinary and marvellous cleverness! Of course, because of stupidity and bad taste you people do not want to understand what has been said, nor do you want to cut off the thread of wicked and godless opinions and the innate error, which you carry around in your soul like some eyesore that afflicts the eyes of reason. For this officer of yours, my dear fellow, wanted those first soldiers not to die, but after losing them against his will and choice (for he was not able to make them immortal), he is, as the saying goes, making do with the second best,[87] which is to put others in place of those who have died and to fill up the number of empty slots with them, so that he keeps the same number; and by making this addition maintains the service of those who have been removed.

But to say the same about God, who is able to create immortal beings, is I fear nonsense and obvious blasphemy. So in this way the example is completely unsuitable and inappropriate. But I will turn it against you people and expose your own foolishness to you! Just as you say that the general is not injured in his task, so clearly God will not be harmed or diminished in his being a good Creator when he remodels this cosmos and transforms and destroys it. But not for eternity: for he is going to transform it; and again, not from eternity; for[88] while he was not making the cosmos, he was making the intelligible world.[89] And so God did not remain idle before he arranged the order of perceptible things. But he creates with order: for the disorderly is not characteristic of God, but of spontaneity.[90] So even when he destroys this perceptible and visible universe, he is good and remains in his goodness; for he does not do away with it utterly, nor does he condemn this universe to destruction altogether; but he causes alteration and change toward the better, and he brings about a better transformation. 'New heavens and a new earth',

Scripture says.[91] That this universe must perish can easily be comprehended from its parts too, which perish day by day. 'For something whose parts perish must also suffer as a whole from the same afflictions that pertain to the parts', says the famous and blessed Basil.[92] But the Stoics also make this argument.[93] And this account of the destruction of the cosmos is unbreakable, compelling and fixed, and you are bound to it by geometrical necessities and bonds, as the saying goes,[94] and you cannot escape the design and strength of our proofs and argument.

But, not content just with throttling you in argument, we will have a go at your beloved [i.e. Plato].[95] I will set out for you the doctrine of wise Plato who, when he comes to compose the *Timaeus*, somewhere says this about God and this universe:

> What is that which always is but does not have coming to be, and what is that which is coming to be, but never is? The first is comprehended by intellection with a reasoned account, and is always about the same things. The second in turn is believed by unreasoning perception, and it comes to be and passes away but never really is. (*Tim*. 27D-28A)

And again, he says about the Creator:

> To find the father and maker of this universe is difficult, but to declare him to everyone once he is found impossible. (*Tim*. 28C)

And again, he says about the heaven:

> Did it always exist, and was there no starting point for its coming to be, or did it come to be, having taken its beginning from some starting point? It has come to be. For it is both visible and tangible and has a body. But all things of such a nature have plainly come to be. (*Tim*. 28B)

And again:

> Time has come to be together with heaven, so that, having come to be together, they will also be dissolved together, if indeed their dissolution will come about. (*Tim*. 38B)

And again he makes the King of All give a speech to the others, who you suppose to be gods, as follows:

> Gods of gods, of whom I am the creator, you are indissoluble <save>[96] by my will. For indeed everything that has been bound together can be dissolved. (*Tim*. 41B)

And again:

> For this reason, since you have come to be, you are not immortal nor are you completely indissoluble. And yet you will not be dissolved nor will you meet with a fate of death because you have received my will, which is a greater and more sovereign bond than those with which you have been tied together when you came to be. (*Tim*. 41B)

So are we subduing you by the enchantment of these arguments, my friend, and do we at last persuade you to wash out the brine in your ears with the water of a sweet discourse?[97] Or do I need to subdue you with my chant for longer? See how Plato himself knows that heaven has come to be, and, in so far as it has come to be, is subject to dissolution and corruption, because dissolution necessarily follows composition. For every composite is by nature dissoluble also.

Indeed, don't let him bamboozle you when he says: 'if indeed their dissolution will come about' and that 'you will not meet with a fate of death'. For he [also] said 'indeed, everything that has been bound together is dissoluble' and that 'you will not be completely indissoluble'. And in discussion with Timaeus himself, he says that heaven nurtures itself from its own destruction, and he recognises that all these things are by their nature perishable and knows that they are receptive of dissolution, since they have also come to be. If he says that these things are immortal by the will of the Creator (being confused about what to say, contradicting himself and fighting with himself as if in a battle at night time; for human wisdom is something of little worth or none at all), he has already confirmed that it is also in their nature to be able to perish, since they have also come to be. Or is that not so?

G. So it seems.

CH. But if these things are by nature perishable, one could scarcely suppose that beings that are by nature perishable are gods. Or does this cosmos seem to you to be a god, even though it has come to be and is by nature perishable, as reason has demonstrated and Plato assumes?

G. I don't know what to say.

CH. Well then, let us proceed in the argument in a more dialectical manner (*sullogistikôteron*). Make an effort to follow this; for I am anxious that you, who are both learned and my friend, do this.

Do you agree that God is incorporeal and has not come to be, and is both imperishable and indestructible, and free from composition, or don't you?

G. I do.

CH. But the cosmos was seen to be perceptible and has come to be, as composite of matter and form, and has been put together from the four elements, according to Plato, and for this reason it is naturally dissoluble.

G. It was.

CH. If then, my dear fellow, God is not like this, but the cosmos is, this cosmos is therefore not God. But if this cosmos is not God in any of its parts, the sun is therefore not God, nor the moon, nor any of the bodies that move in heaven. For these are parts of the universe and creations of God.

G. You're right.

CH. If then these are parts of the universe (and it has been proved that the universe has come to be and is by nature dissoluble, since it is composite and has come to be, and it is clearly right that what is of such a nature is far removed from the blessed nature of God), we should not make the sun or the moon or any of the other planets a god.

G. No, we shouldn't.

CH. Thus, it has been proved also that the sun is not the creator of anything, since it has been agreed that it is not God, but a creation of God. For only God is a creator, since he has not been created by another.

G. You're right. But solve this puzzle for me.

CH. What puzzle?

G. If at some time the cosmos did not exist, how did God exist in his own particular nature?[98] How was he able to exist without the universe? How would he be a benefactor, when what receives his beneficence does not exist? And what would God have been the God of?

CH. You seem to me, my dear fellow, as though you have just woken up from a deep dream, to have forgotten what we have said just now, and to be putting the main point – as you think – of the discussion with us otherwise than you should. For you do not take into account that God, when he acts as a benefactor, does not do so by necessity, just as he is not forced to create, as we said. For only the divine nature is free of necessity.

But, in my view, you people do not think that God is self-sufficient and in need of nothing and perfect, and least of all in need of what has come to be by him. For if he is not able to exist without this universe, by its existence this universe is giving him the greatest portion of himself, if not the whole, i.e. his very being. By this reasoning, the universe would be his cause, not he that of the universe. For then, that which needs something else to ensure its existence (*sustasis*) would also be caused by that of which it is the cause. How therefore did he bring this universe into existence? If 'he brought it into existence', as Plato says,[99] it did not exist before being brought into existence. Don't you understand that to say he assembled it for himself and because of personal need is to do away with the claim that 'it was brought into existence by the goodness of God'?

That argument of yours turns this principle on its head and gets things jumbled up, since [*sc.* on your view] God cannot exist without this universe. But if he, being good, wanted what exists to exist, not needing it for his existence (for he existed before it, since he is perfect and stands in need of nothing, but is himself complete self-sufficiency), it is therefore not necessary that the product is co-eternal with its maker. The maker must be higher than his product, and the creator than what he creates, since what is made is second to the maker in cause and time, unless the cause is unwilling or has not done any reasoning, as the body is [the cause] of the shadow and the source of light is of brightness.[100]

For how would the Creator be a creator, if he were not a creator who wills what he has made?[101] Unless this universe has simply come to be alongside the Creator as a by-product and spontaneously, just as the shadow has come to be alongside the body. But God would be a benefactor, even though what receives his beneficence does not yet exist, since he has within himself what is going to receive his beneficence even before it comes into existence, and also what receives his beneficence itself.

Just as we say that what is naturally suited for begetting is productive (*gonimos*), even if what is begotten does not yet exist, in the same way did we say that God is also a creator, even when his creations do not exist, since he has the creative principles within himself and is going to create in actuality. For in the blessed and perfect God, who always is single and good, what does not yet exist and has not come to be is considered as existing and coming to be, because it is going to be in the future, and because he has it in his power to bring everything into being in an instant of time and a brief moment. He had thus made the willing (*boulêsis*) for what was going to receive his beneficence and for what was going to be created also to be without beginning and co-eternal with the blessed nature.[102]

He produced [this cosmos] when it was going to be expedient for

what was coming to be, and when reason and order willed it. In this way God's willing for what exists and his bestowing of goodness on it is not in time, as the nature of what exists is, and nothing that has come to be will ever be seen to steal and secretly take away for itself this unique and singular characteristic of the Creator: that is, eternal existence. Otherwise, if both exist together and always, I mean God and the cosmos, how can one be the creator, and the other what is created? What is the chance that determines (*apoklêrôsis*) that one is acting, and the other being affected? Conversely, what argument is there for not supposing what is not right even to think, that both are co-eternal, and not that God is eternal and without a beginning, while the cosmos has a beginning and has not always existed? This is the proper order of the creator and what is created, so that we too and along with us any other rational nature there is are able to understand, what creator and maker are, and what created things and products; what is the most perfect and self-sufficient nature and mastery superior to all else, and what the things that have come to be and depend on the power of the Creator and his willing, and are held together by him, stand in need of him alone and are his slaves.

If all things exist together with the Creator, i.e. for eternity, where is the superiority of the Creator on the assumption that all things exist together with him and for eternity? How would he be a creator of what exists together and what has come to be together with him? Where in things of equal honour with regard to existing together, i.e. for eternity, would the mastery and slavery, and the pre-eminence and greater honour of God among all things come from? In this way, therefore, God is always a creator and benefactor, but his creations do not always exist, and in this way God is also the God of things that have not yet come to be, since they exist within him even before their coming into being. All things that are going to come into being he encompassed with his power of foreknowledge. With his particular wisdom, skill and creative power, he projects each as he wants, and when it is fitting, and so that it would be most beautiful.[103] And he is the Creator not because of the individual things that come to be, but from himself.[104] Or do you not call the benefactor of a sick man a doctor also when he intends and wills to help the sick man, even though he has not yet brought his willing into action, but is going to add action to his intention a little later?

G. Necessarily.

CH. In this way, then (take what is pious in this example and discard what is incongruous), God will be a benefactor and creator and the God of things that are going to receive his beneficence and that are going to be created, bestowing his beneficence or creating by necessity – not bringing into being what exists in order to be God (for he

has the being that he is from himself), but doing so because he is good and God. But consider this too, please.

G. What exactly?

CH. Do you not say that a man capable of speech has the power to use speech even when he is silent?

G. Certainly.

CH. What then? Does it not seem to you that Pythagoras and those who were his followers and who practised philosophy in Italy in old times were capable of speech when they maintained a philosophical silence with the other [Pythagoreans]?[105]

G. How could it not?

CH. Therefore, my friend, God too, unless according to you he is worse than Pythagoras and other men, God too would be the Creator and Benefactor, even if at some time he is not creating in actuality, because he is always able to create and has a will and desire which have no beginning for what receives his beneficence and becomes deified?

You people, wanting to escape an absurdity that appears small, seem to me to have become caught up in a great evil. For really, in order, ostensibly, to say that God does not lie idle for some time, but is acting as a benefactor from eternity, you introduce this [the cosmos] as unwilling and unthinking cause of what exists. You raise up in revolt your fellow-slave, the creation, against its Maker, and imagine that the products are co-eternal with their Maker, raising them up to the level of gods. And you attribute both his great name and nature (*pragma*) to whoever you want, as if they were like any other properties, not agreeing that God is single, the One and Good itself, who in everything carries primacy over everything, and is one and single and only.

If this cosmos is co-eternal with God, there is something in respect to which God is not greater than this cosmos: this would be eternal existence.[106] And how will we say that in everything he is superior to everything? If God and the cosmos exist together, and God is eternal and the products must have come to be with their maker, where is the uniqueness of the blessed God and his freedom from all relation and his being beyond all bodily nature? Things existing together in time are of the class of relatives, but relatives are joined to a bodily nature. God, on the other hand, is incorporeal and intellectual. Therefore, God and the cosmos do not exist together, since God is not a body to which relatives are joined, but he alone has not come to be and is eternal, as he is one and God.

I do not understand how you people are always turning to contradiction in your doctrines, just like drunkards!

If Plato, when he composed his *Timaeus*, which for you people is such an inexhaustible source of inspiration,[107] says that the Creator took matter with its disorder, which you are fond of calling 'receptacle and nurse' (*Tim*. 49A), 'formless and shapeless',[108] and again confused and 'moving with an erring motion' (*Tim*. 30A), and brought it into order and instilled peace in place of turmoil, and fashioned and shaped it and changed it from its primordial formlessness, then there was a time when the universe was in disorder, according to Plato, and this cosmos and present harmony did not exist.

If this is so, matter will be co-eternal with God, at least according to Plato, but not now the cosmos.[109] If this is the case, then you also agree that what exists has been created in time, and you are not at all asserting that God acted as a benefactor from eternity, which is what you prattle on about over and over and have on your tongue, scaring those who are more simple-minded. The disorder of matter and the lowest formlessness would be equal to God in also having no beginning and being eternal and equal in honour;[110] indeed this [will follow], that matter would be worthy of the same honours and the same privilege as God who is wise and very beautiful, since it has not come to be. Shape and form and the cosmos, on the other hand, will appear when they have been put into matter at some later time, from which it will follow that shape and form will come to an end at some time and become separated from it, and matter will also return to its prior state of disorder and formlessness; for it is in the nature of what has come to be in time to come to an end in time also.

You see how much incoherence (*lêros*) and stupidity has become attached to your doctrines, which are not willing to allow that God is the maker of substances, but only of shapes, like a carpenter, painter or and builder, who would be unable to demonstrate their craft if there were no matter. The same, therefore, is true in the case of God too: if matter had not [already] existed, he would not have built this cosmos, nor, according to you, would he have known where to insert the all-beautiful principles of his form-making power.

Perhaps indeed, because of lack of matter, he has even made this cosmos smaller than he wanted, or, if the matter was enough for his purpose, this cosmos has taken up all his wisdom and creative principles. Here again, you make matter, which moves with a disorderly and erring motion, equal and wrongly compare it to the great and immeasurable power of God, precisely because it was able to receive all his creative principles and to be as great as he wanted.

In this way, the consequence of your argument discovers in every respect that matter is equal in honour to God. What greater impiety could there be than to make matter without shape, form and figure

equal to God, not only with regard to always existing, but even (so to speak) with respect to his power itself?

G. They say that matter can be grasped by a bastard reasoning,[111] and that Plato has related this simply for the sake of instruction, as on a hypothesis.[112]

CH. If, then, we shall grasp matter by a bastard reasoning, just as we make up the goat-stag,[113] it will be non-existent and insubstantial. But if this so, then God did not build this universe from pre-existing matter, but from what exists in no way at all, since this cosmos clearly has and is agreed to have come to be; it possesses order and harmony, which have come to be on account of one who has ordered them harmoniously, since they do not come about by luck or spontaneously. But this fable of matter and the error of your doctrine have been nobly refuted long ago by many of our people, which is why we are, for the present, reaching the end of the discussion.

G. Your argument, my friend, has shown up the issue under discussion well. But consider how subtly they [*sc*. the Platonists] reason that the cosmos has no beginning and no end.

CH. Do tell.

G. Geometry says that the spherical is the most perfect of all shapes, as having neither beginning nor end. Our vision shows that the cosmos has received a share of this. For the best and most perfect of shapes needed to be placed in the best and <most perfect>[114] thing that has come to be. Consider, then, how they say that because of its shape too, this cosmos is clearly shown to be without a beginning or end, since the spherical shape has neither beginning nor end.

CH. But, my dear fellow, the beginning of this shape is not graspable by me and you; every circle, however, has a beginning and an end. Let a geometer come forward and draw this shape on a surface: 'does he not take his starting-point from some beginning and draw a line around with a pair of compasses?', as the wise Basil says?[115]

G. Of course?

CH. In this way this cosmos, even if one were to suppose that it has a spherical shape, has taken its starting-point from a beginning in time, and did not exist before it was created, and has an end when it occurs to the Creator to put an end (*sumperasma*) to its nature. So that long-winded and prolix silliness of you people would seem to be nothing, since it has been found out and refuted by this argument

and proof. Share in our eagerness to follow closely the argument that this cosmos has come to be and is perishable, and this doctrine will become clearer than the truth to you.

G. I shall follow it.

CH. If something has not come to be, it is also imperishable, yes or no?

G. It would seem that way.

CH. And if something is imperishable, it has not come to be?

G. Necessarily.

CH. However, conversely, if something has come to be, that thing is also perishable, and if something is perishable, that thing has come to be?

G. You're right.

CH. But the cosmos is perishable, as its parts show; and therefore, it is also shown to have come to be. And again, if we were saying that the imperishable has not come to be, and what has not come to be is imperishable, then this cosmos has come to be, since every body has come to be, and therefore the cosmos is perishable. And again, if nothing of the imperishable <…>[116] is mentioned in records, and they say that the first ship's hull was built in Egypt, and it is no trouble to make a genealogy and to count through the years since each [man] has come to be.[117] If, then, neither the hollows of the earth have been filled in,[118] nor the briny water of the sea been mastered,[119] and something whose parts are perishable is not imperishable,[120] nor that which has a limited nature without an end or a beginning, nor that eternal in which arts and human beings have come into existence since the beginning of time,[121] nor providence for what has its being from itself, the cosmos has come to be. If this is so, it will also perish, since it has allotted to its nature both coming to be and perishing.

* * *

A. This was more or less the discussion with the man who boasts about his medical expertise, and who swaggers about and holds his head high above all the people who live on the Nile on account of his perfect wisdom. But in order that I may not leave without having fully entertained you and left nothing out that has a bearing on the question under consideration, I am going to describe another discus-

sion between me and the philosopher for you. The next day, when the throng of his disciples was with him, he was just explaining another treatise by Aristotle to us, the one he wrote about the ethical virtues. And while I was learning as usual and listening eagerly to what was said, the argument about the forms came up suddenly.[122] I was saying that Aristotle did not maintain the theory, but was rather contending with Plato about it, just as with most other doctrines too. For indeed the two men do not agree especially as regards the most important and essential doctrines, and I had recalled what was said by the Stagirite: 'away with the ideas; for they are but twittering'.[123] Ammonius, however, tried to cover up the conflict.[124]

And then, I do not know how, the argument about the universe was revived by us and developed again. The philosopher maintained strongly that the cosmos is co-eternal with God, as if no argument about this had been stirred up the previous day. Then I, looking at him more keenly, eagerly and indeed sharply and falling upon the argument as if on a godsend, took it up with a certain youthful enthusiasm. I now stated roughly the following premise:

CH. Do you say that God, the first and only cause, is pre-eminent among all things and superior in every way whatsoever by an incomparable difference?

AM. Who would deny this?

CH. And you say that eternal being is also one thing among all?

AM. How could it not be?

CH. If, therefore, you are not confused by what has been agreed, and you yourself agree that God is different in everything from everything, and the first and only cause, and you say that eternal being is one thing among all, then God must be pre-eminent and superior to this universe in this very respect too [*sc.* with respect to eternal being].

AM. Certainly. For God is eternal making,[125] but the cosmos eternally coming into being. The difference between the two will therefore be as great as that between what makes and what is made, and between what creates and what is created.

CH. But we are not saying that God is different from the universe <in so far as he makes, and the universe is made>;[126] for the argument did not endeavour to prove this point, since, as you know, it is taken as agreed upon by everyone. And surely proving what is universally agreed by all would be utterly stupid and not the mark of a learned man and philosopher?

Therefore, it does not now fall to us to track and hunt down the difference between God and the cosmos, and the incomparable superiority of God, with respect to making and being affected, but in so far as he alone is eternal and has no kinship (*koinônia*) at all with the universe, at least as far as being eternal is concerned. If this is so, I am asking you once again: do you not say that what always exists, is eternal?

AM. Yes.

CH. And that God, being eternal, always exists?

AM. This is what I'm saying.

CH. And that the cosmos, which according to you is eternal, always exists?

AM. Certainly.

CH. If therefore, you say that what always exists is eternal, and this is not only characteristic of God, according to your doctrine, but also of the cosmos, where does the superiority of God come from, and the fact that beyond all comparison he transcends this cosmos with regard to always existing, since he exists eternally, if indeed he is not the only one who possesses this, but the cosmos also shares the prerogative of eternal existence with him, being accorded the same privileges, on your view? You are not considering this too, that someone laying claim to philosophy must not argue so sophistically and in such a contentious manner, nor be anxious to win a Cadmean victory.[127]

A. This was the discussion. I was speaking, but he was silent, having become more speechless than stones or fish. He saw the bystanders marvelling at our arguments and the proofs of the Christians, wondering and whispering among themselves that they had been very vigorous and strong. But he then ordered some of the bystanders, whom he before had previously filled with his nonsense and stupidity, to get outside and not to listen what was said, to prevent them, I believe, from being affected by the argument and proof, and from being persuaded to profess Christianity again.[128] But I kept to the argument and said to him:

CH. Now answer me this, my dear fellow.

AM. What exactly?

CH. Do you say that there is a peculiar characteristic for each thing among what exists, which is present to it alone and always, as the ability to laugh is characteristic of man, and the ability to neigh of horse?

AM. Of course.

CH. Then it is necessary to find out what would be the most peculiar mark of God, which is present only to him and to him alone, and always. What would be more admirable and befitting the blessed nature than to think of it as eternally existing and unchangingly alone, standing in need of nothing that has come to be because it is perfect and self-sufficient, being always the same simply and one in form, and having no beginning at all nor again an end, but creating out of sheer goodness when it creates? And to think that the other things that have come to be and are liable to be changed have a beginning in time, so that the eternal may belong to God alone, since in him are woven together in one form always both being himself and alone, and being changelessly so?

So, Philosophy of the Greeks (for I am led to talk to this philosophy as if it were alive), do not suppose that anything that by nature grows or changes or in general moves or rests is co-eternal with God. For in this way we will not remove the single peculiar property of God, his being only and always, that is the summit of his prerogatives, saying off our own bat that one of the things that grow by nature and do not really exist to share this with him. But, my fine fellow,[129] in order to furnish you with proofs that are also derived from arguments familiar and dear to you, I will ask this too, if you will answer my question.

AM. Yes, I'll do that.

CH. Do you think that things that exist together (*ta hama*)[130] can be their reciprocal productive cause?

AM. In no way.

CH. Do you say, then, that co-eternal things are of the class of things that exist together?

AM. Necessarily.

CH. And that the cosmos is co-eternal with God?

AM. Certainly.

CH. And that God is the maker of the cosmos?

AM. How could he not be?

CH. Then consider what has been concluded as a whole.

If the cosmos is co-eternal with God, and co-eternal things are of the class of things that exist together, and things that exist together cannot be reciprocal productive causes of each other, then the cosmos cannot have its productive cause from God, unless [we are to say] (a) what comes to be is to be some shadow, or (b) the effect is to be taken into the principle of being along with its cause, <*either*>[131] as the completion of its substance, as in the case of the sun and the source of light, *or* as being of the same substance as the cause, as is the case with the Father and the Son;[132] but the cause is to be a productive one that is rational, capable of deliberate choice and productive of a changed substance. How can it be possible, then, you remarkable fellow,[133] to affirm both that God is the productive cause of the cosmos (which according to you is co-eternal with him) and of its existence, if the substance of the cosmos is other than his? Or to say that God and the cosmos exist together from eternity, if in fact we are right in saying that co-eternal things are of the class of things that exist together, and things that exist together cannot be reciprocal causes of each other?[134]

As the points of common agreement and the dialectical affirmations and denials have shown, one of the following two is necessary: either to deny that perceptible substance is co-eternal with God, while maintaining that God is the maker of the substance of the cosmos, or, if we accept this proposition, to deny utterly the productive cause of the universe. Or does this not seem so to you?

AM. You may well be right.

CH. Therefore we will exercise the same argument again, mimicking Laconic brevity of speech[135] as much as we can, since for those who seek them, noble things naturally become a surer possession by continuous exercise and training.

We are in agreement that God is the maker and cause of the cosmos.

AM. Yes.

CH. You suppose that the cosmos is co-eternal with God.

AM. Certainly.

CH. And co-eternal things are of the class of things that exist together.

AM. How could they not be?

CH. And things that exist together cannot be their reciprocal productive cause.

AM. No.

CH. Therefore the cosmos, which according to you is co-eternal with God, cannot have its productive cause from God. But surely we have said that God is the maker of the cosmos.

AM. Yes.

CH. Therefore the cosmos will not be co-eternal with God. For every product comes second to the maker in cause and time.

AM. But if we are going to say this, consider how we will fall into the following absurdity:

CH. Do tell, for I would gladly listen.

AM. If we are going to say that what exists is not co-eternal with God, God has thus willed what exists to come into being, and there was a time when he did not have his willing for what exists. But if he had willed in time, by necessity he will also change his will at some time. And if this is so, our right conception of God will not be preserved. For willing and changing one's will in time introduces change into what is <not>[136] subject to such affections.

CH. My good friend, then especially we must not say that God has willed in time the coming into being of things that have come to be – if indeed one should not say that the nature of these is not also without beginning and co-eternal with God, but rather that his willing of them was without beginning, since he is good and God, and that he brought into being what has come to be when he intended to benefit it. Secondly, willing, when it is said about humans, brings one to think of change and changing one's will; but with God, willing is not of the human kind, since God is not human. We must therefore consider willing appropriately for [each of] the natures under discussion.

AM. You're right.

* * *

A. A discussion about the sovereign and blessed Trinity also came up amongst us at some point, my friend. The philosopher asked to learn

how we can say that the same entity is a triad as well as a monad; for he said that these two claims were somehow irreconcilable. So I said to him:

My friend, we say that it is a triad in the monad, and a monad in the triad, by being three hypostases, but single in substance. For the principle of what exists, the most productive nature, the ungrudging goodness, the source of life, the intellectual light, goodness itself and one, the first cause, he who is and is true being and always is the same, that is to say the Intellect and Father, he has begotten the Word, not verbally (*prophorikon*) nor again in thought (*endiatheton*),[137] but in substance and essence (*enupostaton*), and of the same substance as himself, from eternity and co-eternal with him.

The Word is of the same divinity as the Intellect and Father, and is the same as him, but not in hypostasis, but in substance. He has brought forth another hypostasis from eternity, which is of the same substance as both himself and the Word, namely what Scripture calls the Holy Spirit, together with the generation of the Word and Son and Wisdom, without any out-flowing or cutting or emptying (for these are affections of bodies). The Holy Spirit can be thought beyond duration (*aiôn*) and time and all extension, and is one with the Word and Creator and Wisdom and the Divine Spirit, since they are derived from the same cause, one by way of generation, the other by procession, or rather by emanation, since Wisdom and the Word rule over the composition and creation and bringing into being (*ousiôsis*)[138] of what exists, but the Divine Spirit is the animating breath in all rational and intellectual substances and the perfection of their hypostasis. 'In fact we say that the Father of the Word and of Wisdom and he who brings forth (*proboleus*) the Holy Spirit, the first cause and principle, is the timeless principle of divinity contemplated in both the Son and Spirit', as Gregory our theologian says.[139] In this way the blessed and most sovereign Trinity is three as well as one, neither scattered into an irrational, pagan plurality, since it is one, nor jealously confined into a single hypostasis in the manner of the Jews, since it is three.[140]

AM. So they really are three in hypostasis and number, but one in substance.

A. The group of listeners gave a great shout and called out with a certain joy and delight. In this way the philosopher had brought together and concluded [for himself] what our argument set out to prove. But he, smiling rather bitterly[141] and blushing somewhat, fell silent, and refrained from another argument.

* * *

These were the three discussions I had with him: two about heaven and God, that this cosmos is not co-eternal with God, and one about the blessed and sovereign Trinity, that is to say the threefold unity and monad. I had many other discussions both about our other doctrines and those of the Greeks as well, but since they contribute nothing to the issue and subject under discussion, it seems right to me to pass over them in silence for the present.

So, my friend, do you want to go back home, satisfied by what has now been said and persuaded by the arguments against the philosopher?

B. Not at all, my dear fellow. I should like you to expel also the final part of the difficulty from my soul, since you have a sharp mind and are a wise speaker.

A. Yes, but put aside this sort of talk. For we have not gone over these matters for the sake of praise and showing off, but because we are concerned for your good condition and health. Praises are of no account to me, but the dear truth and the doctrines and teachings of the church are. So leave praises for the ambitious and those who love and are eager for honour, and tell me what you want, and what it is that throws your soul into confusion and disturbs it with regard to the accepted doctrines of the truth.

B. My dear sir, you were saying that this cosmos has been created by God after the intelligibles, when he needed to extend himself to what exists, for it was by freedom and goodness, and not necessity, that God creates. Thus, you were saying that God did not rest idle before the creation of the perceptible cosmos, since he was first making the intelligibles and pouring out the benefits bestowed on the intellectual natures and filling them full of his grace, without however needing anything that has come to be for himself. For he is the Creator from himself, and not from the things that have come to be, since God is self-sufficient and perfect. Or is it not this you were maintaining?[142]

A. Certainly. You are keen, sharp-witted and have a good memory,[143] and none of the issues in the discussion has escaped your notice.

B. You are returning praises in jest, my dear fellow, and you did not want yourself to be praised, but to praise, even though you honour equality and the just throughout your life.

A. But let us now leave aside these matters, and take up the present investigation. Tell me then what your discourse has sought to articulate.

B. You were saying exactly what I had said, my dear fellow, that after the intelligible cosmos this perceptible cosmos had come to be, when you made it quite clear that, in so far as it has come to be, it is also perishable. The argument has demonstrated very well and vigorously, and contended earnestly, that even if the world perishes, God remains in his proper goodness, without suffering any harm or damage with regard to it [*sc.* his goodness]. You also said this, that it is necessary that the world be transformed and become immortal, and undergo some alteration and change toward the better, and receive a higher, holier and more divine transformation of its present condition.[144] Did you not say this?

A. Certainly.

B. Go on then, and answer me this question.

A. Which one?

B. If God intends to have this cosmos become immortal and to transform it and remodel it for the better, what is the reason for not having made it such from the outset, but at some later point in time endowing it with immortality?[145] For it is either by ignorance of the beautiful that he did not make the cosmos such, because he would make it some day just as from a change of mind, or because he was not able to; or, what it is not right to say, because he did not escape the affection of jealousy. But ignorance, weakness, jealousy and changing one's mind are far removed from the blessed nature. What can you say to this?

A. It is not by ignorance of what is beautiful that he did not make this cosmos imperishable, nor because he was not able to, nor again because he was overcome by the affection of jealousy. For all jealousy is far removed from the only good God and the Good itself,[146] and weakness from power, and ignorance from the wise and from wisdom itself, and changing one's mind from the changeless. But it was necessary, my dear man, for the space to be arranged appropriately for what was going to inhabit the space, and for the dwelling-place not to be greatly unbefitting to its inhabitants.

Therefore, since we have been born perishable beings and change day by day, what surrounds us[147] must also have come to be like this, and again, that when we advance towards immortality, this follows along also. Or do you not think that like takes pleasure in like and is its friend and companion? No doubt you have heard this said as a proverb, and the poet's words have taught you the same.[148]

B. I know what you mean.

A. In this way, therefore, this cosmos, which is fully adorned and conspicuous with a multitude of various plants and countless different forms of animals, and which shines with all these by the act of God; and which has, moreover, the rational natures, i.e. human beings, wandering about in it, on account of whom it surely has been especially created by God –indeed if someone were to say that this is the sole cause of its coming to be, he would not be wrong – [this cosmos] has also become like itself and clings to the concord between its parts. For it was necessary that it should not be arranged in all respects unfittingly, but that it should in some way have a certain likeness to its inhabitants. What then would this likeness be, if this cosmos had been destined to be <in a state of immortality>[149] by God, while things come to be and die, and have been allotted passing into being in time, and not long after perishing – for such is the nature of things that come to be and perish?

How then, if heaven and the bodies that move in heaven were immortal and imperishable and indestructible, would they be able to receive the sight of the perishable eye and be receptive of the other sense-perceptions? Both reason and the wisdom of those men of old and experience itself show and teach that like draws near like.[150] But since we will return to life again by the providence and beneficence of the Creator, receiving immortal bodies that are stronger than any change, with which we indeed we engaged in common life and came into this life – for the good God certainly did not condemn us rational creatures utterly and perpetually to destruction – it was necessary that the things around us should in turn be just like our own bodies, full of glory and immortality and free from all change and alteration, so that like draws near like and reaches contact with it.

This is the reason, my dear man, why this universe has not been created immortal and imperishable by God from the first.

B. You have resolved one difficulty with another difficulty for me, my friend. For if indeed god intended to make men immortal, why does he delay his beneficence? Why did he not make everything immortal together with its generation?

A. Listen, then, to this very beautiful argument,[151] which Moses the blessed prophet and lawgiver wrote down, and which reason has discovered to be true. For the Creator and Maker of this universe created man after the generation of heaven and earth and the sea and the sun and moon and the stars and the beings that inhabit heaven, earth, air and sea. It was necessary that the royal gifts and the symposium and the entertainments be prepared by the King of All and [divine] host as for a king and guest,[152] and that therefore that man should be appointed and put forward as the king and banqueter of the good things which the great host had set before him.

The good Maker, then, when he made man, also combined and tied together the intellectual soul, which Scripture[153] recognises as an image of himself, with a perceptible body, and from the first he planted the seeds of immortality into bodies through the immortal soul so that even things without perception might perceive the beneficence of the good God and his contemplation, and participate in this through the union and mixture of the intellectual substance [*sc.* the soul] with the body. He thus made man free of will and free from necessity, free and independent – for this especially is the mark and symbol of the rational nature, and an image and imitation of the kingdom above. He also provided the law, as the prize of immortality, that man should recognise his master and understand that he is not without king and master, even if he had come to be king of things on earth by the beneficence of him who had made him king.

Recognition of one's own servitude is a fine thing, because it banishes arrogance, presumption, vanity and false pretension, which are the first and the last evil, and brings together one's thoughts and reminds one of the Delphic inscription 'Know Thyself'. The man who makes small account of the law and thinks little of the lawgiver falls away from that immortality which he would have partaken of if he had become a guardian of the law, and is punished with dissolution. For it was necessary that evil should not be immortal, and this was [arranged] by the beneficence of the King and Lawgiver and Creator. Evil in some way is contempt and disregard for the commands of the king and neglect for the benefactor, which least of all escapes the charge of ungratefulness. With this, indeed, man created the beginning of the noisy throng of other evils too, and of the swarm of pleasures that derive from thoughtlessness and intemperance. This is the reason for dissolution; this is the cause of our resurrection and immortality: nothing other than the goodness of God and his compassion towards fallen man and his perfect love of man. In fact the Creator, pitying his fashioned creature and not suffering that it be overcome by evil, dissolves the vessel that receives evil, and then remodels it again and forges it anew, delivered from bad habits and impressions, to prevent us from being sick immortally, but also to prevent the fashioned creature, which in the beginning had been created for immortality, from being condemned to eternal and perpetual destruction.

But since evil and contempt for the law preceded our dissolution, it was necessary that virtue and keeping of the law and freedom from sin should lead the way to our resurrection and immortality. Because of this, my dear fellow, God himself, both the Lawgiver and King, becomes man and remains God. The Creator of nature himself cures the illnesses of nature, displaying it pure, free, unblemished and free from harm in himself – and what is more, completely untroubled and sinless. And for the fashioned creature he becomes the path and

guide for immortality and, to put it simply, the principle and starting-point, having raised and made immortal the body which the Word and Creator himself took from our nature and being and united to himself, together a intellectual human soul, obviously so that he might forge the whole nature anew. For the same reason that the whole human species, after the first man received his dissolution and momentary destruction because of his sin (*plêmmeleia*), was punished with the same things, [so also] will the starting-point of immortality and the tokens of imperishability be passed on to the whole species by the Creator himself, who remained God and became man, in whom evil found neither a form nor a stirring (*kinêma*) of itself, since he is the font of virtues and holiness, and is changelessness and freedom from sin.

You have here, my friend, the explanation for why we were not made immortal from the beginning, together with our generation. Therefore, make the contrast yourself and consider and understand for yourself by comparison the difference between the doctrines.

These people [*sc.* the pagans] suppose that this cosmos is co-eternal with the Creator, and do not allow that God is superior to and different from all that exists in all respects and in everything, but they 'raise up what is circumscribed and has a material body to the same position of honour as the unlimited and incorporeal nature', as Basil, the great teacher of the truth, says.[154] What is perishable by nature will also be completely dissolved, as its parts and composition show, since what has been compounded is also completely dissolved. They [however] make it equal to the indestructible and imperishable and true being and what is always the same, making this and its parts into gods in their ignorance, while in their boorishness they do not agree that God is a creator by providence and willing; using a hackneyed example,[155] they suppose that he is a cause of the cosmos without deliberate choice. Once again, 'they have been caught by their own feathers', as the proverb goes.[156] They say that that which has been created and well put together by the good God must not perish, but when they are asked about individual men, for whose sake especially this universe has come to be, how they can come to be and perish even though they have been created by a good God and well put together, since they are the creations of the good God, they are struck dumb and become more speechless than fish and stones.[157]

Again, they agree that this cosmos has immortality not from itself (for, as I have learned from the ingenious arguments of one of Plato's interpreters,[158] if the Creator were notionally separated from the universe or from holding together and strengthening what has been created and keeping a grasp on what has come to be by him, all things would come to naught and the perishing and destruction of the universe would come about), while they agree with this, they say that both the sun and moon and in a word the seven so-called planets and

heaven itself are gods, and that the beings that are by nature perishable are the causes of what is individually well-regulated. They are remodelling these as gods for us and insulting the great and highly prized name and nature of divinity, and bringing down into destruction the pure nature that is free from harm.

These are the doctrines of these people [the pagans], or rather their hot-tempered stories and fabrications about the universe and their wilful error. But our opinion on what exists, which is the word of truth, is this: we agree that God alone has not come to be and is by nature immortal, and is both without a beginning and eternal, and that this cosmos which is perceptible and visible has come to be after the creation of the things that exist.[159] For the Creator creates with order and orderly sequence, so that there may be nothing disorderly among what exists; for the disorderly is not characteristic of God, but of the spontaneous. In this way we say that God is a creator from himself and not from the things that come to be, but that he does not remain idle before the creation of the perceptible cosmos, since he was producing the intelligibles, and he did not come to the creation of what exists by necessity. Nor again do we say that the cosmos has come to be alongside God as a by-product from eternity and follows him along, so that we avoid introducing this as a non-deliberate cause of the universe, dragged in like some waste product of nature or a burdensome appendage. But we agree that God is the creator of what exists by his abundance of goodness and his will. We feel sure that the cosmos is by nature perishable – for it has come to be – but we say that it will not completely perish nor for eternity, because of the goodness of its Maker, but that it will be transformed toward the better and become immortal together with our bodies after the universal end. For none of the things that were created by the Good for their own sake will be handed over to perpetual destruction.

Even the momentary destruction is brought upon it by the good God for the benefit of the rational beings, to prevent us from being sick immortally, and at the same time so that the intellectual natures, by means of their momentary destruction and transformation, may learn that they have come to be immortal not by the necessity of their own natures, but by the gift of the Creator and have not been put in the first position by lack of a second place; this is to ensure that they look towards the first and only principle, the Good itself and the One, and never grow tired of the contemplation of their benefactor, and love being ruled and having enjoyment of the splendour of the good God forever, and hate absence of a ruler (*anarkhia*), and at the same time the abundance of the power and wisdom of God, who makes mortal beings immortal, and who does not allow us to 'be ignorant of our mortality, or to remain in it', as one of our wise men says,[160] <may appear plainly>.[161]

Therefore the dissolution of perceptible things does not introduce

perpetual destruction into the universe, since this would have been alien to God and not be the work of the good God. But the great and manifold wisdom of God contrived to put down destruction, which evil had introduced, by the destruction of human bodies, and to give a share of immortality to mortal beings, so that after the experience of destruction and dissolution men would also come to hate the cause of dissolution – we said that the cause of this was evil – and moreover, so that through the dissolution of this universe and the resurrection and a greater and finer transformation (*metabolê*) they would be able to understand that it was he who even from the beginning created the great and beautiful sights; and that, by their contemplation of these things they had a duty to admire and marvel at the Supreme Craftsman, and not assign divinity (*theologia*) to his products because of their beauty and well-fitted concord and harmony. Most justly therefore will he chastise those who make his products into gods, and who deny his sole mastery, and who make up the fable that the cosmos is co-eternal with the only eternal one, and who 'raise the creation in revolt against the Creator', as the great teacher of truth Gregory says.[162]

B. You're right. In giving a summary of the main points, you have shown the difference between our doctrines by setting them side by side. And just as light is different from darkness, so are your doctrines from the fables of the Greeks.

But there is just this point, my dear sir, that I am very anxious to have clarified to me, and I beg you to do so.

A. Do me the favour, sir, of asking any question you want.

B. Did you say that god has made man free of will?

A. Yes.

B. And that man received the law from the Creator, but took small account of the law and belittled the law-giver?

A. Certainly.

B. And you said that this was the cause of his dissolution?

A. This is indeed so.

B. What necessity, my dear man, was there then to honour his nature with freedom and to bestow free will upon it, given that he was going to be dragged down into destruction by it and this universe along with him? And how when the neglect for the law, which you said is

the cause of the dissolution, was subsequent to the creation of the universe, could he anticipate it and make the cosmos perishable?

A. My dear fellow, the Creator knew by his power of foreknowledge that man would neglect the law and be mortal, and anticipating this he made a mortal cosmos for him as a fitting home. But now I will give you the reason why God made man free of will. But if you have any other question, ask.

B. Talk about the subject at hand, for the time being.

A. I will. The Creator, my friend, who is good, or rather goodness itself and the Good, wills that our nature not be subject to natural needs, following along wherever it is driven like the irrational animals; moreover, he wills the good [we do] to be ours, and not owing to the bond of nature, so that we may be deemed worthy of praises and prizes because we practise virtue and perform good deeds willingly. For goodness by constraint is not dear to God, but that which has been cultivated out of deliberate choice is. Or do you give praise to the slave who is under your whip and in fetters, if he somehow accomplishes something he was ordered to do, or rather when, although he is not under any constraint or whip, he abandons none of his slave duties, and does not fall short in obeying your orders, but serves you with goodwill and pleasure?

B. Clearly, my dear sir, I admire and welcome the second alternative.

A. Accordingly, my dear fellow, the Creator too opts for the second and welcomes this, because he strives after our well-being alone, and 'enjoys only this in us, that we are saved', as the famous and blessed Clement says.[163] Therefore, those who take away our freedom of will and blame the Creator that they have not been created without deliberate choice, these people do none other than to prefer in honour irrational impulse and nature over the rational, and put involuntary motion before voluntary movement and rational virtue, and are all but indignant that they have not been created sheep, monkeys, camels and asses.

B. Ha! My dear fellow, how you have made an ass, a monkey and a camel out of me and bestowed on me the marks of irrationality[164] because of my problem!

A. You're joking, my dear sir. But I didn't think it proper for a prudent and intelligent man to jest at things of such importance.

B. I was being witty, my dear fellow, but certainly not joking. For I

understand what has been said and I know my debt of gratitude to the Creator, that he has made me rational and free of will. I am[165] indignant not at him – for what man could ever be indignant at the wise and supremely beautiful and good God? – but in fact at the lack of deliberation among men, that they prefer the pleasant to virtue, being enticed by it and ignorant, as if someone were to feel an itch and, being deceived by pleasure, were to scratch his entire body with his fingernails, without thinking of the scabs that follow.[166]

A. You're right, and your comparison is fitting. But if you have any other question, ask.

B. I only have this one puzzle left: how do we say that the bodies of men come to life again and are resurrected, when they are often split up into countless parts and shreds, as it may be, by wild beasts and whatever on earth and in the sea can ruin them, and they are often completely consumed and destroyed?[167]

A. When I have solved this hackneyed question for you, I will put an end to the discussion, unless you have another puzzle that disturbs your soul.

B. Only this doubt rests upon my soul and lies in ambush for it, since you must know well that you have cleansed my soul from many pointless puzzles and much error.

A. Thanks be to the Creator himself, my dear fellow, who granted me to say these things! Get ready, then, to learn how the resurrection of bodies is possible and rational.

B. Tell me, for I should gladly listen.

A. Shall we say that the bodies of men, my dear fellow – it is necessary to speak like the natural philosophers for a moment – are composed of something?

B. They are composed of the four elements; the account of the natural philosophers states, and the truth demonstrates it.

A. Do we say that when bodies have been dissolved they pass into something? Surely they pass into those things from which they have also been composed?

B. Necessarily.

A. Why then does it seem extraordinary or strange, if the wise and

powerful Creator who knows the principles of all things brings back together into harmony from the four elements the bodies of men which have been cut into countless pieces and parts? For he who first assembled these together and arranged them harmoniously, and by his will alone fitted them together from opposites in a mixture worthy of admiration and contemplation – that same God, having dissolved that harmony into the elements from which it was also composed, will command them again to form an indissoluble concord. This he will do with that mighty nod (*neuma*) of his. Surely the divine nature grasps and embraces all things up and down and in between? It is both outside the universe, in it and beyond it, and there is nothing that is void of the divine power and supersubstantial being, which alone is boundless and does not suffer limitation. For divinity is without quantity and magnitude, since it is incorporeal.

B. Certainly.

A. If therefore he fills all things and 'the spirit of the Lord has filled the world',[168] as Scripture says, 'and he holds in his hand the ends of the earth',[169] what difficulty and what trouble is there for the blessed God in knowing the things that are in his hand? Or are you ignorant of what you are carrying in your hand?

B. Not at all.

A. Neither, then, is the wise Creator ignorant of the principles of bodies, nor of the part taken from each element and which is broken up again into the same thing. Indeed, he who can <break up>[170] human bodies cannot be incapable of putting them together after they have been broken up.

Besides, consider this.

B. What exactly?

A. Do you not say that this male sperm, which is sown into the womb of a woman, is a drop with a certain amount of moisture?

B. Yes.

A. Then who, my dear man, is it that makes that small portion of moisture, i.e. the corporeal substance of the male semen, and binds it to the soul, and makes a rational animal, mortal and capable of receiving intellect and knowledge? Surely it was the Creator?

B. Certainly.

A. Why, therefore, does it seem extraordinary to you if God, since he is wise, powerful and a creator, should order bodies to come to life again, given that he knows the principles of bodies both here and now and after the dissolution, and their return into the four elements and the seeds of these themselves? And so it appears plainly that the resurrection is possible.

Listen now to the reasonableness of it. First the Creator, to prevent the things that have come to be by him from being perpetually overcome by death and destruction, wants that all things are and are in a good state and are always. But then does it not seem right to you that those souls obtain prizes in the contest who have finished the competition nobly and have run through this race-course well with the bodies with which they were living and supporting the countless toils[171] of virtue?

B. This seems right and reasonable.

A. And again, that those who steer their way through this life badly and shed the wings of virtue and are troubled by the swarms of intemperance and pleasures, going along with the weight of their [bodily] appendage, carried downwards by the horse of evil[172] and the child within us,[173] forgetful of their own immortality, their kinship with on high and that first, pure image – that those should pass to the sacred prison of punishment with the bodies with which they have also become corrupted, and swim across the river of Pyriphlegethon,[174] which Plato mentions,[175] and Cocytus – which the Scriptures call 'the river of fire'[176] and 'restless worm'[177] and 'Gehenna'[178] and 'eternal shame'[179] and 'prison'[180] and 'punishment'[181] and so on.

B. This too seems clearly right.

A. Well, my dear fellow, we have fully gone through the arguments of the discussion. Now is the time to turn our minds to prayer and to praise the Maker and Creator of this universe.

O Master and Creator of this universe, Father, O Word and Holy Spirit, O divine Trinity and threefold holy Monad, Father without beginning and uncreated, Son who has been created without a beginning, divine Spirit who proceeded from the Father without a beginning, ineffable Trinity united to the Monad, Monad inexpressibly adored in the Trinity and not comprehended [by human reason], uncreated, eternal and consubstantial Trinity, first and blessed Nature and Principle of what exists, ungrudging Goodness and real Being, grant us that our intellect become pure and made worthy of your splendour and contemplation, so that we may reach You, who are the purest, with purity as far as possible, if this is right. Deliver

our souls from evil character and manners, show us the first image undefiled, and may the mighty sojourn [on earth] and presence of You, the one God and Word of the Trinity, and the enormous suffering that brought salvation, by which we have been delivered from sin, not have been in vain. Bring it about that our souls are not untrained in virtue, but trained in the dissolution before the dissolution of our bodies, so that we will not be disturbed when we become free from the shackles and do not often return to things here, unable to endure the parting. Grant us escape from the catalogue of punishments, and that we may not be tried by bitter exile. But when it is pleasing to You, join and place us together in the resting places above, that we may happily obtain the rewards for our training and our life in perishable bodies, in the bosoms of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.

We have prayed enough. Now let's go.[182]

Variations from Colonna's Text

All by Donald Russell except for l. 898

209 Reading *humeteron* in place of *hêmeteron*
243 Deleting *kai*
304 Inserting *ei* before *ton theon*
367 Deleting *tês* before *tôn grammatistôn*
492 Reading *hoiper* in place of *eiper*
683 Inserting *mê* before *ethelontos*
898 Reading *teleiotatôi* in place of *teleiôi* (Gertz)
972 Reading *oukh hêi ho men poiei*, *to de ginetai*
1041 Reading *hê* instead of *kai*
1083 Inserting *mê* after *ton*
1206 Reading *athanatôs* in place of *athanata*
1343 Reading *kataphainêtai* in place of *kataphainetai*
1464 Reading *dialuein* before *dialelumena*

Notes

1. 'The city of the Berytians': i.e. Berytus, the ancient name for Beirut. Its law schools were renowned throughout the Roman Empire since the third century AD, when the city blossomed under the patronage of the Emperor Severus.

2. For a good account of the ancient sources for Gessius' activity, see E. Watts, 'The Enduring Legacy of the Iatrosophist Gessius', *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 49 (2009): 113-33.

3. Ignoring the commas in Colonna's edition before and after *protetagmenon*.

4. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus *De Demosth. dict.* 5.15 Rademacher-Usener.

5. Cf. *Euth*. 2A for the same phrase.

6. Berytus was known as 'the mother of the laws' or 'the nurse of the laws' in late antiquity; cf. Libanius *Ep*. 652.1 and Gregory of Nazianzus *Carmina* 2.2.5. See also L. Jones Hall, *Roman Berytus: Beirut in Late Antiquity*, London 2004, pp. 195-210. Zacharias describes how he followed Severus to Berytus to study law in his *Life of Severus* pp. 46-7 Kugener.

7. There are a number of Platonic echoes in ll. 14-17, as pointed out correctly in Colonna's apparatus. Most significant are *Gorg*. 473A ('You do well to do so, my friend'), also imitated by Aeneas of Gaza *Theophr*. 35,15, and 513B ('you want to be a man involved in the affairs of the city' (*politikos einai boulei*)).

8. Ammonius is here cast as a sophist; see, for example, Plato *Prot*. 310D, where the sophist Protagoras is described as someone who will make others wise for a fee.

9. By the description that follows, this is likely to be a reference to the Church of Anastasia. See L. Jones Hall (2004), p. 209f., and pp. 172-4 for the churches in Berytus.

10. Eustathius, who built the church some time before 449 AD.

11. Note Zacharias' use of *ekphrasis*, the literary description of a work of art, here. A number of contemporary Gazan intellectuals displayed both interest and skill in this genre; cf. Choricius' lengthy description of the Church of St Sergius at *Laud. Mart*. 1.17ff. Foerster-Richtsteig, and also that of St Stephen, 2.28ff. Both texts are translated with useful notes in C. Mango, *The Art of the Byzantine Empire 312-1453: Sources and Documents*, Medieval Academy reprints for teaching 16, Toronto 1986, pp. 60-72. See also Procopius *Descr. imag*. passim.

12. An allusion to Plato *Phdr*. 264C.

13. A proverbial expression similar to 'winning a Pyrrhic victory', viz. one incurring heavy losses.

14. Presumably on Aristotle's *Physics*.

15. This is a reference to the *kathedra*, the teacher's chair that was higher than the students' benches. For illustrations of late antique classrooms of the kind Zacharias probably has in mind here, see R. Sorabji (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science* 2nd edn, London 2008, pp. 2ff. The language of Zacharias' description echoes Themistius' oration 21 ['The Examiner (*basanistês*), or, The Philosopher'], 243A5-B1.

16. There is a difficulty in translating the adjective *kalos* in the following. When

it is referring to, e.g. the heavens, it is tempting to translate it with 'beautiful', the sense in which Plato describes the cosmos as *kalos* at *Tim*. 29A, a passage which serves as a useful background to Zacharias' discussion. On the other hand, where there is talk of a *kalos* product, it may at times be more desirable to translate 'a fine product', or one that has been 'finely made'. Here and below at ll. 180ff. I translate *kalos* with 'beautiful', to make the analogy between God's creation of the universe and that of individual men more transparent.

17. I am not translating *ên d'egô* and similar locutions here as the change of designation is already indicated by CH. [Christian] and AM. [Ammonius] in my translation.

18. The Greek word translated as 'creator' here literally means 'craftsman' (*dêmiourgos*). It is used in Plato's *Timaeus* to describe how a divine agent orders a pre-existing material substrate. In light of Zacharias' commitment to creation *ex nihilo* (expressed by the Christian spokesman at ll. 493-4), it seems more appropriate to speak of a 'creator' (and 'to create' for the cognate verb *dêmiourgein*). There are some difficult choices to be made in deciding whether to capitalise the words 'creator' and 'god' when uttered by Ammonius. I have capitalised them throughout, but one should note that there is a major interpretative problem lurking here: does Ammonius (or later Gessius, for that matter), when speaking e.g. about 'the First and Single One' and 'the Good and one God', as he does in ll. 112-13, commit himself to something very close to Christian monotheism? Is Zacharias 'translating' what Ammonius would have said into language inoffensive to Christian ears? Or is Ammonius, for the purposes of the argument, simplifying his more complex theological tenets which may admit the existence of many gods, as not being relevant to the point immediately at issue?

The extent to which the *Ammonius* can be taken as evidence for a simplified 'Alexandrian' form of Neoplatonic theology has been the subject of much scholarly discussion. In a recent contribution, K. Verrycken ('La métaphysique d'Ammonius chez Zacharie de Mytilène', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 85 (2001): 241-66) gives strong reasons against the reliability of Zacharias' *Ammonius*. See also B. Bydén's forthcoming paper 'A Case for Creationism: Christian Cosmologies in the 5th and 6th Centuries' (in B. Bydén and K. Ierodiakonou (eds), *The Many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy*, Athens: Monographs from the Norwegian Institute at Athens, 2012), which reaches a similarly sceptical conclusion.

19. An echo of *Tim*. 28C.

20. *Aiôn* here seems to signify everlasting duration in time, not, as it will later at l. 573, an eternity beyond time.

21. Cf. Aeneas of Gaza *Theophr*. 48,9-10 for a similar objection. The language in which it is put here closely echoes Plato *Tim*. 41B.

22. Note the Platonic allusion to *Phdr*. 247A ('jealousy is far removed from the divine chorus').

23. For the denial of jealousy in the divine, cf. Plato *Tim*. 29E2, and also Aeneas of Gaza *Theophr*. 49,5-6.

24. Supplying *ho kosmos* as the masculine noun for *kalliona* and *kheirona*.

25. An allusion to a celebrated Homeric passage (*Il*. 15.362-4). It is used in a philosophical context by e.g. Philo of Alexandria *De aet. mund*. 42 Cohn-Reiter, where the idea of the 'futile craftsman' (see next sentence in Zacharias' *Ammonius*) also occurs in close proximity.

26. Cf. Porphyry *in Tim*. Fr. 39 Sodano (= Philoponus *De aet. mund. contr. Procl*. 126.10-24 Rabe, translated by M. Share, *Philoponus: Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 6-8*, London 2005, p. 17). See also M. Baltes, *Die Weltentste-*

hung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, vol. I, Leiden 1976, pp. 192-205 for an extensive discussion of Zacharias' debt to Porphyry here.

27. An allusion to Plato *Gorg*. 465B.

28. For the problem how divine goodness is compatible with the mortality of created individuals, see also the discussion with Gessius at ll. 605-11 below.

29. For the same argument, see ll. 658-62 below, where Zacharias quotes Basil *Hex*. 1.3 and refers to the Stoics. Cf. also Aeneas of Gaza *Theophr*. 42,16-18; 48,12-15.

30. Reading *humeteron* in place of *hêmeteron*. If *hêmeteron* were to be retained, it would read 'I have a certain affection for our doctrine'. I am grateful to Donald Russell for his comments on this sentence.

31. For the phrase *ou panu peithomai* used in this sense, cf. Plato *Gorg*. 513C.

32. Ammonius here echoes Aristotle's claim at *Phys*. 194b13 ('it takes a man and the sun to generate a man'). For the importance of the sun in late antique pagan theology, see e.g. Julian *Or*. 4. It is Julian's speech that stands in the background to the anti-Pagan polemic triggered by Ammonius' comment. See also Introduction, p. 98.

33. The Greek word for 'make a god' here is *theologein*, which is used by Zacharias with much the same force as *theopoiein*. See G.W.H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, Oxford 1969, '*theologeô*' section C.

34. The first principles of (human) generation, i.e. the sperm.

35. A reference to *Tim*. 38C.

36. *Phês* here should be stronger than simply 'to state' or 'to declare' (a simple assertion could not, presumably, convince Ammonius), but weaker than 'to teach' (*doces* in Migne's translation) or 'to demonstrate' (*dimonstra* in Colonna's). Cf. also Plato *Gorg*. 462C for a similar use with *legeis*.

37. Cf. Plato *Phd*. 67A.

38. Deleting *kai* in l. 243.

39. A reference to Socrates' prohibition of suicide at Plato *Phd*. 62B.

40. For this proverb, cf. Plato *Gorg*. 499E.

41. The speaker here is 'A' from the beginning of the dialogue, i.e. Zacharias, who is recounting the argument between Ammonius and the Christian to 'B' in the frame narrative.

42. *Autonomia* (lit. 'freedom to have one's own laws' or 'independence') is here used in a pejorative sense, meaning a freedom one has (arrogantly) assumed for oneself. Olympiodorus uses the word in the sense of 'dogmatism', contrasted with 'proof' (*apodeixis*), at *in Met*. 151.21 Stüve.

43. Following a suggestion by Donald Russell, I am inserting *ei* in l. 304 before *ton theon*. 'Acting like the giants' here means revolting against the divine order. Plato *Soph*. 246A-B may be in the background.

44. The Greek word for 'chain', *seira*, is frequently used in Neoplatonic metaphysics to describe the hierarchical relationships between different gods and, more generally, levels of reality.

45. Cf. Homer *Il*. 2.204-5.

46. A metaphor for God as the Creator of order, originally a military term. Cf. the entry in Lampe (1969) for its use in Christian writers.

47. See n. 33 above.

48. The parenthetical remark 'this is Paul' may be a later gloss.

49. Romans 1:20.

50. Sap. Sol. 13:5. Zacharias, probably quoting from memory, has *kathoratai* in place of the Septuagint's *theôreitai*.

51. This is a reference to the Mouseion at Alexandria. For its place in Alexandrian intellectual life, see the comments by E. Watts, *City and School in Athens and Alexandria*, Berkeley 2006, pp. 147-8.

52. Deleting *tês* before *tôn grammatistôn*, which seems otiose here.

53. See also Aeneas of Gaza *Theophr*. 43,22ff.

54. 'Creative principles' (*dêmiourgikoi logoi*, lit. 'principles of craftsmanship') are rational principles inherent in the Creator's mind which he implants into matter in order to form and shape it. See Preface, p. xii, for this notion, which also occurs in Aeneas of Gaza's *Theoprastus* 58,12.

55. It is interesting to note that the Greek word for 'peace itself' (*autoeirênê*) seems otherwise to be found only in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (*De div. nom*. 218.18).

56. 'My dear friend' (*ô philê kephalê*) is a Platonic form of address, used e.g. at *Gorg*. 513C.

57. Zacharias reads *legomen* for *legômen*, and omits *genesin*.

58. *Tim*. 29E.

59. *Tim*. 31B.

60. It seems clear that the sense of 'dilemma' is required here, *pace* Lampe (1969), entry '*peridexios*'. The entry for '*peridexios*' in Suidas defines the word as a proposition from which either of two consequences can follow. Zacharias' use, however, shows that the term is applied to a proposition from which either of two *impossible* consequences follows.

61. A reference back to Ammonius' challenge at ll. 209ff.

62. Callicles reproaches Socrates in the same terms at *Gorg*. 494D.

63. The meaning of this ritual is uncertain. See, however, the note by J. Adam on Plato *Rep*. 398A for further references and suggestions.

64. Callicles attacks Socrates in the same terms at *Gorg*. 482C.

65. Reading *hoiper* in place of *eiper*.

66. The discussion takes a new start after Gessius' angry appeal to the authority of the ancients (ll. 461-6). But the tables are now turned: at l. 369-370, the Christian interlocutor had to defend his thesis that God can be a creator even though he is not always creating; now, at l. 490, Gessius in his turn has to defend the Platonist thesis that God is always creating, even in the present moment.

67. The notion of a cause 'holding together' (*sunekhein*) separated things has considerable significance in Neoplatonic metaphysics. Proclus, in his *Elements of Theology*, ascribes this function chiefly to the Good, which is said to preserve and 'hold together' each thing by bestowing unity on it (*ET* 13).

68. Cf. Plato *Tim*. 30A: '[god] brought [the universe] from a state of disorder to one of order, because he believed that order was in every way better than disorder' (tr. D. Zeyl).

69. A back reference to the discussion from ll. 369-460.

70. The language here echoes a passage from Plato's *Timaeus* (28B), where being visible, tangible and having a body are singled out as the characteristics of perceptible things.

71. The pagan philosopher Theophrastus (in Aeneas of Gaza's *Theophrastus* 45.21ff.) uses the analogy of a shadow and the universe; his Christian opponent tries to refute him with the same words that we find quoted in Zacharias (Zacharias *Ammonius* ll. 542-5 and Aeneas *Theophrastus* 46,3-5). See also Preface, pp. xvi-xvii, for Platonist uses of the shadow analogy. The way in which Gessius introduces the analogy ('they say', Greek *phasi*) does not suggest that he has a specific author in mind.

72. 'By-product' here translates *parakolouthêma* (lit. 'that which follows along'), a term that is used frequently by Neoplatonic writers from Plotinus onwards to describe incidental causation. The idea that shadows are *parakolouthêmata* of bodies can also be found in Iamblichus *Comm. Math.* 8 (32.23 Festa).

73. 'Came to exist alongside' translates *parhupestê*, a pregnant verb that is cognate with the notion of a *parhupostasis*, a by-product with no independent existence and which is thus parasitic on a higher cause.

74. *Ek tautomatou*; see n. 90 below.

75. For the idea of a 'concomitant' cause (*sunaitios*), see e.g. Plato *Tim.* 46D.

76. This is Aeneas of Gaza, from whose dialogue *Theophrastus* (46,3) the quotation is taken. See n. 71 above.

77. Zacharias' use of the fairly unusual Greek verb *periarthrein* ('to consider more widely') may owe something to pseudo-Plato *Axiochus* 370D, where it also occurs.

78. This formulation closely resembles Proclus'. In his treatise *On the Eternity of the World* preserved in Philoponus' refutation of it, Proclus writes that 'time is a measure of the motion of heaven, as eternity is a measure of the living being itself' (Philoponus *De aet. mun. contr. Pr.* 103.19-20, translated by M. Share, *Philoponus: Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 1-5*, London 2004, p. 278). Proclus argues that 'if time exists together with the heaven and the heaven together with time, there is no heaven if there is no time nor any time if there is no heaven' (tr. M. Share), evidently a close parallel with Gessius' challenge here.

79. Cf. Aristotle *Cat.* 7B15ff.

80. For a very similar line of argument, see Proclus *in Tim.* 3.50.2-4 Diehl.

81. *Tim.* 38B.

82. 'Premise' here translates *lêmmation*, which technically is a diminutive of *lêmma*, but indistinguishable in meaning from it in Zacharias' time (cf. e.g. *Doctrina Patrum* 263.1).

83. Gessius' Christian opponent is not above using a good Platonic definition of time; cf. Plat. *Tim.* 37D-E.

84. See the previous discussion with Ammonius, ll. 102ff.

85. The sense of *kalon ti* here is somewhat difficult to pin down; Colonna translates it with 'being of a higher nature', but that may be interpreting the word too much. For the purposes of the argument, no more need to be implied here than that individual human beings are in some sense 'beautiful' or 'fine' or even 'noble', whatever that may turn out to be in detail.

86. Gessius' example may be a philosophical adaptation of Herodotus' account of the Persian Immortals at *Hist.* 7.83.

87. Lit. 'embarking on a second sailing', a well-known proverbial expression to describe settling for a second best course of action. It occurs most famously at Plato *Phd.* 99D.

88. I am changing Colonna's punctuation to read a colon after *ex' aïdiou* and a comma after *auton* in l. 651. This seems to be a simpler of way of getting the required sense than assuming that *ex apeirou* is tacitly understood to follow *mê demiourgôn auton*, and that *proteron* is to be understood to follow *epoei*.

89. This is a dense stretch of argument. The two main points being established here are this: (i) that God will not be a creator for all *future* time, since he will eventually turn the universe into something else entirely; and (ii) God will not have been a craftsman for all *past* time, because he has created other things before, namely the intelligible world. Together, these two points are designed to prove that the universe need not be co-eternal with its creator, by demonstrating that God can begin and stop being a creator.

90. 'Spontaneity' translates *to automaton* here; it could be rendered as 'chance' or 'randomness' also. Aristotle discusses the difference between *to automaton* and cases of 'luck' (*tukhê*), which involve human agents capable of good fortune and action, at some length at *Phys*. 2.4-6.

91. Cf. Isaiah 65:17 in LXX.

92. Basil *Hex*. I.3.30-32 Giet.

93. Cf. e.g. Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.141 (46J Long/Sedley) for this argument.

94. A nod towards Plato, who uses the phrase 'geometrical necessities' at *Rep*. 5.458D, though in an entirely different context.

95. On Zacharias' use of the literal interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus*, against the non-literalist Neoplatonists of his time, see also Introduction, p. 97.

96. Inserting *mê* before *ethelontos*, as in Plato *Tim*. 41B.

97. A turn of phrase borrowed from Plato *Phdr*. 243D.

98. Cf. Plato *Tim*. 42E, where Plato's creator-god (the Demiurge) is said to abide 'in his own particular nature' after declaring his commands to the younger gods.

99. Cf. *Tim*. 32B.

100. Cf. Basil *Hex*. 1.7.22-3 Giet, who uses the same examples of the shadow and the source of light.

101. This sentence is another near quotation of Aeneas of Gaza; cf. *Theophr*. 46,2-3.

102. The term *sunaïdios* ('co-eternal') is frequently used in Christian writers; *sunanarkhos* ('also without beginning'), on the other hand, seems to occur only in Zacharias. For discussion of the idea that God's will is beginningless, see Preface, p. xiii. The same problem comes up again in the discussion with Ammonius at ll. 1078-83.

103. Lines 796-99 are a near quotation of Aeneas of Gaza *Theophr*. 37,11-14.

104. Lines 799-801 are a near quotation of Aeneas of Gaza *Theophr*. 36,14-15.

105. Aeneas refers to the Pythagorean practice of silence also, at *Theophr*. 47,16.

106. For discussion of this objection, see Preface, pp. xiv-xv.

107. Lit. 'to which you are a jar', a reference to *Gorg*. 493A, where an anonymous Sicilian or Italian is reported to have likened the impressionable and persuadable (irrational) part of the soul to a 'jar'. The use of the Greek word for 'jar' (*pithos*) plays on the similarity with the word for 'being persuaded' (*peithesthai*).

108. This is not a direct quotation from the *Timaeus*, but has entered the doxography as Plato's view; cf. e.g. Stobaeus *Anth*. 1.11.3.8-9.

109. Note that this critique chooses to disregard a long tradition of non-literal interpretation of the *Timaeus* which goes back to the Old Academy.

110. For a similar argument, see Basil *Hex*. 2.2.9-10 Giet.

111. Cf. Plato *Tim*. 52b.

112. 'On a hypothesis': i.e. as if the creation of the world involved some temporal sequence and a real separation of matter from the Creator, when in fact this is not the case. This was the explanation originally given by Speusippus and Xenocrates (cf. *Schol. in Ar. De caelo*, 279b32ff.). The phrase 'for the sake of instruction' (*didaskalias kharin*) is used by the Platonist Tarus to explain Plato's method in the *Timaeus*; he is quoted by Philoponus at *De aet. mund. contr. Pr*. 187.26 Rabe.

113. A common example for a mental construct; cf. Aristotle *An. Pr*. 1.38, 49a22-4, *An. Post*. 2.7 92b4-8.

114. Reading *teleiotatôi* in place of *teleiôi*, in light of *teleiotaton* in l. 898.

115. *Hex*. 1.3.10-11 Giet. The point of Basil's analogy is that although the

heavens move with a circular movement and may thus appear beginningless, they must have a beginning even if we do not know it, just as any drawn circle does. It is curious that the reference to *movement* has completely dropped out in Zacharias' version of the circle analogy, rendering it much weaker. 'Gessius' is attempting to directly infer that the universe is beginningless and eternal from its spherical shape, which is a hopeless endeavour. Cf. *Tim*. 34A, and Proclus' thirteenth argument for the eternity of the world, where the spherical shape is used to infer to circular motion, and then to eternity, as preserved in Philoponus (*De aet. mun. contr. Pr*. 477.14-479.10 Rabe). See also K. Verrycken, 'La métaphysique d'Ammonius chez Zacharie de Mytilène', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 85 (2001): 257.

116. There is a lacuna here. I have translated *ouden tou aphthartou* <…> *grammata legetai* as if they belonged together; this may well not be the case.

117. This may be inspired by Plato *Tim*. 22A-B.

118. We have here the first of four arguments attributed to Theophrastus (who himself reports these arguments to refute them) by Philo of Alexandria *De Aet.* 117. The point is this: if the world was eternal, over infinite time all surface irregularities would have been levelled, and so 'all hollows been filled in' (Philo *De Aet*. 118-19).

119. This is the second argument by Theophrastus: the sea level has been observed to decrease in the past, hence over an infinite period of time the sea would have fully retreated, 'and the briny water of the sea been mastered' as Zacharias has it. Cf. Philo *De Aet.* 120-3.

120. The same argument is also found in Theophrastus, his third (Philo *De Aet*. 124).

121. Here, the thought seems to be that if one were to count back the generations of men and trace back the progress of the arts through a catalogue of inventions such as the one in Eusebius *PE* 10.6.8, one would conclude that the earth's age must have been young indeed, which jars with the notion of its eternity. Philo ridicules this argument at *De Aet*. 145-6.

122. K. Verrycken rightly points out that reading *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.4, 1096a11-17 may have provoked the change of topic from 'ethical virtues' to the theory of forms. See his 'La métaphysique d'Ammonius chez Zacharie de Mytilène', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 85 (2001): 251.

123. Cf. Aristotle *An. Post.* 83a32-3.

124. Zacharias' report contains some measure of truth: a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* by Asclepius of Tralles said to come 'from the oral teaching of Ammonius' includes an interesting discussion of how Plato's and Aristotle's disagreement over the forms is to be understood. Cf. *in Met*. 69.22ff. Hayduck, where Asclepius says that Aristotle is not really at odds with Plato but merely combats a particular misinterpretation of the theory of forms.

125. The idea that God is not only the formal but also the 'productive' or efficient cause of the universe is also attributed to Ammonius by Simplicius *in De cael*. 271.20 Heiberg. It was apparently the subject of an independent treatise by Ammonius, summarised by Simplicius at *in Phys*. 1361.11-1363.13 Diels. For an account of Ammonius' position, see R. Sorabji, 'Infinite Power Impressed: The Transformation of Aristotle's Physics and Theology', in J. Henry and S. Hutton (eds), *New Perspectives in Renaissance Thought: Essays in Memory of Charles B. Schmitt*, London 1990.

126. Reading *oukh hêi ho men poiei*, *to de ginetai*, as suggested to me by Donald Russell.

127. See above, n. 13.

128. If the Greek word *authis* here is to mean 'again', as it commonly does, the implication would be that Ammonius' audience included many lapsed Christians. Note, however, that *authis* may mean no more than 'from this time onwards'; cf. LSJ II.3.

129. This form of address is used by Socrates in the *Gorgias* to Polus and to Callicles (e.g. at 470A), and has marked ironic overtones in Plato's dialogue.

130. On the ambiguity of *ta hama* (here translated with 'things existing together') between causal and temporal co-existence, see Preface, pp. xv-xvi.

131. Read *hê* instead of *kai*.

132. This seems likely to be a Christological reference. The claim that the Father and the Son are of the same essence was famously accepted by the Council of Nicaea in 325 AD.

133. A form of address also used by Socrates addressing Callicles at *Gorg*. 489D.

134. For a slightly different translation of this passage (ll. 1037-50) with further discussion, see Preface, pp. xix-xx.

135. Cf. *Prot*. 434B, where the same expression occurs.

136. Inserting *mê* after *ton*, as required by the sense (the reference is to God). I am grateful to Donald Russell for this suggestion.

137. The distinction between an internal *logos* and a *logos* uttered in speech is originally Stoic (see now K. Hülser, *Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker II*, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1987, frr. 528-35), and plays an important role in Philo's biblical exegesis and Patristic theology.

138. A relatively rare word found also in pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite *De div. nom*. 129.1.

139. Zacharias seems to compose his quotation from several passages by Gregory of Nazianzus. The phrase 'bringer-forth (*proboleus*) of the Spirit' appears in his *Or*. 23, 1160.14 Migne (*PG* vol. 35); *TLG* line numbering); the expression 'contemplated in the Son and the Spirit' e.g. at *Or*. 2, 432.1, and frequently elsewhere. Other borrowings from Gregory, chiefly from orations 25 and 26, are indicated in Colonna's *apparatus criticus*.

140. Perhaps inspired by Gregory of Nazianzus, *Or*. 25, 1120.45-1221.1, a very close parallel to Zacharias here.

141. As Colonna rightly notes, the description of Ammonius' embarrassment here may owe something to the portrayal of Thrasymachus at *Rep*. 1.337A. Zacharias may deliberately have cast Ammonius in the light of this rather brash and unphilosophical Platonic character, expecting his educated readers to pick up the reference.

142. 'B' is referring back to ll. 649-67. God is said to have created the intelligible world before the sensible world at l. 650; idleness is denied of him in ll. 651-2. The claim that he is the Creator from himself first occurs at ll. 510-11.

143. An echo of Theodorus' praise of young Theaetetus in Plato's dialogue *Theatetus* (144A).

144. A reference back to the discussion from ll. 649-67. The idea of a transformation which the world will undergo at the end of time is first introduced at ll. 656-7.

145. For the same problem, see Aeneas of Gaza *Theophr*. 48,19.

146. E. Gallicet, 'La risurrezione dei morti in Enea di Gaza e in Zacaria Scolastico', *Augustianum* 18 (1978): 278 n. 15 argues that Zacharias is here silently correcting a very similar passage in Aeneas of Gaza's *Theophrastus* (49,7), where envy is said to be removed from 'the Good', not 'the only Good and the Good itself'. See also Introduction, p. 97.

147. i.e. the cosmos.

148. See Homer *Il*. 17.218, quoted by Plato at *Lys*. 214A.

149. Reading *athanatôs* in place of *athanata*.

150. Cf. Plato *Symp*. 195B.

151. Cf. Plato *Gorg*. 523A.

152. An echo of Plato *Tim*. 17A.

153. Following Colonna's suggestion and taking *logos* here as 'a verse' from the Bible, i.e. Scripture, rather than rendering the word as 'reason' or 'argument', as is more common. Cf. Gen. 1:26-7 (LXX).

154. Cf. *Hex*. 1.3 Giet.

155. This refers to the example of the shadow; see above, n. 17.

156. Cf. Aeschylus *Myrm*. fr. 139 Nauck. Feathers here stand for feathered arrows.

157. See l. 996 above, where Ammonius is said to have become 'more speechless than fish and stones' at the end of his first discussion with the Christian spokesman.

158. The idea that the universe can be said to have come to be in the sense that it can be notionally (*epinoiai*) separated from its creator plays an important role in the eternalist reading of the *Timaeus*. See the texts collected in R. Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators: A Sourcebook*, vol. 2: *Physics*, London 2004, 8(b), pp. 162-4. See also n. 112 above.

159. 'After the creation of things that exist': i.e. after the creation of the intelligible world. One would have expected *noêtôn* in place of *ontôn*, for clarity, as K. Verrycken points out ('The Creation of the World according to Zacharias of Mytilene', *Dionysius* 27 (2009): 110), but the two terms can of course be used in much the same sense, if 'what exists' is to mean 'what really exists'.

160. This is Aeneas of Gaza; cf. *Theophr*. 43,19.

161. Read *kataphainêtai* in place of *kataphainetai* in l. 1343, governed by *hôs an* in l. 1339.

162. Gregory of Nazianzus *Or*. 7.7.2 Boulenger.

163. Cf. *Protr*. 1.6.2.4-5 Mondésert.

164. i.e. sheep, proverbially stupid animals in ancient Greek literature.

165. Read perhaps *nemes*(*a*)*ô* in place of *nemesêsô*. A present sense of the verb is in any case required.

166. The reference to scratching is probably borrowed from *Gorg*. 494C, where Socrates is provoking Callicles.

167. For discussion of this problem, see Preface, pp. ix-xi. Aeneas discusses the same problem at some length in his *Theophrastus*, 54,20-68,5.

168. Sap. Sol. 1:7.

169. Ps. 94:4.

170. Read *dialuein* before *dialelumena*.

171. Lit. 'the countless sweats of virtue', with 'sweats' (*hidrôta*) standing in place of 'toils'.

172. An allusion to Plato *Phdr*. 247B.

173. Cf. Plato *Phd*. 77E.

174. Following Colonna's suggestion and supplying *potamous* after *Puriphlegethontas*.

175. At *Phd*. 113B-C.

176. Daniel 7:10.

177. Isaiah 66:24.

178. Matthew 5:22; Mark 9:43; 9:47.

179. Isaiah 54:4; Daniel 12:2.

180. Matthew 25:46.

181. Probably a reference to Satan's prison at Revelation 20:7.

182. The ending of the dialogue closely resembles that of Aeneas of Gaza's *Theophrastus* (cf. 68,21), once again drawing its inspiration from the ending of Plato's *Phaedrus*.

English-Greek Glossary

absence of a ruler: *anarkhia*
abundance: *periousia*
act like the giants, to: *gigantan*
action: *ergon*
activity: *energeia*
actual fact: *pragma*
actuality: *energeia*
admirable: *axiagastos*
advocate: *skholastikos*
affected, to be: *paskhein*
affection: *pathos*
affliction: *pathêma*
alteration: *alloiôsis*
always: *aei*
always existing, with regard to: *kata to aei einai*
animal: *zôion*
antiquity: *arkhaiotês*
appendage: *epholkion*
architect: *oikodomos*, *tekhnitês*
argument: *logos*
arrogance: *huperêphania*
art: *tekhnê*
art of an embellisher, the: *kommôtikê tekhnê*
ass: *onos*
at the same time: *hama*

bastard reasoning: *nothos logismos*
battle at night time: *nuktomakhia*
beautiful: *kalos*
beauty: *kallonê, to kallos*
beginning: *arkhê*
beginning, also without: *sunanarkhos*
beginning, from the: *ex' arkhês, tên arkhên*
beginning, has no: *anarkhos*
beginning, in the: *tên arkhên*
beginning, without a: *anarkhos*
beginning in time: *khronikê arkhê*
beginning of time, since the: *ap' arkhês khronou*
being, bringing into: *ousiôsis*
benefactor: *euergetês*
benefactor, act as a: *euergetein*
beneficence: *euergesia*
beneficence, to receive: *euergeisthai*
benefit, for the: *ep' euergesiai*
benefits: *hai euergesiai*
blame, to: *kataitiasthai*
blasphemy: *blasphêmia*
blessed: *makarios*
bodily nature: *sômatikê phusis*
body: *sôma*
bond: *desmos*
break up: *luein*
brief moment, in a: *akariaiai rhopê*
brilliance: *lampêdôn*
brine: *halmuros*
bring forth: *proballein*
bring into being, to: *paragein pros genesin*
briny water: *to halmuron*
builder: *oikodomikos, oikodomos*
building, of: *oikodomikos*
by-product: *parakolouthêma*

camel: *kamêlos*
captive: *desmôtês*
carpenter: *tektôn, tektonikos*
carpentry, of: *tektonikos*
cause: *aitia, aitios, to aition*
cause of existence: *hupostatikê aitia*
caused, be: *aitiatos*
chain: *seira*
change: *metabolê*
change, to: *enallattein, metharmottein*
change of mind: *metameleia*
change one's will, to: *metabouleuesthai*
changeless: *atreptos*
changelessly: *atreptôs*
changelessness: *atrepsia*
characteristic: *kharaktêristikos*
Christian: *khristianos*
Christianity: *khristianismos*
circle: *kuklos*

circular rotation: *peridinêsis*
co-eternal: *sunaïdios*
come to be, has: *genêtos*
come to be, has not: *agenêtos*
come to be, to: *gignesthai*
come to be, what has: *ta gigonota*
come to be alongside, to: *parhuphistanai*
come to be as a by-product, to: *parakolouthein*
come to life again, to: *anabiôskesthai, anabioun*
coming into being: *genesis*
command: *prostagma*
commander: *stratêgos, taxiarkhos*
common man: *idiôtês*
comparison: *sugkrisis*
compassion: *oiktos*
compelling: *anagkastikos*
compelling demonstration: *apodeiktikai, apodeiktikê anagkê*
competition: *agôn*
completion, as a: *sumplêrôtikos*
composite: *sunthetos*
composition: *sunthesis, sustasis*
concomitant cause: *sunaitios*
concord: *euharmostia, sumphônia, sumpnoia*
condemn, to: *katadikazein*
conflict: *makhê, stasis*
conflict, free of: *astasiastos*
consequence: *akolouthia*
constitution: *politeia*
construct, to: *huphainein*
contemplate: *theôrein*
contemplation: *theôria*
contempt: *kataphronêsis*
contempt (for the law): *huperopsia nomou*
contentious manner, in a: *eristikôs*
cosmos: *kosmos*
counter-argument: *antithesis*
craftsman: *dêmiourgos, tekhnitês*
create, to: *dêmiourgein, ktizein*
created by, to be: *gignesthai* + *pros* + gen.
created thing: *ktisma*
creation (= created thing): *dêmiourgêma*
creation: *dêmiourgia, ktisis, poiêsis*
creative: *dêmiourgikos*
creative power: *dêmiourgikê dunamis*
(creative) principles: (*dêmiourgikoi*) *logoi*
creator: *dêmiourgos, genesiourgos*
creature: *plasma*
crowd of gods, a: *dêmos theôn*
cutting: *tomê*

damage: *zêmia*
damage, to: *blaptein*
death: *thanatos*
deified: *theoumenos*
deliberate choice: *prohairesis*
deliberate choice, without: *aprohairetos*
democracy: *dêmokratia*
demolish, to: *anaskeuazein*
demon: *daimôn*
demonstration: *apodeixis*
demonstrative: *apodeiktikos*
depend, to: *artasthai*
desire: *prothumia*
destroy, to: *luein*
destruction: *anairesis, phthora*
dialectical manner, in a more: *sullogistikoteros*
dialogue: *sunousia*
die, to: *teleutan*
dilemma: *peridexios*
discussion: *sunousia*
disorder: *akosmia, ataktos, ataxia, phurmos*
disorderly, the: *to atakton*
disregard: *aphrontistia*
dissolution: *dialusis, lusis*
dissolve, to: *dialuein*
distributor: *dianomeus*
divine chorus: *khoros theios*
Divine Spirit: *pneuma theion*
divinity: *theologia, theotês*
doctor: *iatros*
doctrine: *doxarion, doxasma*
dream up, to: *oneirôttein*
drop of liquid: *rhanis hugrotêtos*
duration: *aiôn*
dwelling-place: *oikêtêrion*

eclipse: *ekleipsis*
edifice: *oikodomia*
effect: *to aitiaton*
elements: *ta stoikheia*

emanation, by: *ekporeutikôs*
emptying: *kenôsis*
end: *sumperasma, teleutê, telos*
end, has no: *ateleutêtos*
end, without a: *apaustos*
end one's life, to: *teleutan ton bion*
endow, to: *metapiskhesthai*
enormous suffering that brought salvation, the: *ta sôtêria kai huperphuê pathêmata*
equal in honour: *homotimos*
eristic: *eristikos*
error: *plêmmeleia*
essence, in: *enhupostatos*
eternal: *aei, aïdios*
eternal existence: *to aei einai*
eternity: *aiôn*
eternity, for: *aei*
eternity, from: *ex aïdiou*
evil (adj.): *kakos*
evil (n.): *kakê, to kakon, kakia*
example: *paradeigma*
exercise: *energeia*
exist, to: (mid.) *huphistanai, huparkhein*
existence: *huparxis, sustasis*
existence, to bring into: *huphistanai*
experience: *peira*
expertise: *tekhnê*
explanation: *aitia, anaptuxis*
extended in three dimensions: *trikhêi diastatos*
eyes of reason: *ommata tês dianoias*

fable: *muthos*
fabrication: *anaplasma*
faith: *eusebeia, pistis*
false: *pseudês*
false, the: *to pseudos*
false pretension: *alazoneia*
fashioned creature: *plasma*
fellow-slave: *doulos, homodoulos*
figure, without: *askhêmatistos*
fitting: *epitêdeios*
fixed: *aphuktos*
follow, to: *parakolouthein*
follow along, to: *parakolouthein, xunepesthai*
font: *pêgê*
for its existence: *pros to huphistanai*
foreign: *allotrios*
form: *eidos, idea*
form, to: *skhêmatizein*
form, without: *aneideos*
formless: *aneideos*
formlessness: *amorphia*
form-making power: *eidopoios dunamis*
forms (Platonic): *ideai*
free: *aphetos, eleutheros*
free from: *eleutheros* + gen.
free of struggle: *amakhêtos*
free of will: *autexousios*
freedom: *eleutheria*
freedom from sin: *anharmatêsia*
freedom of will: *to autexousion*
futile: *mataioponos*

generation: *genesis, gennêsis*
generation, by way of: *gennêtikôs*
geometrical: *geômetrikos*
give light, to: *phôtizein*
given a specific form: *eskhêmatismenos*
go around, to: *peripolein*
goat-stag: *tragelaphos*
god: *theos*
godless: *atheos*
good: *agathos*
good condition: *euhexia*
good god, the: *ho agathos*
good life, the: *euzôia*
goodness: *agathotês*
grace: *kharis*
greatness: *megethos*

habit: *hexis*
happiness: *eudaimonia*
harm: *lôbê*
harmonious: *emmelês*
harmony: *harmonia*
heal, to: *hugiazein*
healing, of: *iatrikos*
health: *hugeia*
heaven: *ouranos*
highly prized: *perimakhêtos*
hold together, to: *sugkratein, sunekhein*
holiness: *hagiotês*
hollows (of the earth): *koila* (*tês gês*)
Holy Spirit: *pneuma hagion*
honour: *axia*
host: *estiatôr*

human (adj.): *anthrôpeios, anthrôpinos*
human (n.): *anthrôpos*
human beings: *anthrôpos*
humidity: *hugrotês*
hypostasis: *hupostasis*
hypothesis, on a: *en hupothesei*

idle: *en argiai*
idleness: *argia*
ignorance: *agnoia*
ignorant: *anoêtos*
illuminate, to: *katalampein*
image: *eidôlon, eikôn*
imitation: *mimêsis*
immaterial: *ahulos*
immeasurable: *ametrêtos*
immortal: *athanatos*
immortal, become: *apathanizein*
immortal, make: *apathanizein*
immortality: *athanasia*
imperfect: *atelês*
imperfection: *to ateles*
imperishability: *aphtharsia*
imperishable: *aphthartos*
impiety: *asebeia*
impression: *tupos*
in need of nothing: *anendeês*
in one form: *henoeidôs*
in regard to existing together: *kata to hama einai*
inanimate: *apsukhos*
incoherence: *lêros*
incomposite: *asunthetos*
incorporeal: *asômatos*
independent: *autonomos*
indestructible: *anôlethros*
indissoluble: *adialutos*
individual men: *anthrôpoi kata meros*
inescapable: *aphuktos*
inhabit, to: *diaitan*
initiated, not: *atelestos*
injustice, to do: *adikein*
inquiry: *zêtêsis*
instruction: *didaskalia*
instruments: *ta organa*
insubstantial: *anhupostatos*
intangible: *anaphês*
intellectual: *noeros*
intellectual natures: *noerai phuseis*
intellectual substance (soul): *noera ousia*
intelligible: *noêtos*
intelligibles: *ta noêta*
intemperance: *akolasia*
interpret, to: *exêgeisthai*
interpreter: *exêgêtês, mustagôgos*
invent: *anaplattein*
invisible: *ahoratos*
involuntary: *aboulêtos, akousios*
involved in the affairs of the city: *politikos*
irrational impulse: *alogos hormê*
irrationality: *alogia*

jealousy: *phthonos*

king: *basileus*
king, of the: *basilikos*
king, without: *abasileutos*
king of all: *basileus pantôn*
kingdom (above): *basileia* (*anô*)
kinship: *sungeneia*

lack of matter: *endeia tês hulês*
lamp: *lukhnos*
law: *nomos*
lawgiver: *nomothetês*
lecture (on natural philosophy): *akroasis* (*phusikê*)
liable to be changed: *treptos*
lift up, to: *anabibazein*
light: *phôs*
like: *homoios*
limit: *horos, perigraphê*
limitation: *perihorismos*
limited: *perigraptos*
live before, to: *probioun*
living being: *zôion*
love of man: *philanthrôpia*

magnitude, without: *amegethês*
make a change, to: *metapoiein*
make a god, to: *theologein*
make equal, to: *exisoun*
make into god, to: *theologein*
make up: *anaplattein*
make up a fable: *muthoplastein*
maker: *poiêtês*
making (n.): *to poiêtikon, poiêsis*
male: *anthrôpinos, thoros*

man: *anthrôpos*
mark: *gnôrisma*
mass: *ogkos*
master: *despotês*
master, without: *adespotos*
mastery: *despoteia*
material: *hulê*
material body: *hulikon sôma*
matter: *hulê*
measure: *metron*
medical teacher: *iatrosophistês*
mixture: *krasis, mixis, sunanakrasis*
moisture: *hugrotês*
monad: *henas, monas*
monarchy: *monarkhia*
monkey: *pithêkos*
moon: *selênê*
mortal: *thnêtos*
most productive nature: *gonimôtatê phusis*
motion: *kinêsis, phora*
mould, to: *metaplattein*
movement: *kinêma*
musician: *mousikos*

name: *onoma*
narrative: *logos*
nature: *ousia, pragma, phusis*
nature, by: *phusei*
necessity: *anagkê, anagkai*
neglect: *oligôria*
neglect, to: *oligôrein*
noisy throng: *homados*
non-deliberate: *aprohairetos*
non-existent: *anhuparktos*
nonsense: *adoleskhia*
notionally: *epinoiai, en*
nurse: *tithênê*
nurture oneself, to: *trephesthai*

on the assumption that all things exist together: *kata to hama einai ta panta*
one: *henas*
one in form: *henoeidôs*
opinion: *doxa, doxasma*
opposites: *ta enantia*
order: *diakosmêsis, harmonia, taxis*
orderly: *enharmonios*
orderly sequence: *akolouthia*
out-flowing: *rheusis*

pagan: *hellênikos*
paganism: *hellênismos*
pair of compasses, with a: *kentrôi kai diastêmati*
part: *meros, moira*
parts, without: *amerês*
peaceful: *eirênaios*
perceptible: *aisthêtos*
perception, without: *anaisthêtos*
perfect: *teleios*
perfection: *to teleiôtikon*
perish, to: *phtheiresthai*
perishable: *phthartos*
perpetual: *diênekês*
perpetually: *diênekôs*
philosopher: *philosophos*
philosophy: *philosophia*
phrase: *rhêma*
piece: *moira, tmêma*
plant seeds, to: *egkataspeirein*
plants: *phuta*
pleasure: *hêdonê*
poet: *poiêtês*
position: *taxis*
power: *dunamis*
power of foreknowledge: *prognôstikê dunamis*
power of transformation: *alloiôtikê dunamis*
powerless: *adunatos*
practise the law, to: *nomizein*
pre-eminence: *to proukhon*
pre-eminent, to be: *proekhein*
premises: *lêmmation*
prerogative: *axiôma*
present at the same time: *homokhronos*
pretentious: *alazôn*
principle: *arkhê*
prison: *desmôtêrion*
privilege: *proedria*
procession, by: *prodikôs*
product: *poiêma*
productive cause: *poiêtikê aitia*
proof: *apodeixis*
proportion: *analogia, protasis, sumpnoia*
providence: *pronoia*
provider: *khorêgos*
pseudo-argument: *paralogismos*
punishment: *tisis*

pure: *katharos*
purpose: *boulêsis*
pursue an argument, to: *philosophein*
put down, to: *kataluein*
put on, to: *metapiskhesthai*
putrefaction: *sêpsis*
puzzle: *aporêma, aporia*

quality: *poiotês*
quantity, without: *aposos*

rational and intellectual substances: *logikai kai noerai ousiai*
rational animal: *logikon zôion*
reason: *aitia, logos*
reason subtly, to: *katakompseuesthai*
reasoning: *logismos*
receptacle: *dexamenê*
reincarnation: *metensômatôsis*
relation: *skhesis*
relationship: *sungeneia*
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